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CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE
CHALLENGE OF FAMILY TIES
Dan Markel*
Jennifer M. Collins**
Ethan J. Leib***
This article asks two basic questions: when does, and when
should, the state use the criminal justice apparatus to accommodate
family ties, responsibilities, and interests? We address these questions
by first revealing a variety of laws that together form a string of "fam-
ily ties benefits" pervading the criminal justice system. Notwithstand-
ing our recognition of the important role family plays in securing the
conditions for human flourishing, we then explain the basis for erect-
ing a "Spartan" presumption against these family ties benefits within
a criminal justice system. We delineate the scope and rationale for the
presumption and under what circumstances it might be overcome.
When the presumption is overcome, we urge distributing the benefit
on terms that are neutral to family status, and instead focus on func-
tions served by established relationships of care-giving responsibility.
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INTRODUCTION
Few people envied David Kaczynski. In 1996, he found some old
writings by his brother Ted that were similar in tone and content to a
manifesto submitted to newspapers in 1995 by a feared terrorist, known
to law enforcement agents as the Unabomber. David was then faced
with an agonizing choice about whether to disclose his discovery to fed-
eral investigators. He ultimately revealed Ted's name, believing that he
had assurances from federal authorities that they would not pursue the
death penalty against his brother, whom David believed to be mentally
ill. When Attorney General Janet Reno decided, nonetheless, to pursue
a capital case, David was devastated.' Later, Ted Kaczynski pled guilty
to charges that carried a life sentence.2 Subsequently, David Kaczynski
became an anti-death penalty advocate.3
David Kaczynski is perhaps the best-known example in recent years
of a family member who provided law enforcement officials with the
critical information that led to the arrest of a loved one.4 Unsurprisingly,
many family members confronted with a dilemma like David Kaczynski's
make an entirely different choice.
1. See David Johnston & Janny Scott, Prisoner of Rage: The Tortured Genius of Theodore Kac-
zynski, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1996, at 1; Serge F. Kavaleski, His Brother's Keeper, WASH. POST, July 21,
2001, at W10.
2. See David W. Chen, The Unabomber Case: The Survivors; Sadness Now Mixes with Relief
and Regret, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1996, at A18.
3. See David Kaczynski, Editorial, Death Penalty Turnaround, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2005, at
B13.
4. Indeed, recently, the Suffolk County District Attorney asked parents in the community to
turn in their children whom they knew to be involved in crime. See John R. Ellement, Man Tells Po-
lice His Son Shot Teen-In Self-Defense, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 19,2006, at B7 (quoting Suffolk District
Attorney Daniel F. Conley as saying, "I would urge parents, though it is difficult, to turn in their chil-
dren if they have in fact committed a violent crime"); cf. Kevin Rothstein & Jessica Fargen, Kin Turn
in Suspect for School Shooting, BOSTON HERALD, Dec. 6, 2005, at 6 ('"They definitely did the right
thing. The police can't handle the situation alone,' Police Commissioner Kathleen O'Toole said of the
arrest. 'It takes community and it takes responsibility."').
No. 41 1149
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Consider the Sheinbein family, for example. In 1997, a high school
senior named Samuel Sheinbein was charged with murder after police
found the burned and dismembered body of an acquaintance in the ga-
rage of a vacant house in Maryland.5 But Sheinbein was never brought
to trial in Maryland because he fled to Israel within days of the murder,
and Israel subsequently refused to extradite him.6
So how was a seventeen-year-old able to get to Israel so quickly?
Prosecutors alleged that after learning that his son was a murder suspect,
Samuel's father, Sol Sheinbein, brought Samuel, who was then hiding in
New York, his passport, some clothing, and a ticket to Israel. Sol also
drove his son to the airport,7 and then flew to Israel a few days after his
son, where he continues to live and work.8 Prosecutors in Maryland sub-
sequently filed a misdemeanor charge against him for obstructing a po-
lice investigation. But because of the nature of the charge and his status
as an Israeli citizen, Sol could not be extradited either.9
After Samuel Sheinbein pled guilty before an Israeli court and was
sentenced to spend twenty-four years in prison,"° Sol gave his first inter-
view to an Israeli newspaper. In defending his actions, Sol, a practicing
lawyer, stated: "I did some simple soul-searching and I came to the con-
clusion that with all due respect to the law, I am first of all a father and
only after that a citizen."11  Samuel Sheinbein's mother, in an earlier
statement, claimed that "any parents would go and would do what we are
doing.""l
5. See Manuel Perez-Rivas & Maria Good, Md. Teen Sought in Dismemberment Slaying; War-
rant Charges Student with Murder After Burned Body is Found in Vacant House, WASH. POST, Sept.
23, 1997, at D1.
6. See Barton Gellman & Steve Vogel, Israel Bars Return of Md. Teen, May Hold Murder Trial
There; Father, Brother Accused of Helping Aspen Hill Youth Flee, WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 1997, at Al.
Because Samuel's father had been born in Israel, the Israeli authorities considered Samuel to be an
Israeli citizen. See id. Samuel's lawyer admitted that her client had deliberately fled to Israel because
he preferred to be tried and incarcerated there rather than in the United States. See Montgomery Co.
Seeks U.S. Help in Slaying Suspect's Extradition; Teen Fled to Israel, Wants to be Tried There, BALT.
SUN, Oct. 1, 1997, at 2B.
7. See Katharine Shaver & Lee Hockstader, Charge Filed Against Sol Sheinbein for Helping His
Son Flee to Israel, WASH. POST, Aug. 28, 1998, at Cl. Sheinbein also apparently agreed to tell the po-
lice if he learned of his son's location, but drove to New York to help his son flee to Israel rather than
disclosing that information. See Andrea F. Siegal, Silver Spring Man Fights to Keep Law License; Ac-
cused of Helping Son Flee Md. Murder Charges, BALTIMORE SUN, Sept. 11, 2002, at 2B.
8. See Barton Gellman & Karl Vick, Parents Allege Sheinbein Was Being Robbed, WASH. POST,
Oct. 1, 1997, at Bi; see also Katharine Shaver, Patent Office Bars Wanted Lawyer; Ex-Md. Resident
Helped Son Flee After '97 Killing, WASH. POST, June 24, 2005, at B4 (indicating that Sol Sheinbein
continued to work on behalf of Israeli clients despite issuance of Maryland arrest warrant in 1998 and
disbarment in 2002, filing sixty-four patent applications in the United States since 2001).
9. See Shaver, supra note 8, at B4.
10. See Lee Hockstader & Craig Whitlock, Sheinbein Sentenced to 24 Years: Israeli Court Ac-
cepts Recommendation of Plea Agreement; Teenager Can Apply for Parole at 33, WASH. POST, Oct. 25,
1999, at Bi.
11. Ramit Plushnick-Masti, A Family's Shame: Sheinbein's Parents Describe Their Pain, Baffle-
ment, WASH. POST, Nov. 5, 1999, at B1.
12. Lee Hockstader, Judge Says Israel Can Extradite Sheinbein: Appeal of Ruling May Take
Months, WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 1998, at Al. Remarkably, two judges on Maryland's highest court
1150 [Vol. 2007
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The choices David Kaczynski and Sol Sheinbein made arise virtu-
ally every day in every jurisdiction, where family members have the op-
portunity to facilitate or obstruct enforcement of the criminal law. In-
deed the media recently reported stories about fugitives whose family
members created alibis (including reporting the death of the fugitive) for
them;13 criminals who perpetrated their frauds with the assistance of fam-
ily members;14 and white-collar criminals whose spouses offered testi-
mony or other evidence in exchange for a reduction of the criminal liabil-
ity they themselves faced.15
The conflict between duties as citizens and loyalties as family mem-
bers has long been explored in literature-most prominently in Antigone,
Sophocles's play about a young woman's decision to defy the ruler Creon
in favor of affording her brother Polynices a proper burial. Nonetheless,
it is a relatively uncharted area in legal scholarship.16 This is especially so
with respect to how this classic tension manifests itself within the criminal
justice system.17
The goal of this article is to expose some of the various challenges
the American criminal justice system faces when it decides upon the
proper treatment of family ties and responsibilities. 8 We find that the
agreed. Judge Eldridge, who dissented from the majority's opinion disbarring Sol Sheinbein from the
practice of law in Maryland, suggested that Sheinbein had done no more than "forum shop" for the
most advantageous jurisdiction in which to have his son tried. See Att'y Grievance Comm'n v. Shein-
bein, 812 A.2d 981, 1007-09 (Md. 2002) (Eldridge, J., dissenting, joined by Judge Raker).
13. See, e.g., Long Thought Dead, Suspect Turns up Alive, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Sept. 25,
2005 (describing role that the son of a man, suspected of murder, played in helping the world think his
father was dead); Reported as Dead, a Suspect in 1964 Killings Is Found Alive, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25,
2005, at A26.
14. See Carrie Johnson, Prosecutors Making Fraud Cases Relative: Government Targets Family
of Accused, WASH. POST, Nov. 27, 2003, at Al (discussing the Adelphia case where prosecutors in-
dicted the founder of the company and his two sons); Press Release, Securities and Exchange Com-
mission, SEC Charges Adelphia and Rigas Family with Massive Financial Fraud (July 24, 2002), avail-
able at http:/lwww.sec.govlnewslpressl2002-110.htm.
15. See Kurt Eichenwald, Ex-Chief Financial Officer of Enron and Wife Plead Guilty, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 15, 2004, at C9 (noting that Lea Fastow, Mr. Fastow's wife, who was a former assistant
treasurer at Enron, entered a separate guilty plea to a single tax felony stemming from efforts she
made to hide income that came from one of her husband's secret dealings with an Enron colleague).
16. A few legal scholars have addressed Antigone's plight, e.g., Martha Grace Duncan, "A
Strange Liking": Our Admiration of Criminals, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 17-18; Mark S. Howenstein,
The Tragedy of Law, and the Law of Tragedy in Sophocles' Antigone, 24 LEGAL STUD. F. 493 (2000),
but none, so far as we know, has systematically looked at the intersection of the criminal justice system
and the role of family ties the way this article does.
17. The analogy to Antigone is admittedly imperfect. First, Creon was also Antigone's uncle
and arguably a paternal surrogate because her father Oedipus had been expelled from Thebes. Con-
sequently, one could view the conflict Antigone faces as intrafamilial, as well as a duel between the
family and state. Second, we are more sympathetic to Antigone's plight because the edict she was
flouting was unreasonable and oppressive, and an especial affront to the social norms of Greek times,
which required proper burial for the dead lest their souls wander forever after. See Duncan, supra
note 16, at 18. Thus, Antigone's defiance of Creon may be viewed as rebellion against an unjust law,
whereas Sheinbein's father, for example, cannot fairly protest the justice of the relevant law prohibit-
ing murder.
18. We refrain from taking positions on the definitional makeup of the family on account of our
normative position that the criminal law should generally be drafted in terms that are neutral to the
status of a family member. To the extent recognition of care-giving relationships is warranted, as we
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state does not always impinge upon family members in the course of in-
vestigating or prosecuting all the crimes about which it knows. Indeed,
sometimes the law defers to the decision of family members to prioritize
their duties to family over their duties as citizens. We characterize state
policies that seem to defer to or promote family interests as "family ties
benefits."19
At the core of this article stand two basic questions: when does, and
when should, the state use the criminal justice apparatus to accommo-
date, protect, or benefit family interests? The article answers these de-
scriptive and normative questions separately. Throughout Part I, we
provide an overview of the multiple sites in which family life intersects
with the criminal justice system. We trace these intersections from the
initial decision by family members to engage in criminal activity through
the entirety of the eventual intervention by the criminal justice system.
For example, we focus on efforts by some states to shield from prosecu-
tion family members who harbor fugitives or conceal relevant informa-
tion from law enforcement officials. We also explore how jurisdictions
offer evidentiary privileges and other exemptions affecting evidence-
gathering that constrain the state from intruding into familial relation-
ships. We then turn to matters of pretrial release, sentencing, and prison
administration, where many jurisdictions expressly permit consideration
of family ties when, making decisions in these areas. In closing Part I, we
specify which aspects of these intersections between criminal law and the
family are properly characterized as family ties benefits, and which ones
are likely not.
Part II then takes a normative turn and offers a framework for as-
sessing family ties benefits within the criminal justice system: we assess
the costs that they are likely to exact from society and explore why they
should generally be rejected absent a compelling state interest. We begin
with an appreciation of the important role families play in securing the
conditions for human flourishing.2" We also note the ambivalent rela-
tionship the state has with the family: on the one hand, the state depends
on the family to prepare individuals for their role as citizens; on the other
hand, the state must compete with the family for the loyalty of individual
explain in Part III, the law should instead uses terms that are sensitive to care-giving functions instead
of traditional family-based status.
19. When we say the state extends a benefit because of family ties, we are using that term in an
expansive manner, for what we are really referring to are situations where the state extends a privilege
to (or forbears requiring something from) a family member on account of his being a family member
with someone else. (We tend not to use the word "privilege" to help avoid confusion; evidentiary
privileges are just one example of these family ties benefits.) Some might think these benefits merely
"respect" family ties rather than benefit them, but we think that because these benefits have real con-
sequences (as opposed to simply conveying attitudes of respect), it is better to characterize them as
actual benefits.
20. Here, we develop an account drawing on several sources, including Linda McClain's work.
See, e.g., LINDA C. MCCLAIN, THE PLACE OF FAMILIES: FOSTERING CAPACITY, EQUALITY AND
RESPONSIBILITY (2006); Linda C. McClain, The Domain of Civic Virtue in a Good Society: Families,
Schools and Sex Equality, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1617, 1624-27 (2001).
1152 [Vol. 2007
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members. That discussion serves as a springboard for our critique of
family ties benefits in the realm of criminal justice.21
Part II articulates four distinct normative concerns that may arise
when extending special accommodations to families in the criminal jus-
tice system.22 First, the historical context in which the family's relation-
ship to the criminal law has evolved reveals that many family ties benefits
often served (and in some cases, continue to serve) to perpetuate patriar-
chy, gender hierarchy, or domestic domination. Our second concern is
that accommodations to families might impede the realization of criminal
justice understood as the effective and accurate prosecution of the guilty
and the exoneration of the innocent.23 Our third reservation stems from
the way that family ties preferences can disrupt norms of equality that
should otherwise prevail in an attractive regime of liberal governance.
On this view, criminal investigations and prosecutions should treat citi-
zens' interests with equal concern, and without fear or favor. The exten-
sion of special privileges to persons simply because of their family situa-
tion bears an onus of justification, especially since the policy that extends
such privileges will have a negative and discriminatory effect on those
without family ties-some of whom never made actual choices to avoid
family ties. Fourth, we note that some family ties benefits can have the
undesirable effect of incentivizing more criminal activity-and more suc-
cessful criminal activity at that. To the extent the law effectively signals
messages to the public, some family ties benefits encourage family mem-
bers to keep their criminal enterprises in the family. For example, if sen-
tencing policies serve to create a class of persons that are immune from
incarceration or that receive heavy discounts in their prison terms, then
those persons will be the most sought after to serve in criminal enter-
prises -or they themselves might seek out criminal activity.
We think these four considerations, taken together, suffice to create
a "Spartan presumption" against family ties benefits in the criminal jus-
tice system." Of course, erecting a presumption does not entail eliminat-
21. For examples of scholarship advocating such benefits, see Leslie Acoca & Myrna S. Raeder,
Severing Family Ties: The Plight of Nonviolent Female Offenders and Their Children, 11 STAN. L. &
POL'Y REV. 133 (1999); Myrna S. Raeder, Gender and Sentencing: Single Moms, Battered Women, and
Other Sex-Based Anomalies in the Gender-Free World of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 20 PEPP. L.
REV. 905 (1993) [hereinafter Raeder, Gender and Sentencing]; Milton C. Regan, Jr., Spousal Privilege
and the Meanings of Marriage, 81 VA. L. REV. 2045 (1995).
22. We recognize that not each family ties benefit will implicate all of these concerns. We there-
fore begin with only a presumption against family ties benefits, rather than wholesale hostility.
23. When we use the term inaccuracy, we are using that term to refer to the idea that justice is
not being accurately realized (in terms of effective prosecution of the guilty and exoneration of the
innocent). In this sense, inaccuracy might also indicate an unjustified leniency (or harshness), which is
a matter that can also be seen when considered in the context of equality issues.
24. We utilize the term "Spartan" presumption quite ironically, aware that the Spartan regime
placed undue emphasis on loyalty to the state over loyalty to the individual or the family unit. See,
e.g., William A. Galston, The Legal and Political Implications of Moral Pluralism, 57 MD. L. REV. 236,
245 n.45 (1998) (describing ancient Sparta as a place "where family life, education, and public re-
sources were all directed toward the cultivation of military virtues"); Sanford Levinson, Testimonial
Privileges and the Preferences of Friendship, 1984 DUKE L.J. 631, 632 ("Who... can ever forget the
No. 4]
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ing accommodations of family ties; instead, we propose that such benefits
undergo a set of searching inquiries. First, to what extent does the family
ties benefit in question contribute to patriarchy, inaccuracy, inequality,
or heightened risk of crime-the normative costs often associated with
family ties benefits? Second, assuming the benefit implicates one or
more of these concerns, to what extent does the benefit vindicate a com-
pelling state interest that justifies the use of the benefit in the criminal
justice system? Finally, are other less troubling means-means that can
be crafted in terms that are neutral to family status-available to protect
the interest underlying the benefit? To be sure, this kind of scrutiny will
not resolve all questions: we will inevitably have disputes about the
strength of competing claims. But it will do some important work in
helping us think more clearly about the problem before us, and, in close
cases, will alert us to some of the potentially hidden costs of family ties
benefits.25
In Part III, we apply the normative framework developed in Part II
to assess some of the benefits we identified in Part I. Some we find good
reason for eliminating or curtailing substantially-evidentiary privileges,
exemptions from prosecutions, and sentencing discounts in most cases.
In other instances, we argue that the Spartan presumption is rebutted be-
cause the normative costs of the benefits are relatively low and an over-
riding interest justifies the use of the benefit. And in some cases-child-
sensitive arrest practices, in particular-the normative costs are so low or
nonexistent that even without an overriding interest, the presumption
can be rebutted. Finally, in many cases, we suggest there are policies
neutral to family status that can be used to achieve the underlying goal of
facilitating care giving without encroaching on the core values of the
criminal justice system-and we demonstrate how those could work in
particular instances. Part IV concludes with some reflections relevant for
future theoretical and empirical work in this area.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF FAMILY TIES AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE
Issues related to a defendant's family ties arise throughout the life
cycle of both the actual crime and any subsequent intervention by the
criminal justice system. The Sections below explore many of these points
of intersection and highlight the more salient ones for our project.
Spartan mother who berates the messenger for first telling her that her five sons have died before indi-
cating that the Spartans indeed had won the battle?").
25. For the most part, our discussion centers on legal policy issues, which are in many cases,
more appropriately developed by legislatures. However, our argument does address the issue of new
intrafamilial privileges, as well as the use of some common law defenses, which are typically addressed
in the courts in the first instance.
1154 [Vol. 2007
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A. The Commission of a Crime
Sadly, the most obvious intersection of a family relationship and
criminal activity occurs in the selection of a victim. The Bureau of Jus-
tice Statistics recently reported that "[flamily violence accounted for 11
percent of all reported and unreported violence between 1998 and
2002.''26 Forty-nine percent of these crimes involved a spouse attacking a
spouse, and eleven percent involved a parent attacking a child. 7 In 2002,
approximately twenty-two percent of all murders committed that year
involved the murder of a family member.28
On the other hand, a defendant's family responsibilities may also
provide the motive for criminal activity. Like Victor Hugo's Jean Val-
jean, 9 accused thieves may claim that they stole food or money in order
to sustain their family.3° Mercy killers might claim that they killed solely
to end a loved one's suffering and not to derive any personal benefit.31 A
parent might kill to avenge a crime committed against a child.32
Family members of the primary defendant have multiple decisions
to make in relation to the commission of a crime. First, they can decide
whether to become involved in the crime itself-before, during, or after
its commission. Second, whether they ultimately become involved or
not, once they have knowledge of the crime they have to decide whether
to help law enforcement authorities, either by disclosing information
about the crime in the first instance or cooperating with law enforcement
officials once a formal investigation is underway.
The story of David Kaczynski is just one of the better-known exam-
ples of family members grappling with the dilemma of whether to turn a
family member over to the authorities.33 In California, a police sergeant
26. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FAMILY VIOLENCE STATISTICS 1 (2005).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See VICTOR HUGO, LES MIStRABLES (Lee Fahnestock & Norman MacAfee trans., 1987).
30. See, e.g., Thief Says She Hit Bank for Her Kids, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 22, 1992, at 3 (describing the
case of a woman who robbed a bank in order to be able to fulfill outstanding child support obligations
and thus win the right to see her children again); Thief Sentenced to Read 'Les Miserables,' UNITED
PRESS INT'L, June 9, 1998 (discussing a judge's decision to require a man who stole a turkey to feed his
family to read LES MISERABLES as part of his sentence).
31. See, e.g., State v. Forrest, 362 S.E.2d 252 (N.C. 1987) (upholding the conviction of a man who
claimed that he killed his father in his hospital bed in order to end his suffering).
32. See, e.g., People v. Nesler, 941 P.2d 87 (Cal. 1997) (addressing problems in sanity phase of
trial of a mother who shot to death the man who had sexually molested her young son).
33. For similar examples of a brother making the same decision as David Kaczynski, see Cantu
v. State, 939 S.W.2d 627, 631 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); Elise Ackerman & Marianne Lavelle, Thicker
Than Blood, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 1, 1997, at 30, 32 (describing the case of Joe Cantu, who
turned his younger brother in to the police after hearing his brother laughing about the fact that he
had just participated in the gang rape and murder of two young girls); Linda Grace-Kobas, Death Pen-
alty Offers Families No Closure, Law School Speakers Say, CORNELL CHRON., Mar. 20, 2003, available
at http://www.news.cornell.edu/Chronicle/03/3.20.03/death-penalty-forum.html (describing case of Bill
Babbitt, who told the police that he believed his brother Manny had killed an elderly woman and then
was horrified when Manny, a paranoid schizophrenic, was eventually executed for the crime); Serge F.
Kovaleski, His Brother's Keeper, WASH. POST, July 21, 2001, at W10.
No. 4]
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was suspended for helping his son evade arrest after committing a series
of bank robberies.34 In Louisiana, a sheriff's deputy advised his son that
warrants had been issued for his arrest on child pornography charges and
helped him flee the jurisdiction.35 In Minnesota, a mother arrived home
just after her son had shot and killed an acquaintance in her kitchen. In-
stead of calling the police, the mother helped dump the body in an alley
and clean up the bloody crime scene.36 These conflicts of loyalty trigger
significant media and public interest in the decisions made by the family
members;37 importantly, those who cooperate with law enforcement are
often subjected to being called a "snitch," and are regarded as people
who violate "the taboo against turning on one's family. '38
34. See Beth Shuster, Veteran LAPD Officer Aided Fugitive Son, Panel Finds, L.A. TIMES, Mar.
27, 1996, at B3. The sergeant ultimately received a thirty-three-day suspension. See also Andrew
Blankstein, Member of Robbery Ring Convicted, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1997, at B4.
35. See Mandy M. Goodnight, Vernon Deputy Sentenced to Jail, ALEXANDRIA DAILY TOWN
TALK (Alexandria, La.), May 24, 2003, at 4A. The deputy was convicted of assorted criminal charges
related to his assistance and sentenced to spend one year in prison.
36. See David Chanen, Woman Charged As Accomplice to Her Son's in Shooting Death, STAR
TRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minn.), Dec. 15, 1998, at 5B. For other examples, see Ackerman & Lav-
elle, supra note 33, at 30 (describing how the brother of Thomas Capano, a well-known political figure
in Delaware, helped him dump the body of his former mistress into the ocean); M. Hernandez,
Woman Sentenced for Role in Killing, VENTURA COUNTY STAR, Apr. 26, 2005, at 2 (describing how a
mother, who had witnessed her son stab a man to death, helped her son flee to Mexico to avoid ar-
rest); Ed Pope, Police Charge Father in Fugitive Insurance Fraud Case, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS,
Mar. 2, 2000 (describing how a father destroyed evidence to prevent police from locating his daughter,
who was charged with participating in a $10 million insurance fraud scheme).
37. See William Booth, Kaczynski's Brother Expresses Sadness, Relief in Aftermath of Plea; Ac-
cuser Still Feels Powerful Sibling Connection, WASH. POST, Jan. 24, 1998, at A3; Don Oldenburg, What
If He Were Your Brother? When David Kazcynski Fingered the Unabomber Suspect, He Became the
Star in a Morality Play, WASH. POST, Apr. 11, 1996, at C1.
38. See Oldenburg, supra note 37 (describing comments by G. Gordon Liddy). We were unable
to locate any rigorous empirical work attempting to answer the question of what most Americans
would do if they learned a family member had committed a serious crime. USA Today conducted a
telephone poll of 305 adults in 1990 that was prompted by the Charles Stuart case in Boston, in which
Stuart murdered his pregnant wife and famously accused a black man of committing the crime. Stuart
became a suspect only after his brother went to the police. Eight percent said they would not turn in a
family member accused of murder; 79% said that they would. See Tom Squitier & John Larrabee,
Poll: 79% Say They'd Turn in Kin Who Killed, USA TODAY, Jan. 15, 1990, at 3A. The newspaper ac-
knowledged two problems with the survey: first, the outcome might well have been affected by the
outrageous facts of the Stuart case itself. See id. (quoting criminologist James Fox, who stated that
"[t]hese poll results would have been very different if the survey had been done last year.... It's not
what they would do, but what they would have liked the Stuarts to do"). Second, "experts" acknowl-
edged that the results might "reflect the 'socially desirable response' rather than the real-life action"
that people would take if actually confronted with the situation. Id. We suspect that relatives' deci-
sion making would vary on two vectors: the severity of the crime and the degree of closeness of the
relative (whether closeness is measured in emotional closeness or bloodline closeness). It probably
would be hard, for example, to turn in a child for all but the most heinous crimes, and it would be
comparatively less heart wrenching to turn in a distant cousin even if a more serious crime was in-
volved.
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B. The Prosecution: Investigation, Charging Decisions, and Pretrial
Release
1. The Investigation
After the investigation of a crime has commenced, prosecutors have
to decide whether to interview family members and whether to subpoena
them to testify before the grand jury. One of the more well-known re-
cent examples of a prosecutor subpoenaing a family member to testify
before the grand jury involved Marcia Lewis, Monica Lewinsky's
mother. Kenneth Starr, the prosecutor, plainly had reason to believe
that Lewis might possess relevant information; she was known to have a
very close relationship with her daughter and was believed to have dis-
cussed Starr's investigation with her.39 Nevertheless, his decision to sub-
poena Lewis was controversial. Lewinsky's lawyer called Starr's deci-
sion "disgraceful"; Lewis's own lawyer argued that "no mother should
ever be forced by federal prosecutors to testify against their child."'"
Two aspects of the Lewis controversy merit emphasis. First, several
commentators asserted during Kenneth Starr's investigation that it was
extremely unusual to subpoena family members during a criminal inves-
tigation.42 Based on one of the authors' seven years of experience as an
Assistant United States Attorney43 and on a recent informal survey of
prosecutors across the country, these assertions are inaccurate. Prosecu-
tors regularly interview as many family members as feasible and, if ap-
propriate, subpoena them to testify before the grand jury. Indeed, it
would be irresponsible to ignore family members, who often are in pos-
session of extremely relevant information. Because of their proximity to
and relationship with a defendant, family members often become confi-
dants of the defendant and might even have been in a position to witness
the crime. Moreover, requiring a family member to testify before the
grand jury can be a very effective tool for previewing any testimony a
family member might offer on a defendant's behalf at the criminal trial
and for "locking in" that testimony. For example, if a defendant's
39. See Jeff Leen, Mother Has Supporting Role in Lewinsky's Capital Drama, WASH. POST, Feb.
4, 1998, at Al; see also Judy Keen & Kevin Johnson, For Mom, Spotlight Could Burn, USA TODAY,
Feb. 11, 1998, at 4A (suggesting that prosecutors were in possession of a taped phone call showing that
Lewinsky had talked to her mother about how to impede the sexual harassment suit pending against
President Clinton).
40. See, e.g., Naftali Bendavid, Lewinsky's Mother Testifies: Starr's Subpoena Stirs Up Ethical
and Legal Debates, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 11, 1998, at 1; Art Buchwald, Save Moms from Starr, NEWSDAY,
Feb. 18, 1998, at A40; Lawrence Goodman, Lawyers Rap Handling of Mom, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Feb.
14, 1998, at 2; Stuart Taylor, Jr., Must A Parent Testify?, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 23, 1998, at 33.
41. See Richard T. Cooper, David Willman & Cecilia Balli, Lewinsky's Mother Leaves Dis-
traught After Testimony, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1998, at A16. One commentator went so far as to argue
that Starr's subpoena "could endanger the institution of parenthood as we know it." Buchwald, supra
note 40.
42. See, e.g., Bendavid, supra note 40, at 28 (citing statements by attorneys Bruce Yannett and
Jeffrey Jacobovitz suggesting that Starr's decision to subpoena Lewinsky's mother was an aberration).
43. The prosecutor was Professor Collins.
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mother testified before the grand jury that she had no idea of her son's
whereabouts at the time the murder in question was committed, her
grand jury testimony would be a powerful impeachment tool if she at-
tempted to provide an alibi defense for her son at trial.
Second, the Lewinsky controversy highlights the ongoing dispute
regarding the scope of testimonial privileges that should be extended to
family members, an issue that will be discussed in greater detail in Part
I.C.
2. Charging Decisions
Some of the most difficult decisions for law enforcement arise in re-
lation to the charging decision. If a family member has cooperated with
the primary defendant in some way, should that family member be
prosecuted? Prosecutors have grappled with that question in several re-
cent high-profile corporate crime cases, such as those involving the En-
ron, Adelphia, and ImClone corporations.44
The prosecution decision is typically an easy one if the family mem-
ber is involved in the crime as a principal in the classic sense of the
term.45 The difficult decisions for prosecutors lie at the margins of crimi-
nal involvement, when a family member has acted as an accessory, par-
ticularly as an accessory after the fact.46 Typical charging options in this
scenario would be obstruction of justice or hindering prosecution, har-
boring a fugitive, or accessory after the fact for states that retain that
charging option.
a. Exemptions for Family Members Harboring Fugitives
Remarkably, in fourteen states, the prosecution of family members
for harboring fugitives is not an option, regardless of the nature of the
44. In the Enron case, for example, Enron chief financial officer Andy Fastow and his wife Lea
were both indicted in connection with the fraud. See Carrie Johnson, Prosecutors Making Fraud Cases
Relative: Government Targets Family of Accused, WASH. POST, Nov. 27, 2003, at Al. In the Adelphia
case, prosecutors indicted the founder of the company and his two adult sons. Id. Similarly in Im-
Clone, executive Sam Waksal pled guilty to fraud charges "in an attempt to spare his daughter and his
[eighty-year-old] father from being charged with insider trading." Id. Johnson also cites the case of
Aldrich Ames, whose deal to plead guilty to espionage charges included a promise of leniency for his
wife. Id.
45. A principal in the first degree, of course, would be the family member who physically com-
mits the offense. Joshua Dressier defines a "principal in the second degree" as "one who is guilty of
an offense 'by reason of having [intentionally assisted] ... in the commission thereof in the presence,
either actual or constructive, of the principal in the first degree."' JOSHUA DRESSLER,
UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 464 (3d ed. 2001).
46. Dressler describes an accessory after the fact as "one who, with knowledge of another's guilt,
intentionally assists the felon to avoid arrest, trial, or conviction." Id. at 465. Although most states
have eliminated the various common law categories of principal and accomplice liability, many states
still treat accessories after the fact as a separate category of offender, and often worthy of a less severe
degree of punishment. Id. at 432-33.
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crime or the extent of the family member's involvement. 7 These states
typically exempt spouses, parents, grandparents, children, grandchildren,
and siblings from prosecution for providing assistance to an offender af-
ter the commission of a crime "with the intent that the offender avoids or
escapes detection, arrest, trial, or punishment. '48  An additional four
states reduce liability for an immediate family member but do not ex-
empt them from prosecution entirely. 9
Florida's statutory exemption for family members is one interesting
example. It forbids prosecution of spouses, parents, grandparents, chil-
dren, or grandchildren for helping an "offender avoid[] or escape[] detec-
tion, arrest, trial, or punishment," with one important exception." The
exemption does not apply if the primary offender is alleged to have
committed child abuse or neglect or the murder of a child under the age
of eighteen, "unless the court finds that the person [claiming the exemp-
tion] is a victim of domestic violence."'"
These statutes are significantly broader than the exemption that ex-
isted at common law, which forbade only the prosecution of a wife as an
accessory, but not the prosecution of a husband for aiding his felon wife
or the prosecution of other family members. 2 Despite the popularity of
the broader exemptions among many states, the Model Penal Code
drafters rejected the inclusion of a family member exemption in its acces-
sory provision, "in part on the ground that this is a factor that can be
47. The states that provide exemptions for family members are Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Kentucky, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia,
West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 777.03 (West 2004); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
5/31-5 (West 2005); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-44-3-2 (West 2005); IOWA CODE ANN. § 703.3 (West 2004);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 520.110 (West 2004); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 274, § 4 (West 2005); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 195.030 (West 2004); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-22-4 (West 2005); N.C. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 14-259 (West 2004); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-1-4 (West 2004); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 5
(West 2004); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-19 (West 2004); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-11-6 (West 2005); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 946.47 (West 2004).
48. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 777.03. Iowa is more restrictive in that it only exempts spouses from
criminal liability. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 703.3. Illinois and North Carolina do not include grandpar-
ents or grandchildren within their exemptions. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/31-5; N.C. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 14-259. Indiana does not include grandparents, grandchildren, or siblings. See IND.
CODE ANN. § 35-44-3-2.
49. These states are Arkansas, New Jersey, Washington, and Wyoming. See ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 5-54-105 (West 2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:29-3 (West 2007); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.76.070
(West 2007); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-5-202 (West 2007). Washington, for example, typically treats ren-
dering criminal assistance to a murder suspect as a Class C felony, but only as a gross misdemeanor if
committed by an immediate family member. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.76.070.
50. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 777.03(1)(a).
51. See id. § 777.03(1)(b).
52. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES *38-39 ("So strict is the law where a felony is
actually complete, in order to do effectual justice, that the nearest relations are not suffered to aid or
receive one another. If the parent assists his child, or the child his parent; if the brother receives the
brother, the master his servant, or the servant his master, or even if the husband relieves the wife, who
have any of them committed a felony, the receivers become accessories ex post facto. But a feme-
covert can not become an accessory by the receipt or concealment of her husband; for she is presumed
to act under his coercion, and therefore she is not bound, neither ought she, to discover her lord.");
Leo Gerard Smith, Note, Family Member Exemption for Accessory After the Fact, 20 J. FAM. L. 105,
107-09 (1981) (discussing common law exemption for wives).
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taken into account at sentencing."53 The drafters also noted that "ex-
emption rules create trial difficulties if the government bears the burden
of proving that none of the specified relations exists."54
No federal law currently provides a family member with an exemp-
tion from prosecution.5 Some federal courts, however, have at least ex-
pressed sympathy to the pleas of family members charged with aiding an
accused relative. For example, in United States v. Oley,56 although up-
holding the right of the government to charge a wife with harboring her
fugitive husband, the court remarked that "[i]t would undoubtedly be
difficult to obtain a conviction charging wives with harboring their hus-
bands" and that "it might be regarded as inhuman and unnatural on the
part of a wife to surrender her husband to the authorities and contrary to
the instincts of human beings to do so."57
Some states have grappled with the constitutionality of the family
exemption. For example, in upholding Florida's statute against an equal
protection challenge, a Florida appeals court emphasized "society's in-
terest in safeguarding the family unit from unnecessary fractional pres-
sures" and applauded the legislature's decision to "confer[] immunity so
that these individuals need never choose between love of family and
obedience to the law."58 The New Mexico Supreme Court similarly up-
held its state statute against a constitutional challenge, but did not en-
gage in any sustained analysis and instead simply stated that the statute's
classifications were reasonable and thus consistent with the Equal Pro-
tection Clause.59
More recently, the Ninth Circuit concluded, as a matter of federal
law, that it was indeed constitutional to prosecute a spouse for hiding her
husband and his assets.' In United States v. Hill,61 Patricia Hill claimed
that her prosecution on charges of harboring a fugitive and accessory af-
ter the fact for helping her husband evade child support obligations to his
first wife was unconstitutional because the government sought to "crimi-
nalize conduct in which she is entitled to engage under the First and Fifth
Amendments to the Constitution," specifically "her rights of association,
marriage, privacy, and due process."'62 Although the court noted that
"basing a harboring or accessory conviction on normal and expected
53. MODEL PENAL CODE § 242.3 cmt. at 237 (1980).
54. Id.
55. See Smith, supra note 52, at 123-24 (discussing the treatment of family member exemptions
in the federal system).
56. 21 F. Supp. 281,282 (E.D.N.Y. 1937).
57. Id.; see also Haupt v. United States, 330 U.S. 631 (1947). In Haupt, the defendant was
charged with treason for aiding his saboteur son during World War II, but the Supreme Court noted
that the possibility the defendant's acts were motivated by "parental solicitude" rather than "adher-
ence to the German cause" was certainly a relevant factor for the jury's consideration. Id. at 641.
58. State v. C.H., 421 So. 2d 62, 65 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
59. See State v. Lucero, 541 P.2d 430,434 (N.M. 1975).
60. United States v. Hill, 279 F.3d 731, 733-34 (9th Cir. 2002).
61. See id.
62. Id. at 736.
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spousal conduct might well violate Griswold," it concluded that Hill's
conduct in this case crossed the line past "normal spousal conduct" and
into the realm of the intentional frustration of law enforcement. 63
b. Familial Status Defenses in Law and Practice
Another important way in which the criminal justice system uses
family ties to mitigate or eliminate criminal responsibility is when a de-
fendant has selected a family member as his victim. Some of the most
striking examples of the criminal justice system's recognition of family
relationships occur in relation to crimes committed against women and
children by a family member. A general hesitance to intervene in family
life, even to protect a family's most vulnerable members, is a deeply in-
grained historical tradition in this country.' In recent years, we have of
course seen some progress in criminal justice policy, 65 such as the repeal
of marital rape exemptions in many states,66 the increased law enforce-
ment attention and funding devoted to spousal battering,67 and the wide-
spread adoption of mandatory child abuse reporting statutes. 68  But the
general tradition of noninterference in crime involving intrafamily vio-
lence is hardly a historical relic. As a result, we can look at the way vari-
ous criminal justice systems carve out exceptional treatment (in the form
of liability or sentencing) for offenders who commit crimes against family
63. Id. at 737.
64. See, e.g., Jane C. Murphy, Rules, Responsibility, and Commitment to Children: The New Lan-
guage of Morality in Family Law, 60 U. PIrr. L. REV. 1111, 1165 (1999) ("One of the most deeply em-
bedded principles in American family law is the principle of family autonomy, which limits the state's
intervention in the affairs of the intact family."); Carl F. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Trans-
formation of American Family Law, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1803, 1835-39 (1985) (discussing the "legal tra-
dition of noninterference in the family"); Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert F. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries,
81 VA. L. REV. 2401, 2406 (1995) (noting that academic commentators have begun to argue that "the
latitude given to parents in rearing their children is... excessive, allowing some parents to inflict un-
monitored and unsanctioned harm on their children" and that "the tradition of legal protection of pa-
rental rights has deep historical roots"); see also discussion infra Part I.B..1. But see Carolyn B. Ram-
sey, Intimate Homicide: Gender and Crime Control, 1880-1920, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 101, 101 (2006)
(revising the "feminist understanding of the legal history of public responses to intimate homicide by
showing that, in both the eastern and the western United States, men accused of killing their intimates
often received stern punishment, including the death penalty, whereas women charged with similar
crimes were treated leniently" for the period under review).
65. See generally Donna Coker, Crime Control and Feminist Law Reform in Domestic Violence
Law: A Critical Review, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 801 (2001).
66. See Michelle J. Anderson, Marital Immunity, Intimate Relationships, and Improper Infer-
ences: A New Law on Sexual Offenses by Intimates, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1465, 1485 (2002-2003) (stating
that since the mid-1970s, marital immunity for sexual offenses was eliminated in twenty-four states and
the District of Columbia).
67. See generally EVE S. BUZAWA & CARL G. BUZAWA, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE RESPONSE (2d ed. 1996) (describing reform efforts in police and prosecutors' offices); Jeannie
Suk, Criminal Law Comes Home, 116 YALE L.J. 2, 7 (2006) (critically appraising the "use of protec-
tion orders to prohibit the cohabitation and contact of intimate partners" where domestic violence has
occurred).
68. See ELIZABETH PLECK, DOMESTIC TYRANNY: THE MAKING OF SOCIAL POLICY AGAINST
FAMILY VIOLENCE FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 173 (1987) (noting that "no other piece
of modern social legislation has been so quickly adopted by all the states").
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members-what might be called the "law on the books"-and at the
same time examine the "law in the streets," the way various practices in
the criminal justice system also contribute to differential treatment of
those who commit crimes against family members.
For laws on the books that treat family members differently, con-
sider the classic context in which a defendant tries to reduce his respon-
sibility for an intentional killing by claiming provocation in response to
learning of a wife's infidelity.69 Indeed, under the "modern" version of
the provocation doctrine, defendants often can reduce their liability for
an intentional killing from murder to manslaughter when "the defendant
claims passion because the victim left, moved the furniture out, planned
a divorce, or sought a protective order. '7° Other apparent sanctuaries
from the reach of criminal law persist in the realm of crimes committed
against spouses: some states extend preferential treatment to a sexual of-
fender who victimizes a spouse.7'
Family ties recognition is even more pronounced in the context of
crimes committed against children. A notable example of this kind of
family ties benefit is the acceptance of the "parental discipline defense"
in child abuse prosecutions. Although the contours of the defense vary
somewhat between states, in general the defense exempts parents from
prosecutions for assault if the corporal punishment was used to "benefit"
the child and if the nature of the punishment used was objectively rea-
sonable. 72 This defense is raised in both fatal and nonfatal cases of child
abuse.73  Deana Pollard recently conducted a comprehensive examina-
tion of child corporal punishment in, the United States and concluded
that every state still uses some variant of "a justification-based defense
that operates to defend parents from liability for even severe physical
violence and injury to minors," as long as the parent was "engag[ed] in
'discipline"' at the time of the conduct in question. 4 The use of this spe-
cial defense for parents persists even though twenty-seven states and the
District of Columbia ban spanking in schools and thirty-nine states ban
69. See Donna K. Coker, Heat of Passion and Wife Killing: Men Who Batter/Men Who Kill, 2 S.
CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 71, 72 (1992); Laurie Taylor, Provoked Reason in Men and Women:
Heat of Passion Manslaughter and Imperfect Self-Defense, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1679, 1692-96 (1986).
70. Victoria Nourse, Passion's Progress: Modern Law Reform and the Provocation Defense, 106
YALE L.J. 1331, 1332 (1997) (footnotes omitted).
71. See Anderson, supra note 66, at 1486. Professor Anderson argues that the benefits fall into
three categories: "those that exempt spouses from sexual offenses other than forcible rape, those that
maintain separate spousal sexual offense statutes, and those that impose extra requirements for the
prosecution of marital rape." Id.
72. Deana Pollard, Banning Child Corporal Punishment, 77 TUL. L. REV. 575,641 (2003).
73. Id. at 621.
74. Id. at 634-35. Professor Pollard's article contains an excellent discussion of different ap-
proaches states take in evaluating parental claims that the injuries they inflicted upon their children
should not be considered child abuse because they were simply disciplining their children. Id. at 635-
46. She also notes that, despite mounting evidence about the dangers posed by spanking, ninety per-
cent of American parents still hit their children. Id. at 577.
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spanking in day care centers.75 The Model Penal Code also recognizes a
variant of this defense, stating that "the use of force against another is
justifiable if: (1) the actor is the parent ... and (a) the force is used for
the purpose of safeguarding or promoting the welfare of the minor, in-
cluding the prevention or punishment of his misconduct .... "76
In addition to the parental discipline defense, familial status is rec-
ognized in the context of sex offenders who victimize their own children.
These sex offenders benefit from three kinds of statutory disparities: in-
cest loopholes, sentencing loopholes, and sex offender registration loop-
holes.77 In other words, they benefit from statutory schemes that treat
them differently (and more leniently) than would be the case if the mis-
conduct had been perpetrated against nonfamilial victims. 78  For exam-
ple, sexual offenses against one's own children can be prosecuted under
incest statutes, instead of general sexual abuse statutes or rape statutes.
The benefit of incest convictions is that they "typically carry far less sig-
nificant penalties. 79 According to a recent survey, "twenty-six states re-
tain some preferential treatment for incest offenders as compared to
other sexual offenders."8
Additionally, parents receive further preferential statutory treat-
ment through exemption from sexual offender registration requirements.
In the last dozen years or so, every state has enacted some form of
scheme in which convicted sex offenders must register with the state.
Nonetheless, under some of these statutes, parental offenders receive
preferential treatment. In a fascinating recent article, Rose Corrigan fo-
cuses on the implementation of Megan's Law in the state of New Jer-
sey.8 New Jersey uses something called a "Registrant Risk Assessment
Scale" to determine a defendant's risk of reoffending. Defendants deem-
ed to have higher risk levels are subject to more extensive community
notification requirements." One of the scale's criteria is "victim selec-
tion." Offenders who victimize strangers are given the highest possible
score under this criteria, while offenders who victimize "house-
hold/family" members are given the lowest possible score and deemed to
75. See id. at 586.
76. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.08 (1985); see also Pollard, supra note 72, at 641 (discussing the
Model Penal Code's adoption of a parental discipline defense).
77. See Jennifer M. Collins, Lady Madonna, Children at Your Feet: The Criminal Justice System's
Romanticization of the Parent-Child Relationship, 93 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming Oct. 2007) (manu-
script at 18, on file with the University of Illinois Law Review) (citing state statutes of incest loop-
holes).
78. See id.; see also Leonore M.J. Simon, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Sex Offender Legislation
and the Antitherapeutic Effects on Victims, 41 ARz. L. REV. 485, 493-95 (1999) (discussing preferen-
tial treatment given to family sex offenders in the State of Washington).
79. See Collins, supra note 77 (manuscript at 13) (citing incest loopholes in state statutes).
80. See id. (manuscript at 14-16) (citing state statutes with incest "preferences"). Parents can
also receive further preferential statutory treatment through exemption from sexual offender registra-
tion requirements. Id.
81. See Rose Corrigan, Making Meaning of Megan's Law, 31 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 267 (2006).
82. Id. at 285-86.
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be low-risk offenders.83 Corrigan argues that New Jersey's view of "in-
cest as a crime rarely committed and seldom repeated means that in
many jurisdictions, acquaintances and intimates are, by definition, inca-
pable of being 'predators' for the purposes of registration and notifica-
tion."'  Further, "[i]ndividuals convicted of incest are excluded from the
state's online sex offender database. 85
As to the law in the streets, we see how practices of investigation
and prosecution permit the scourge of domestic violence (chiefly against
women) to continue, though admittedly not at the same levels of indif-
ference as a generation ago. 86  Notwithstanding important changes in
many jurisdictions,87 this violence occurs in the context of a recent history
where many police officers and prosecutors expressly devised and im-
plemented policies of noninterference in "private" family life.88
In practice, parents also continue to benefit from pervasive prefer-
ences that render their effective prosecution more unlikely: for instance,
prosecutors may face substantial difficulties in securing convictions
against parents on homicide charges in child abuse cases because juries
are disinclined to think that parents are capable of wanting to hurt their
children.89 Moreover, prosecutors often face a public backlash when they
seek to prosecute parents on account of a child dying due to parental
negligence, even though no objections are raised to prosecuting unre-
lated caregivers in comparable circumstances. 9° Naturally, this backlash
83. See id. at 291. Corrigan reports that the manual accompanying the scale explains this classifi-
cation as justified because "intrafamilial offenders have[e] the lowest base rate of reoffense." Id. (cita-
tion and internal quotation marks omitted).
84. Id. at 299.
85. Id. Corrigan notes this exclusion was supported by rape care advocates in order to promote
victim confidentiality. Even if the exclusion does protect victims, however, it clearly gives offenders
the obvious benefit of avoiding identification as a sex offender to friends, employers, and other mem-
bers of the community. This is particularly problematic in light of research suggesting that many incest
offenders cross-offend, in that they also abuse victims outside their immediate families. This research
is discussed in Collins, supra note 77, (manuscript at 33-34).
86. See Deborah Tuerkheimer, Recognizing and Remedying the Harm of Battering: A Call to
Criminalize Domestic Violence, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 959 (2004).
87. See Wayne Logan, Criminal Law Sanctuaries, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 321, 345-46
(2003) (discussing "increased statutory authority for police to execute warrantless arrests in the home;
the enactment of mandatory arrest laws for domestic abuse; and most recently "no drop" policies,
which remove the discretionary authority of prosecutors (and victims) to forgo abuse prosecutions").
88. See id. at 343-45.
89. See Ruth Teichroeb, Cases Among Toughest to Prosecute; Juries Don't Want to Believe a
Parent Could Kill a Child, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 1, 2002, at Al (reporting that "prose-
cutors across Washington say child homicides are among the toughest cases to prove beyond a reason-
able doubt" and that "when young children die because of parental neglect, the chance of convicting a
parent is so small prosecutors rarely file any charges").
90. For example, in 2002, a Virginia father of thirteen children accidentally left his youngest
child, a twenty-one-month-old girl, in the family van when the family returned home from running an
errand. A neighbor found the child dead in the van seven hours later. Despite the fact that the father
had not checked on his toddler daughter even once during that time frame, his prosecution by the
Commonwealth of Virginia for involuntary manslaughter immediately ignited a firestorm of contro-
versy. One law professor, for example, condemned the decision as "send[ing] a chilling message of
prosecutorial over-reach and abuse" and compared the "logic" behind the prosecution to "the Viet-
nam war technique of destroying a village to save it." Jonathan Turley, A Tragedy, Not a Crime,
[Vol. 2007
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may inhibit some prosecutors, especially politically accountable ones,
from prosecuting parents who harm their children.91 This preferential
treatment for parents persists even though young children in particular
face far greater risk of danger from their relatives at home than they do
from strangers in public places.92
3. Pretrial Release
Family ties issues also arise in the context of pretrial release. Be-
fore a suspect is tried for his crime, the state must first decide whether to
detain or release him.93 If it releases him, the state must determine which
conditions it will impose to ensure that the defendant appears at trial. If
it detains the alleged offender, the state must determine what kind of ac-
cess to the outside world it will allow so that the defendant can prepare
his case.
Determinations of pretrial release take different forms in different
jurisdictions, but they usually share at least one feature in common: they
specifically look at a suspect's family ties and responsibilities when con-
sidering whether to release the suspect, and under what conditions. For
instance, the 1966 Bail Reform Act (BRA) gave federal judges guidance
regarding decisions about pretrial release, expressly articulating that
courts should examine the accused's family ties.94 Many states followed
suit.95
WASH. POST, June 9, 2002, at B8. For an in-depth discussion of the prosecution of negligent parents,
see Jennifer Collins, Crime and Parenthood: The Uneasy Case for Prosecuting Negligent Parents, 100
Nw. U. L. REV. 807 (2006).
91. See 1 NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE AND THE OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, JUSTICE SYSTEM PROCESSING OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT CASES:
FINAL REPORT 15 (1996) (reporting results of comprehensive study of child abuse cases in mid-1990s
and stating that "every professional interviewed stressed the difficulty in prosecuting cases because the
general public, and thus jurors, are extremely reluctant to believe physical and child abuse allega-
tions"); Jan Chapman & Barbara Smith, Response of Social Service and Criminal Justice Agencies to
Child Sexual Abuse Complaints, 10 RESPONSE 7, 13 (1987) (reporting the findings of a study of 388
cases from the mid-1980s, all of which were classified as "founded," meaning a social worker had be-
lieved the allegations to be true, that determined "parents were less likely to be prosecuted and, if
prosecuted, they often received little or no incarceration and surprisingly short periods of incarcera-
tion").
92. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SEXUAL ASSAULT OF YOUNG CHILDREN AS
REPORTED TO LAW ENFORCEMENT: VICTIM, INCIDENT, AND OFFENDER CHARACTERISTICS 10 (July
2000) (reporting that for sexual assault victims under the age of six, forty-nine percent were sexually
victimized by a family member, and only three percent were assaulted by a stranger); see also BUREAU
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CHILD VICTIMIZERS: VIOLENT OFFENDERS AND THEIR VICTIMS 17 (Mar.
1996) (stating that "in 1974 over 70% of the murders of infants were carried out by a family member").
This figure dropped substantially if the homicide victim was a teenager.
93. For an overview of pretrial release patterns, see MARC L. MILLER & RONALD F. WRIGHT,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURES 760-95 (2003).
94. Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, 80 Stat. 214 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
3142 (g)(3)(A) (2000)).
95. See, e.g., ALA. R. CRIM. P. 7.2(a)(1) (2006) (requiring court to consider a range of factors in
determining pretrial release, including "the age, background and family ties, relationships and circum-
stances of the defendant"); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 903.046(2) (West 2001) (mandating court to consider
"[t]he defendant's family ties[ and] length of residence in the community"); Watson v. State, 158
1165No. 4]
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Additionally, some states delineate pretrial release conditions that
are tied to family responsibilities and effects. For example, in Illinois,
the statute governing bail bonds informs judges that they should consider
imposition of conditions that require defendants to support his or her
dependents.96 If the victim of the crime is a member of the household,
then, depending on the precise circumstances, the court may impose
conditions that require the defendant to vacate the home, refrain from
contact,97 or make payments of temporary support."
C. The Determination of Guilt: Pleas and Trials
1. Pleas
If multiple members of one family are prosecuted, one way in which
family ties become particularly relevant is if the government decides to
include as part of a plea bargain an offer "of adverse or lenient treatment
for someone other than the accused."99  Such "wired" or linked plea
agreements are certainly not uncommon and are routinely upheld by
courts.1" Two well-known examples involved promises of leniency to a
spouse in order to induce the primary defendant to plead guilty. Jona-
than Pollard, convicted of engaging in espionage on behalf of Israel, un-
successfully attacked the validity of his life sentence on the ground that
his plea had been rendered involuntary because the government "wired"
his plea to that of his wife's."°1 More recently, Andrew Fastow, the for-
mer chief financial officer of Enron, faced tremendous pressure to plead
guilty because of the government's decision to target his wife; simultane-
ous jail sentences for the couple would have left their two young sons
without a parent in the home." Lea Fastow was ultimately sentenced to
S.W.3d 647, 648 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (noting that the Court of Criminal Appeals has determined
that a court in setting bail should consider, among other things, the "defendant's: work record, family
ties, . . . length of residency").
96. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/110-10(b)(10) (2002).
97. See Suk, supra note 67, at 2 (describing use of protection orders as a form of "state-imposed
de facto divorce that subjects the practical and substantive continuation of intimate relationships to
criminal sanction").
98. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/110-10 (c). We foreshadow here our points developed in Part I.F and
in Part III that the consideration of family ties in the context of pretrial release may be a factor the
government uses not necessarily as a benefit to family interests, but as a proxy for an accused's likeli-
hood to stay in the community rather than flee. In such circumstances, alternative means may be
available, such as greater use of tracking devices, which only indirectly benefit members of families. In
the case of the kinds of conditions imposed on pretrial release, however, it is hard to view the condi-
tions imposed as something other than intended to promote family interests.
99. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357,364 n.8 (1978).
100. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, "Package" Plea Bargaining and the Prosecutor's Duty of Good
Faith, CRIM. L. BULL., Nov.-Dec. 1989, at 507, 512 n.15, 513 n.20 (collecting cases). For more recent
decisions upholding the use of wired plea agreements, see United States v. Vest, 125 F.3d 676, 679 (8th
Cir. 1997); United States v. Marquez, 909 F.2d 738, 742-43 (2d Cir. 1990).
101. United States v. Pollard, 959 F.2d 1011, 1015 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
102. See Mary Flood & Tim Fowler, Fastow May Have to Plea Bargain to Protect His Wife,
HOUSTON CHRON., Sept. 3, 2002, at 1A. The government was very aggressive in pressuring Andrew
1166 [Vol. 2007
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a year in prison; her husband will not serve his longer sentence until after
his wife is released and his cooperation in the trial against other Enron
executives is completed.1"3
2. Trials and Testimonial Privileges
One way in which family ties permeate the trial process is through
limitations on the government's ability to present all relevant evidence.
Testimonial privileges are widely recognized exceptions to the common
law principle that "the public has a right to every man's evidence."'" Be-
cause the public has a compelling interest in the efficient and correct ad-
ministration of its criminal justice system, even the few privileges recog-
nized by the law are not to be "expansively construed," since they "are in
derogation of the search for truth." ' Nevertheless, the law recognizes a
small class of relationships held to be inviolable by prosecutors and sub-
poenas, allowing witnesses with relevant and probative evidence to claim
a privilege not to divulge the information they know even though it could
be useful in the administration of justice."° As a general rule, federal
courts are cautious before creating new mechanisms to allow people to
refuse to help the justice system. State systems, by contrast, tend to be a
bit more generous, recognizing clergyman-parishioner and doctor-patient
privileges, as well as journalist-source and accountant-client privileges
rejected under Federal Rule of Evidence 501.107
The testimonial privileges immediately relevant to our analysis here
are the spousal privileges and other claims of intrafamilial privilege as
applied in the criminal justice context; we focus here on a spousal or par-
ent-child privilege but, mutatis mutandis, the analysis could be applied to
other intrafamilial privileges between brothers and sisters, nephews and
uncles, and the like.
Fastow by taking a number of actions that directly impacted his wife, from freezing the couple's finan-
cial accounts to ultimately indicting her. See Mary Flood & Tom Fowler, Charges Grow for Ex-Enron
Execs: Fastow's Wife, 6 Others Surrender to Federal Authorities, HOUSTON CHRON., May 2, 2003, at
1A. One of Lea Fastow's attorneys argued that the charges were "a transparent effort to put pressure
on Andrew Fastow." William McQuillen, Enron's Crime Family?, CHI. SUN-TIMES, May 2, 2003, at
59.
103. See Mary Flood, Lea Fastow Requests Early Release: Legal Team Says Sentence Should be
Time Served, HOUSTON CHRON., Feb. 17, 2005, at Dl; see also Alexei Barrionuevo, Fastow of Enron
Has His Moment in the Sun, and Some Banks Pay Dearly, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2006, at C1.
104. 8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2192 (John T. McNaughton ed., rev. ed. 1961). See gen-
erally United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323,331 (1950).
105. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974).
106. The law has several sources for testimonial privileges. Most commonly, the common law is
the root of them. The attorney-client privilege, for example, is one of the oldest recognized privileges
in the common law-and every court recognizes it to some extent. See, e.g., Swidler & Berlin v.
United States, 524 U.S. 399, 403 (1998). The Fifth Amendment is another source of a testimonial
privilege in that it gives persons a privilege against self-incrimination. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No
person shall be... compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.").
107. See generally 2 SCOTT N. STONE & ROBERT K. TAYLOR, TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES § 3 (2d
ed. 1995) (explaining the accountant-client privilege and where and when it applies); id. § 6 (address-
ing the clergy-penitent privilege); id. § 7 (doctor-patient privilege); id. § 8 (journalist-source privilege).
No. 41
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a. Spousal Privileges
In the common law there are two categories of spousal privileges,
and all states and federal courts have adopted one or both of them in
some form: the spousal immunity and the marital-communication privi-
leges. The spousal immunity (sometimes called the adverse testimony
privilege) operates in criminal cases and generally protects spouses from
testifying as witnesses against their spouse-defendants during a valid
marriage.1" Different jurisdictions apply the immunity in different ways:
some insist on complete disqualification of spouses; some allow a spouse-
witness to testify if he or she wishes; some allow a spouse-defendant to
prevent the spouse-witness from giving adverse testimony; and others al-
low a spouse-defendant to consent to adverse spousal testimony.0°
The immunity evolved from the old English common law rule of
complete disqualification, where, in the first instance, a wife was not al-
lowed to testify against her husband."' Eventually the disqualification
rule became gender neutral-and was finally abolished in England in
1853.11 The United States also recognized a disqualification rule in the
federal courts until the Supreme Court refined the immunity in Funk v.
United States,"' which found spouses competent to testify at one an-
other's trials-particularly for rather than adverse to one another.
The Supreme Court had once recognized very broad spousal privi-
leges for the federal courts in Hawkins v. United States.113 There, the
Court held that the privilege was a "rule which bars the testimony of one
spouse against the other unless both consent."1 4 To justify such a power-
ful privilege, the Court argued that "the law should not force or encour-
age testimony which might alienate husband and wife, or further inflame
existing domestic differences."" 5 But in Trammel v. United States, the
Supreme Court reversed course and concluded as a matter of federal law
that "[wihen one spouse is willing to testify against the other in a crimi-
nal proceeding ... their relationship is almost certainly in disrepair; there
is probably little in the way of marital harmony for the privilege to pre-
serve.""' 6 Accordingly, the Court modified the spousal immunity in fed-
108. See, e.g., Regan, supra note 21, at 2119.
109. To see which states have adopted this privilege and which version, see 2 STONE & TAYLOR,
supra note 107, § 5.02, nn.4, 8, 12, 13.
110. "[I]t hath been resolved by the Justices that a wife cannot be produced either against or for
her husband." 1 E. COKE, A COMMENTARIE UPON LITTLETON 6b (1628); see also 8 WIGMORE, supra
note 104, § 2227. Some have contested this story and have argued that the immunity has its roots in
"petit treason," the crime of violence against a head of household. See id.
111. See Developments in the Law-Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1450, 1564
(1985) [hereinafter Developments in the Law].
112. 290 U.S. 371, 380-82 (1933).
113. 358 U.S. 74 (1958).
114. Id. at 78.
115. Id. at 79.
116. 445 U.S. 40, 52 (1980). This is false. Prosecutors can threaten spouses and offer them fairly
substantial incentives to testify against their loved ones, even if the relationship is otherwise strong.
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eral courts, allowing it to be waived by the spouse-witness. Many states
have followed a similar pattern of having once allowed the spouse-
defendant to prevent the spouse-witness from adversely testifying and
"liberalizing" to allow spouse-witnesses to testify if they wish (even if it is
only to reduce their own potential sentences!).
Unlike spousal immunity, the spousal-communication privilege sur-
vives dissolution of a marriage and prevents a spouse from divulging any
kind of confidential communication in a civil or criminal case; it is waiv-
able only by the communicant. 1"' The privilege is limited to communica-
tions (not acts) that transpire during a valid marriage-and it is deemed
waived if the communications are disclosed to third parties. The spousal-
communications privilege, with its roots in the common law, was recog-
nized by the Supreme Court in Wolfle v. United States, 18 and Blau v.
United States,"9 and remains largely unmodified and undisturbed. Pur-
portedly, the privilege ensures free and frank communication between
spouses; for without such protection, marriages would lack open conver-
sation. 20
b. Intrafamilial Privileges
In contrast to the spousal privileges, federal courts tend not to pro-
vide any similar protection for a parent-child, brother-sister, or other in-
trafamilial relationships-irrespective of whether what is at stake is tes-
timonial immunity or a confidential communication privilege. A parent-
child privilege is the one most often claimed (and discussed in the secon-
dary literature) 12 '-and most often flatly rejected by courts,122 with a few
117. To see which states have adopted this privilege and in what way, see 2 STONE & TAYLOR,
supra note 107, § 5.09.
118. 291 U.S. 7,14-15 (1934).
119. 340 U.S. 332, 333-34 (1951).
120. Cf FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, HUMAN, ALL Too HUMAN, (Ernst Behler ed., Gary Handaerk
trans., Stanford Univ. Press 1995) (1878) ("Marriage as a long conversation. In entering into a mar-
riage we should put the question to ourselves: Do you believe that you will enjoy conversing with this
woman all the way into old age? Everything else in marriage is transitory, but most of the time to-
gether is spent in conversation.").
121. See, e.g., Maureen P. O'Sullivan, An Examination of the State and Federal Courts' Treatment
of the Parent-Child Privilege, 39 CATH. LAW. 201 (1999); Catherine J. Ross, Implementing Constitu-
tional Rights for Juveniles: The Parent-Child Privilege in Context, 14 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 85 (2003);
Amee A. Shah, The Parent-Child Testimonial Privilege-Has the Time for It Finally Arrived?, 47
CLEV. ST. L. REv. 41 (1999); Erica Smith-Klocek, A Halachic Perspective on the Parent-Child Privi-
lege, 39 CATH. LAW. 105 (1999); Shonah P. Jefferson, Note, The Statutory Development of the Parent-
Child Privilege: Congress Responds to Kenneth Starr's Tactics, 16 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 429 (1999); Kim-
berly L. Schilling, Note, Intrafamilial Communications: An Analysis of the Parent-Child Privilege, 37
FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 99 (1999).
122. See, e.g., United States v. Dunford, 148 F.3d 385 (4th Cir. 1998) (no recognition of privilege
when the defendant father was charged with gun crimes and abusing children with those guns; protec-
tion of this family unit not warranted); In re Grand Jury, 103 F.3d 1140 (3d Cir. 1997) (no confidential
communication privilege in child-parent relationship because the overwhelming majority of states and
federal courts reject the privilege); In re Erato, 2 F.3d 11 (2d Cir. 1993) (no recognition of the mother's
asserted right not to testify against her adult son, particularly when she benefited from her son's illegal
activity); In re Doe, 842 F.2d 244 (10th Cir. 1988) (no parent-child privilege recognized); United States
No. 4]
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exceptions.13 Although Jaffee v. Redmond124 opened the door for federal
courts to fashion new privileges when the Supreme Court recognized a
claim of a psychotherapist/social worker-patient privilege under Rule
501, federal courts generally continue to reject the assertion of in-
trafamilial privileges.'2
The story is somewhat more complicated at the state level. A ma-
jority of states reject intrafamilial privileges beyond spousal relations.2 6
However, Idaho,'27 Connecticut,' Massachusetts, 9 and Minnesota 3 ° all
have some limited form of parent-child privilege conferred by statute;
additionally, New York courts have judicially carved a limited parent-
child testimonial privilege.' Moreover, Virginia and Texas appellate
court judges have written strong dissents arguing for state recognition of
a parent-child privilege.'32
Each of the jurisdictions that recognize the privilege gives the par-
ent-child privilege different contours. The Idaho law seems to give the
v. Ismail, 756 F.2d 1253 (6th Cir. 1985) (children have no right not to testify against parents and can be
forced to do so); In re Santarelli, 740 F.2d 816 (11th Cir. 1984) (no federal support for a family privi-
lege); United States v. Penn, 647 F.2d 876 (9th Cir. 1980) (no "family" privilege so a five-year-old had
to testify against his mother).
123. See In re Agosto, 553 F. Supp. 1298 (D. Nev. 1983) (recognizing a parent-child privilege); see
also cases cited infra note 132.
124. 518 U.S. 1 (1996).
125. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury, 103 F.3d 1140.
126. See generally Kelly Korell, Testimonial Privilege for Confidential Communications Between
Relatives Other than Husband and Wife-State Cases, 62 A.L.R. 5th 629 (1998).
127. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 9-203(7) (2004) ("Any parent, guardian or legal custodian shall not be
forced to disclose any communication made by their minor child or ward to them concerning matters
in any civil or criminal action to which such child or ward is a party."). The privilege does not apply in
all cases, including cases involving allegations of child abuse.
128. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-138a (West 2004) ("In any juvenile proceeding in superior
court, the accused child shall be a competent witness, and at his or her option may testify or refuse to
testify in such proceedings. The parent or guardian of such child shall be a competent witness but may
elect or refuse to testify for or against the accused child except that a parent or guardian who has re-
ceived personal violence from the child may, upon the child's trial for offenses arising from such per-
sonal violence, be compelled to testify in the same manner as any other witness.").
129. MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 233, § 20 (West 2005) ("An unemancipated, minor child, living
with a parent, shall not testify before a grand jury, trial of an indictment, complaint or other criminal
proceeding, against said parent, where the victim in such proceeding is not a member of said parent's
family and who does not reside in the said parent's household.").
130. MINN. STAT. § 595.02.10) (2004) ("A parent or the parent's minor child may not be exam-
ined as to any communication made in confidence by the minor to the minor's parent.... This excep-
tion may be waived by express consent to disclosure by a parent entitled to claim the privilege or by
the child who made the communication or by failure of the child or parent to object when the contents
of a communication are demanded."). The statutory privilege in Minnesota does not apply in all cir-
cumstances, including cases involving allegations of child abuse or the termination of parental rights.
131. See In re A & M (People v. Doe), 403 N.Y.S.2d 375 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978) (common law rec-
ognition of a parent-child privilege through the constitutional right to family privacy); People v. Fitz-
gerald, 422 N.Y.S.2d 309, 312 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979) (extending the parent-child privilege to an older
child; holding that the privilege is not limited to minors); In re Ryan, 474 N.Y.S.2d 931,931 (N.Y. Fam.
Ct. 1984) (recognizing a grandmother as a parent for parent-child privilege purposes). But see People
v. Hilligas, 670 N.Y.S.2d 744, 747 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998) (rejecting Fitzgerald for independently living
adults).
132. See Diehl v. Texas, 698 S.W.2d 712, 717 (Tex. App. 1985) (Levy, J., dissenting); Belmer v.
Virginia, 553 S.E.2d 123, 129 (Va. Ct. App. 2001) (Elder, J., dissenting).
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privilege to parents so they do not have to testify against their children,
but it does not give symmetrical treatment to children who do not want
to testify against their parents.'33 Connecticut limits its grant of the privi-
lege to "juvenile proceeding[s] in Superior Court." '134 Massachusetts lim-
its its parent-child privilege to "unemancipated, minor child[ren], living
with a parent," ruling out application of the privilege to older children. 35
Like Idaho's law, Massachusetts's is asymmetric, but in just the opposite
way: in Massachusetts parents can be forced to testify against their chil-
dren, just not the other way around. 3 6 Minnesota, although supporting a
symmetrical privilege, limits its grant of privilege to cases involving "mi-
nor" children, subject to waiver by parent or child.137 In short, there is
little uniformity in the states about whether the privilege exists-and
where it does, exactly how and when it applies. Most states that recog-
nize the privilege, however, recognize an exception for when there is a
dispute between parent and child, a possibility of parental abuse or ne-
glect, or a crime of violence within the household.
D. Sentencing
Consideration of family ties often arises in the sentencing context
because, according to a 1999 study, over half of all state and federal pris-
oners have children; indeed, more than a million minor children have at
least one parent incarcerated. 3' This Section explores ways in which
family ties are connected to the judicial consideration of a particular sen-
tence.
1. Federal Practice Pre-Booker
Prior to the Supreme Court's ruling in Booker v. United States,
which rendered the federal sentencing guidelines "effectively advi-
sory,"'3 9 "family ties and responsibilities"'" were, generally speaking, ac-
133. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 9-203(7).
134. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-138a (2004).
135. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 20 (2005).
136. Compare IDAHO CODE ANN. § 9-203(7), with MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 20.
137. See MINN. STAT. § 595.02.10) (2004).
138. CHRISTOPHER J. MUMOLA, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SPECIAL REPORT:
INCARCERATED PARENTS AND THEIR CHILDREN NCJ 182335, at 1 tbl.1 (reporting figures for 1999,
"an estimated 721,500 State and Federal prisoners were parents to 1,498,800 children under age 18"),
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/iptc.pdf.
139. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 246 (2005). In his remedial opinion, Justice Breyer
highlighted the provision in 18 U.S.C. § 3661, which says that "[n]o limitation shall be placed on the
information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense
which a court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropri-
ate sentence." Id. at 252.
140. Family ties may be thought to be distinct from family responsibilities, in that one could have
strong family ties (a devoted son or brother) without necessarily incurring significant family responsi-
bilities.
No. 4]
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corded little significance in the federal sentencing regime."' The United
States Sentencing Commission (USSC) regarded family ties and respon-
sibilities as a "discouraged" factor, and thus departures from the guide-
lines on the basis of "family ties and responsibilities" were permissible
only if the court found that the negative effects on the defendant's family
were "present to an exceptional degree or in some other way makes the
case different from the ordinary case where the factor is present."' 42
That is not to say that courts categorically refused departures when there
was evidence of "extraordinary" family ties and responsibilities;'43 indeed
many federal courts extended such departures, even across a wide range
of crimes.'
To the extent that there is pattern underlying the pre-Booker fed-
eral cases involving downward departures for family ties, it is discernible
by asking whether the defendant provided an irreplaceable (or at least
critical) role as caregiver to family dependents, and if so, whether the
downward departure contemplated by the judge would suffice to "cure"
the harm that would otherwise be visited upon the family member.'45
Thus, the more severe the criminal offense level of a particular offender,
the less likely it would be that a departure based on family responsibili-
ties would be granted-because, as the Commission said in its commen-
tary on the relevant provision, I4" the departure should be capable of re-
solving the problem of the irreplaceable caregiver.'47 Thus, applying this
141. See, e.g., United States v. Menyweather, 431 F.3d 692, 699 (9th Cir. 2005) ("family circum-
stance is a discouraged factor under the Guidelines"); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 5H1.6 (2000) ("family ties and responsibilities and community ties are not ordinarily relevant" in
deciding if a departure is warranted); see also United States v. Aguirre, 214 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir.
2000) (referring to family circumstance as a "discouraged" factor). See generally Melissa E. Murray,
The Networked Family: Refraining the Legal Understanding of Caregiving and Caregivers, 94 Va. L.
Rev. (forthcoming 2008) (canvassing family circumstances departures in federal courts).
142. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 96 (1996).
143. See United States v. Harrington, 82 F.3d 83, 90 (5th Cir. 1996) (Guidelines permit considera-
tion of extraordinary family effects for purposes of downward departure but finding "nothing extraor-
dinary" in this case); United States v. Rivera, 994 F.2d 942, 953 (1st Cir. 1993); United States v.
Gaskill, 991 F.2d 82, 85 (3d Cir. 1993) ("In our opinions, we have concluded that section 5H1.6 does
not prohibit departures, but restricts them to cases where the circumstances are extraordinary.");
United States v. Cacho, 951 F.2d 308, 311 (11th Cir. 1992) (same); United States v. Pena, 930 F.2d
1486, 1494-95 (10th Cir. 1991).
144. United States v. Haversat, 22 F.3d 790, 797 (8th Cir. 1994) (price fixing); United States v.
Sclamo, 997 F.2d 970, 974 (1st Cir. 1993) (drug distribution); United States v. Johnson, 964 F.2d 124,
125 (2d Cir. 1992) (bribery and theft); United States v. Alba, 933 F.2d 1117, 1122 (2d Cir. 1991) (drug
offenses); Pena, 930 F.2d 1486 (drug distribution); see also Gaskill, 991 F.2d at 86 (fraud case indicat-
ing that the sentencing court could depart on remand).
145. See ROGER W. HAINES, JR., FRANK 0. BOWMAN III, & JENNIFER C. WOLL, FEDERAL
SENTENCING GUIDELINES HANDBOOK 1445 (2006) (addressing whether "the departure effectively will
address the loss of caretaking or financial support"); United States v. Leon, 341 F.3d 928, 931 (9th Cir.
2003); see also United States v. Roselli, 366 F.3d 58, 68-69 (1st Cir. 2004) (looking at whether "there
are feasible alternatives of care that are relatively comparable" to the defendant's).
146. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.6 cmt. n.1(B) (2006).
147. The implication is that if the departure simply reduces rather than eliminates the difficulty,
the departure should not be awarded. Thus, courts have been reluctant, given the state of the law, to
confer departures to minimize all the disruptions typically caused by incarceration of a family member.
See, e.g., United States v. Wright, 218 F.3d 812, 815-16 (7th Cir. 2000) ("Today we conclude that a
(Vol. 20071172
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notion, many appellate courts upheld downward departures when a
Guideline sentence would otherwise leave a young child without a custo-
dial parent. 148 That said, the fact that a defendant was an "irreplaceable
caregiver" was not always a necessary or a sufficient explanation for fed-
eral court practice. Some courts authorized departures when a defen-
dant was not the sole caretaker because the court recognized the ex-
traordinary nature of the family situation and wanted to minimize
disruption to the children's lives.149  Other courts refused to extend de-
partures even when the defendant was an irreplaceable caregiver."5°
When departures based on family ties were awarded, they had the
capacity to cause wide disparities between otherwise similarly situated
offenders. For example, in United States v. Johnson, two defendants
were convicted of participating in the same crime and warranted the
same offense level.' Nevertheless, Johnson, the defendant with care-
taking responsibility of four children, received a significant departure
from the Guidelines based on family responsibilities and was sentenced
to six months' home detention and three years of supervised release;
meanwhile the other defendant, Purvis, who was without children and
who was also found to have played a more minor role in the scheme, re-
ceived twenty-seven months in prison and two years of additional super-
downward departure for extraordinary family circumstances cannot be justified when, even after re-
duction, the sentence is so long that release will come too late to promote the child's welfare."). This
state of affairs leads some judges to believe that the law they must apply here to be quite "cruel."
United States v. Jurado-Lopez, 338 F. Supp. 2d 246, 254 n.17 (D. Mass. 2004) (Gertner, J.) (excoriating
case law prohibiting departures for ordinary family responsibilities as "cruel"). Commentators often
agree. See Raeder, Gender and Sentencing, supra note 21, at 960; Myrna Raeder, Remember the Fam-
ily: Seven Myths About Single Parenting Departures, 13 FED. SENT'G REP. 251 (2001); Jack B.
Weinstein, The Effect of Sentencing on Women, Men, the Family, and the Community, 5 COLUM. J.
GENDER & L. 169, 169 (1996) (Section 5H1.6 "is so cruelly delusive as to make those who have to ap-
ply the guidelines to human beings, families, and the community want to weep").
148. United States v. Aguirre, 214 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (four-level departure upheld
"based on the fact that there is an 8 year-old son who's lost a father and would be losing a mother for a
substantial period of time"). However, in cases where another parent (aside from the defendant) was
available, courts routinely rejected the downward departure by the trial court. See, e.g., United States
v. Miller, 991 F.2d 552, 553 (9th Cir. 1993). But see United States v. Chestna, 962 F.2d 103, 107 (1st
Cir. 1992) (although defendant was single with four small children, this was not "an unusual family
circumstance"); United States v. Mogel, 956 F.2d 1555, 1565 (11th Cir. 1992) (declining to view a single
mother of two minor children as warranting extraordinary family circumstances); United States v.
Headley, 923 F.2d 1079, 1083 (3d Cir. 1991) (stating that "the imprisonment of a single parent was not
extraordinary," even where the woman had five minor children).
149. United States v. Spero, 382 F.3d 803, 805 (8th Cir. 2004) (affirming downward departure for
defendant who provided critical care for autistic son and other three children, notwithstanding that
defendant had a spouse); United States v. Jebara, 313 F. Supp. 2d 912, 919-20 (E.D. Wis. 2004) (split-
ting defendant's sentence between incarceration and home confinement due to judge's view that a
short-term disruption to the defendant's children would be tolerable but not a long-term one).
150. See, e.g., United States v. Sweeting, 213 F.3d 95, 104 (3d Cir. 2000) (invalidating a Section
5H1.6 downward departure for a single mother of five children (one afflicted with some neurological
disorders)). Sweeting might be distinguished on account of the defendant's substantial criminal history
and the severity of the penalty under the guidelines, which in this case, exceeded five years.
•151. United States v. Johnson, 964 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1992).
No. 4] 1173
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vised release. 152 This case dramatizes the disparity because the offenders
were co-defendants in the same case-but the disparity that resulted here
is at least as likely to arise across cases as within them. Some courts have
recognized that departures motivated by a desire to minimize the harms
inflicted on innocent third-party family members confer a windfall bene-
fit on the defendant.153 Those courts typically justify their decisions by
reference to a cost-benefit analysis under which the costs to the innocent
children were weighed against the public benefit of incarcerating the de-
fendant; the reasoning under such analyses, however, is usually conclu-
sory.
154
Finally, although departures on the basis of family responsibilities in
the federal context have been discouraged, district court judges retained
discretion to sentence within the range prescribed by the Sentencing
Guidelines, and in that area of discretion, judges may have quite widely
considered the influence of the factor of family ties and responsibilities.' 15
2. Federal Practice in the Post-Booker Landscape
Delineating the boundaries of what counts as "extraordinary" fam-
ily ties and responsibilities has become much easier in a post-Booker sen-
tencing world. With the Guidelines now advisory, federal courts have a
wider berth to steer sentences outside of the ranges established by the
U.S. Sentencing Commission."6 As a result, courts are awarding more
downward departures than previously. 157  In the post-Booker world, as
the Ninth Circuit recently observed, "[c]onsideration of family responsi-
bilities" may now be viewed as part of a defendant's "history and charac-
teristics," '58 and judges can assess those traits as reasons to mitigate the
length of sentences."5 9 Whereas various federal district court judges felt,
152. Id. at 126; see also Karin Bornstein, Note, 5K2.0 Departures for 5H Individual Characteristics:
A Backdoor Out of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 24 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 135, 135 (1993);
Gregory N. Racz, Note, Exploring Collateral Consequences: Koon v. United States, Third Party Harm,
and Departures from Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1462, 1480 (1997).
153. United States v. Menyweather, 431 F.3d 692, 703-08 (9th Cir. 2005) (Kleinfeld, J., dissent-
ing).
154. Id. (criticizing lower court's departure on grounds of family responsibilities because the sen-
tence failed to adequately reflect seriousness of the offense).
155. See, e.g., United States v. Duarte, 901 F.2d 1498 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that trial court may
properly consider defendant's stable family ties and responsibilities in setting sentence within the pre-
scribed range).
156. See Dan Markel, Luck or Law? The Constitutional Case Against Indeterminate Sentencing
Schemes 28-38. (unpublished manuscript, on file with U. ILL. L. REV.).
157. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FINAL REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF UNITED STATES V.
BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING (2006), available at http://www.ussc.gov/booker-report/Booker
Report.pdf (summarizing results).
158. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (2000).
159. Menyweather, 431 F.3d at 700 (noting that, after Booker, district court judges "have the dis-
cretion to weigh a multitude of mitigating and aggravating factors that existed at the time of manda-
tory Guidelines sentencing, but were deemed 'not ordinarily relevant,' such as age, education and vo-
cational skills, mental and emotional conditions, employment record, and family ties and
responsibilities" (quoting United States v. Ameline, 409 F.3d 1073, 1093 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc)
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prior to Booker, that the Guidelines were too harsh because they failed
to give significant weight to family ties and responsibilities, 6" these
judges can now invoke family ties and responsibilities as a basis for de-
parture from the Guidelines with greater frequency and flexibility.'61
3. State Practices
The flexibility that now exists in the federal sentencing system re-
garding consideration of family ties and responsibilities also prevails in
many states, especially those that endow sentencing judges with wide dis-
cretion to determine the length of a sentence. Approximately thirty-two
of the nation's jurisdictions have retained an indeterminate sentencing
scheme, with the remainder having some form of sentencing guidelines in
place. 6' These eighteen sentencing schemes may have voluntary guide-
lines, presumptive guidelines, or fixed guidelines, depending on the juris-
diction, as well as variations on these themes. By contrast, the other
states have "traditional" indeterminate sentencing schemes that extend
virtually unfettered discretion to sentencing judges (or, in some cases,
sentencing juries) to sentence within the statutory limits set by the legis-
lature, and, in many jurisdictions, leave the option for parole available.
The judges (or parole boards) in those indeterminate sentencing states
are often at liberty to consider the nature and extent of family ties or re-
(Wardlaw, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added))). Thus, for example, "[tihe
difficulty of providing appropriate care for a child of a single parent may, when balanced against fac-
tors such as the nature of the offense, § 3553(a)(1), deterrence to criminal conduct, § 3553(a)(2)(B),
and protection of the public, § 3553(a)(2)(C), warrant a sentence outside the Guidelines." Id. at 700.
160. United States v. Jurado-Lopez, 338 F. Supp. 2d 246, 254 n.17 (D. Mass. 2004) (Gertner, J.)
(excoriating case law prohibiting departures for ordinary family responsibilities as "cruel"); LINDA
DRAZGA MAXFIELD, U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FINAL REPORT: SURVEY OF ARTICLE III JUDGES ON
THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES 8 (2003), available at http://www.ussc.gov/judsurv/jsfull.pdf
("More than half of all judges would like to see more emphasis at sentencing placed on an offender's
mental condition or the offender's family ties and responsibilities."); cf. STANTON WHEELER ET AL.,
SITTING IN JUDGMENT: THE SENTENCING OF WHITE-COLLAR CRIMINALS 154 (1988) (judge explains
that "[w]hether there are people who are dependent on him or her [i.e., the defendant].... whether
there is going to be an injury to others if I incarcerate him: that has a profound effect on me and when
I sense that, I am more inclined to be lenient").
161. See, e.g., United States v. Ranum, 353 F. Supp. 2d 984, 990-91 (E.D. Wis. 2005) (noting that
defendant is "fifty years old, had no prior record, a solid employment history, and is a devoted family
man. He has two children, one of whom is still in school. Prior to his recent marriage, he was a single
father who did an excellent job of raising two daughters. He also provides care and support for his
elderly parents. His father suffers from Alzheimer's disease and is particularly dependent on defen-
dant-defendant is one of the few people he still recognizes. Defendant's mother is also elderly and
suffers from depression. I concluded that defendant's absence would have a profoundly adverse im-
pact on both his children and his parents."); United States v. Jaber, 362 F. Supp 2d 365, 383 (D. Mass.
2005) ("Measuring a departure for 'extraordinary family obligations' now in the light of Booker and
the purposes of sentencing (particularly the likelihood of recidivism), I would find that Momoh quali-
fied for a downward departure on these grounds."). But see Myrna Raeder, Gender-Related Issues in a
Post-Booker World, 37 MCGEORGE L. REV. 691, 716 (2006) (contending that "many judges are not
exercising their Booker discretion" and that "a relative handful of judges" are responsible for most of
the family ties departures).
162. Richard S. Frase, State Sentencing Guidelines: Diversity, Consensus, and Unresolved Policy
Issues, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1190,1191 (2005).
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sponsibilities (along with a wide range of other reasons for leniency) in
setting a sentence or releasing an offender.63 And for the most part, they
are not required to explain that a particular sentence was enhanced or
reduced on account of family ties or responsibilities. Iowa's sentencing
scheme, for example, simply makes "clear that sentencing is a matter of
[a] trial court's broad discretion," and trial courts will be reversed there
only for "abuse of that discretion,"'" though what counts as an abuse of
discretion is substantially unpredictable to the outside observer.
The multiplicity of sentencing structures in the states is mirrored by
the various approaches states take in setting sentences in relation to the
family ties or responsibilities of an offender. In some jurisdictions, the
presence or absence of family ties and responsibilities will do little to af-
fect one's sentence.'65 For instance, in Oklahoma's noncapital sentencing
proceedings that occur before a jury, a defendant may not introduce evi-
dence solely designed to mitigate the sentence, such as information about
family ties and responsibilities."6 Florida's sentencing scheme is some-
what similar in that it does not articulate any express exception for de-
fendants with family ties and responsibilities; the relevant statute states
that sentencing "should be neutral with respect to race, gender, and so-
cial and economic status," '67 but it is unclear whether social status in-
cludes familial ties and responsibilities.
By contrast, in Massachusetts, the state legislature authorized the
courts to consider an offender's family ties and responsibilities in setting
an offender's sentence."6 Consideration of family ties and responsibili-
163. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 3003(b)(4) (West 2007) (including family ties within a list of
"suitability factors" that the Parole Board is to consider in awarding parole).
164. State v. Killpack, 276 N.W.2d 368, 373 (Iowa 1979); State v. Warner, 229 N.W.2d 776, 782-83
(Iowa 1975); see also State v. McKeever, 276 N.W.2d 385, 387 (Iowa 1979) ("Punishment must fit the
particular person and circumstances under consideration; each decision must be made on an individual
basis, and no single factor, including the nature of the offense, will be solely determinative").
165. For example, in Washington, the state guidelines contain "no provision comparable to
U.S.S.G. § 5H1.6," which, as discussed above, expressly discourages the consideration of family ties
and responsibilities. State v. Law, 110 P.3d 717 (Wash. 2005). Rather, the Washington sentencing
scheme "explicitly prohibit[s] such considerations" when considering departures. Id. at 725. The state
simply requires a "substantial and compelling reason[]" to depart from the state guidelines. Id. at 733
(Sanders, J., dissenting); see also People v. Coleman, No. 231299, 2002 WL 1340891, at *3 (Mich. Ct.
App. June 18, 2002) (under the sentencing statute in Michigan, a court may depart from minimum sen-
tence if it finds "substantial and compelling reasons" to do so; defendant's family ties did not consti-
tute a reason to depart downward).
166. Malone v. State, 58 P.3d 208, 210 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002) (stating that when jury decides
punishment for noncapital offenses "there simply is no provision allowing for mitigating evidence to
be presented in the sentencing stage of the trial. This is a limitation enacted by our Legislature, and
the limitation is undoubtedly constitutional.... [A] criminal trial is not to be based upon so-called
'character' evidence, and the same principle applies to sentencing proceedings").
167. The courts in Florida must also bear in mind that the "primary purpose of sentencing is to
punish the offender. Rehabilitation and other traditional considerations continue to be desired goals
of the criminal justice system but must assume a subordinate role." FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.701.
168. See Commonwealth v. Langill, No. ESCR2002-729, 2003 WL 22459077, at *3 (Mass. Super.
Ct. Sept. 29, 2003) (enumerating a list of mitigating factors, including family ties and responsibilities, in
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 211E § 3(d)); Commonwealth v. Morris, No. ESCR2002-1227, 2003 WL
22004943, at *6 (Mass. Super. Ct. Aug. 19, 2003) (legislature's intent was for the court to refer to the
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ties has also been expressly permitted in Louisiana, 69 Pennsylvania,'
Utah,' Wisconsin, 7 ' Tennessee,'73 Arizona,'74 and North Carolina.'75
Indeed, in Louisiana, the legislature has said that a court, when deciding
to suspend a sentence, should consider whether "[t]he imprisonment of
the defendant would entail excessive hardship to himself or his depend-
ents.' 17 6 Perhaps the most unusual feature of some courts' family ties ju-
risprudence is that some judges will consider the absence of family ties to
an area as a reason to not extend any leniency in a sentence.'77
nonexclusive list of mitigating factors found in Massachusetts Sentencing Act, which included family
ties and responsibilities of offender).
169. State v. Luke, 917 So. 3d 1226, 1228 (La. Ct. App. 2005) (stating that, when sentencing an
offender, courts should consider, inter alia, "age, family ties, marital status" but noting that "[tihere is
no requirement that specific matters be given any particular weight at sentencing"); State v. Douglas,
914 So. 2d 608, 610 (La. Ct. App. 2005) ("The important elements which should be considered are the
defendant's personal history (age, family ties, marital status, health, employment record), prior crimi-
nal record, seriousness of offense and the likelihood of rehabilitation."); State v. Fultz, 591 So. 2d
1308, 1310 (La. Ct. App. 1991) (upholding sentence after trial court considered "defendant's age, em-
ployment, family ties and responsibilities, and criminal history").
170. Pennsylvania's sentencing guidelines themselves do not suggest specific mitigating factors,
see 204 PA. CODE § 303.1 (2006), but the law in Pennsylvania does require consideration of alterna-
tives to incarceration, and the criteria for probation state that courts should, when deciding whether to
impose probation instead of incarceration, consider whether "[t]he confinement of the defendant
would entail excessive hardship to him or his dependents." 42 PA CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9722 (2006).
171. Utah has sentencing guidelines that courts are encouraged to use as a starting point. UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-3-201(7)(e) (2002) ("In determining a just sentence, the court shall consider sentenc-
ing guidelines regarding aggravating and mitigating circumstances promulgated by the Sentencing
Commission."). Those guidelines state that courts may consider mitigating a sentence when an adult
offender has "exceptionally good.., family relationships ... [or i]mprisonment would entail excessive
hardship on offender or dependents." UTAH SENTENCING COMM'N, 2006 ADULT SENTENCING AND
RELEASE GUIDELINES 17 (2006), available at http://www.sentencing.utah.gov/Guidelines/Adult/
AdultGuidelineManual2006.pdf.
172. Wisconsin has a purely advisory guidelines system in place, and the guidelines provide that
courts may mitigate the sentence of a defendant when he has "strong and stable ties to family and
community." See WIs. SENTENCING COMM'N, WISCONSIN SENTENCING GUIDELINES NOTES 7 (2003),
available at http://wsc.wi.gov/docview.asp?docid=3297.
173. State v. Turner, No. M2003-02064-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL 2775485, at *6 n.2 (Tenn. Crim.
App. Dec. 1, 2004) ("[T]his court has stated that ... work ethic and family contribution are entitled to
favorable consideration under Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-113(13)."); see also State v.
McKnight, 900 S.W.2d 36, 55 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) ("The defendant would normally be due some
favorable consideration based upon his family contributions and work ethic. Because, however, the
'help' he provided to young people was improperly motivated, the factor is inapplicable here."). The
sentencing statutes in Tennessee also permit sentence mitigation if the defendant committed the of-
fense in order to "provide necessities for the defendant's family or the defendant's self." TENN. CODE
ANN. § 40-35-113(7) (2006).
174. State v. Johnson, 640 P.2d 861, 867 (Ariz. 1982) ("[S]entencing judge listened to the mitigat-
ing evidence before him and apparently concluded that appellant's family ties, military record, and
good reputation did not offset the seriousness of appellant's murderous design.").
175. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.16 (2006). North Carolina's Sentencing Guidelines permit miti-
gation of sentences when "[t]he defendant supports the defendant's family" and when the "defendant
has a support system in the community." Id.
176. LA. CODE. CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 894.1.B(31) (2006).
177. See, e.g., State v. Baker, No. 02-1332, 2003 WL 22339644, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 15, 2003)
(finding no abuse of discretion where trial court, which was required to state on the record its reasons
for sentencing in a particular way, said to defendant, in explaining its imposition of sentence, that "you
lack a stable residence; you have no family ties to the area, or [sic] no substantial family ties to the
area").
No. 41
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Finally, we note that sentencing in various states involves the intro-
duction of victim impact evidence. 78 While some jurisdictions allow vic-
tim impact evidence to be introduced by any number of persons con-
nected to the victim, some jurisdictions only allow statements by the
victim's family members.7 9
E. Prison Policies
Our punitive practices surrounding incarceration cannot help but
acknowledge family ties because sentences imposed upon wrongdoers
will usually affect inmates' families: a son, a daughter, a father, a mother,
a brother, or a sister ceases to be regularly present in a family's life. The
federal and state governments must make choices about how to deal with
family ties and responsibilities. For example, should families of the in-
carcerated be entitled to special visitation rights? Should the incarcer-
ated get special dispensations (like furloughs) to see family members
outside of prison? Should family ties be considered in prison placement
decisions? We look at some of these questions in the context of the fed-
eral criminal justice system.
1. Federal Prison Visitation Policies
The Federal Bureau of Prisons' policy statement announces that
"visits [by family] are an important factor in maintaining the morale of
the individual offender and motivating [him] toward positive goals."'"
Indeed, some have gone so far as to argue that family visitation in prison
is a "fundamental" right (whether of the prisoner or of the family of the
178. See DOUGLAS E. BELOOF, PAUL G. CASSEL, & STEVEN J. TWIST, VICTIMS IN CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE (2d ed. 2005).
179. See State v. Muhammad, 678 A.2d 164, 179-80 (N.J. 1996); Wayne A. Logan, Through the
Past Darkly: A Survey of the Uses and Abuses of Victim Impact Evidence in Capital Trials, 41 ARIZ. L.
REV. 143, 153-56 (1999) (describing New Jersey statute that allows only a family member of a homi-
cide victim to offer a victim impact statement during a sentencing hearing); see also Cargle v. State,
909 P.2d 806, 828 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) ("[V]ictim impact evidence should be restricted to those
unique characteristics which define the individual who has died, the contemporaneous and prospective
circumstances surrounding that death, and how those circumstances have financially, emotionally, psy-
chologically, and physically impacted on members of the victim's immediate family." (emphasis
added)).
180. FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, PROGRAM STATEMENT 7300.4A(1) (2003); see also DANIEL
GLASER, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF A PRISON AND PAROLE SYSTEM 366 (1964) (interaction with family
members promotes rehabilitation); AM. CORRECTIONAL ASS'N, MANUAL OF CORRECTIONAL
STANDARDS 542 (1966) (family members "should be permitted and encouraged to maintain close con-
tact with the inmate"); AM. PRISON ASS'N, A MANUAL OF CORRECTIONAL STANDARDS 342 (1954)
(parole success depends on family ties during incarceration); COMM'N ON ACCREDITATION FOR
CORRECTIONS, MANUAL OF STANDARDS FOR ADULT CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS 88 (1981)
(same). The Bureau provides in its bill of rights for inmates that inmates "have the right to visit and
correspond with family members and friends." FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, PROGRAM STATEMENT
5270.07 § 541.12(5) (1987).
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prisoner), 1 protected by the Constitution.'82 Courts have not, generally,
found such a "right" to exist, 83 though some courts have shown solicitude
for family visitation when privileges are withheld unreasonably. 8" In the
final analysis, however, courts rarely intrude on the wide discretion af-
forded prison administrators in devising visitation policies.'85 That said,
most prisons make some provision for family visitation, though such
policies routinely give prisoners access to visitors who are not members
of the incarcerated's family as well.'86 Accordingly, although families do
not necessarily get privileged status in the realm of visitation policies
(because inmates can also be visited by friends and business associ-
ates), 87 it is likely that family visitation would be greeted with greater
181. See Virginia L. Hardwick, Note, Punishing the Innocent. Unconstitutional Restrictions on
Prison Marriage and Visitation, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 275, 295-98 (1985) (arguing that families have a
constitutional right to see their imprisoned family members).
182. This argument is based, in the first instance, on the Supreme Court's decision in Moore v.
East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977), which held that the state could not prevent an extended family
from living together because family relationships are special. Id. at 503-06; see also Hardwick, supra
note 181, at 296. Hardwick also relies on, inter alia, Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972) (hold-
ing that parental rights cannot be terminated without procedural due process and a competency hear-
ing); Franz v. United States, 707 F.2d 582, 601 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (stating that "it appears impossible to
say with any confidence that the concerns that underlie our willingness to accord 'fundamental' status
to parent-child bonds are any less telling when the relationship in question consists of mere 'visita-
tion"'); and In re Rhine, 456 A.2d 608, 614 (Pa. Super. 1983) (holding that parents who have children
in foster care have visitation rights that cannot be infringed without clear and convincing evidence in
favor of termination of such right).
183. See, e.g., Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 420 (6th Cir. 1984) ("Prison inmates have no ab-
solute constitutional right to visitation."); Craig v. Hocker, 405 F. Supp. 656, 674 (D. Nev. 1975) ("So
long as there are reasonable alternative means of communication, a prisoner has no First Amendment
right to associate with whomever he sees fit."); see also Bazzetta v. McGinnis, 124 F.3d 774, 779 (6th
Cir. 1997) (citing and following Bellamy); Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283, 291 (5th Cir. 1977)
(leaving visitation regulations to prison administrators); Harris v. Thigpen, 727 F. Supp. 1564, 1581
(M.D. Ala. 1990) (citing and following Newman); Thompson v. Bland, 664 F. Supp. 261,262 (W.D. Ky.
1986) (same); White v. Keller, 438 F. Supp. 110, 115 (D. Md. 1977) (finding that the incarcerated have
no right to visitation).
184. See Griffen v. Coughlin, 673 N.E.2d 98, 122-23 (N.Y. 1996) (finding a prison policy that re-
quired attendance in a religiously oriented substance abuse program to qualify for the prison's Family
Reunion program to violate the Establishment Clause); McMurry v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 742, 764
(W.D. La. 1982) (rejecting policy preventing children under fourteen from seeing their jailed parents);
Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269, 322 (D.N.H. 1977) (holding that "visitation privileges may be
curtailed as a punishment for disciplinary infractions" but "may not be so great as to infringe upon
inmates' First Amendment rights to familial association").
185. See, e.g., Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586 (1984); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547-48
(1979); Doe v. Coughlin, 518 N.E.2d 536, 538 (N.Y. 1987) (ruling that a prison can exclude inmates
with HIV/AIDS from family visitation programs); In re Dyer, 20 P.3d 907, 912 (Wash. 2001) (finding
that prison authorities have wide discretion to administer an extended visitation policy because "It is
not in the best interest of the courts to involve themselves in the 'day-to-day management of prisons,
often squandering judicial resources with little offsetting benefit to anyone. Courts ought to afford
appropriate deference and flexibility to state officials trying to manage a volatile environment."'
(quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 482 (1995))).
186. But see Jeremy Travis, Families and Children, FED. PROBATION, June 2005, at 31, 37.
("[Miany prisons narrowly define the family members who are granted visiting privileges.").
187. See Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 133 (2003) (upholding prison regulations that impose
two-year visitation bans and regulations that excluded visits by minor nieces and nephews and children
as to whom parental rights had been terminated). As the regulations upheld in Bazzetta did allow vis-
its between an inmate and her own children, grandchildren, and siblings, the Court did "not im-
ply ... that any right to intimate association is altogether terminated by incarceration or is always ir-
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deference than nonfamily visitors at the prison administration level,
given the Federal Bureau of Prisons' general embrace of family ties as
especially rehabilitative."8 It may seem appropriate to furnish families
with special opportunities for visitation to ensure family reunification af-
ter incarceration and to avoid the termination of parental rights.189 In-
deed, some states require reunification services for incarcerated par-
ents. 190
Beyond simple visitation rights are rights to "contact" visitation.
"Contact" visitation, because of the inherent safety and security issues at
stake, is usually reserved for only a few types of visitors (depending on
the security risk of the individual prisoner).19' Family members, of
course, are most likely to draw upon the sympathies of the prison ad-
ministration and prisoners can often gain access to "contact" visitation
privileges with their family members."
2. Federal Prison Furlough Policies
Family ties are also directly implicated in prison furlough policy.
Furloughs are authorized unaccompanied absences from a corrections
facility during a term of incarceration and are privileges (not rights); they
are explicitly sanctioned by federal law at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3622 and 4082 and
are available to eligible inmates based on the severity of the crime and
sentence, the inmate's release date, and other factors. According to the
federal guidelines, there are many reasons that might justify furloughs,
including: needing to appear in court, participation in job training, par-
ticipation in "educational, social, civic, religious, and recreational activi-
ties which will facilitate release transition,"'93 and participation in the
"development of release plans." 94 Moreover, furloughs are often used to
relevant" in evaluating the legitimacy of prison policies. Id. at 131. In Bazzetta, however, the Court
found a legitimate penological interest in excluding certain extended family members from visitation.
Id. at 126-27.
188. See FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, PROGRAM STATEMENT 7300.4A(1) (2003).
189. See Lanette P. Dailey, Imprisoned Mothers and Their Children: Their Often Conflicting Legal
Rights, 22 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 1, 40-43 (2001); Philip M. Genty, Permanency Planning in the
Context of Parental Incarceration: Legal Issues and Recommendations, 77 CHILD WELFARE 543, 545-
46 (1998); Heidi Rosenberg, California's Incarcerated Mothers: Legal Roadblocks to Reunification, 30
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 285,325-26, 329-30 (2000).
190. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361.5(e)(1) (West 2007); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 384-
b(2)(b), 7(f) (McKinney 2007).
191. See, e.g., Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586, 589 (1983) (holding that contact visitation
can be constitutionally prohibited for security reasons); accord Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080,
1114 (9th Cir. 1986) (same); Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 420 (6th Cir. 1984); Lynott v. Hender-
son, 610 F.2d 340, 342 (5th Cir. 1980).
192. For example, Kentucky permits contact visitation of immediate family, and three additional
adults that the inmate may specify. If he has no immediate family, the warden may permit him to have
more than three nonrelative visitors. KENTUCKY CORRECTIONS, POLICIES AND PROCEDURES-
INMATE VISITS 3 (2004), available at http://www.corrections.ky.gov/NR/rdonlyres/9El37E51-BF40-
451E-BF4C-208503BD1958/Ol6lVisit.pdf.
193. FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, PROGRAM STATEMENT 5270.07 (1987).
194. Id. § 570.32(a)(2).
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facilitate the provision of healthcare, mental health, or dental services
not available on site at a correctional institution.
Nevertheless, according to the Federal Bureau of Prisons' Program
Statement about furloughs, "[d]ay furloughs are generally used to
strengthen family ties."' 95 And the policies that govern furloughs make
clear that furloughs may be given so that an inmate may be "present dur-
ing a crisis in the immediate family"'96 and may request a furlough "[t]o
reestablish family.. . ties." '197 Families get special consideration in the
distribution of furloughs-and, all else being equal, those eligible in-
mates with families will likely get more furloughs than those without.
3. Federal Prison Placement Policies
Notwithstanding the general preference of Congress and the U.S.
Sentencing Commission to discourage sentencing departures based on
family ties and responsibilities, there are various ways in which the fed-
eral criminal justice system is sensitive to family ties and responsibilities
when dealing with "the nature, extent, place of service, or other incidents
of an appropriate sentence."'99 In this respect, a judge could, in consid-
eration of a family's location, recommend that the Bureau of Prisons
place an offender closer to his family.'99 Indeed, as Judge Posner wrote
in Froehlich v. Wisconsin Department of Corrections ,2° concerning the
transfer of a female state prisoner whose children sued to keep her in
Wisconsin, although such an accommodation is not constitutionally im-
posed on prison officials, "it may be a moral duty.""2 1
Additionally, a series of programs to accommodate families in
placement decisions have emerged, though often in very short supply.20 2
For example, the Federal Bureau of Prisons instituted a program called
Mothers and Infants Together (MINT). Under this program, "[e]ligible
women who have been sentenced to incarceration reside in a community
correction setting with their infants for up to 18 months after delivery."203
Myrna Raeder elaborates upon other similar programs put in place at the
state level:
California funded its Pregnant and Parenting Women's Alternative
Sentencing Program Act and has opened two long-term community
195. Id. § 570.31(a)(1). Such furloughs are also granted "to enrich specific institution program
experiences."
196. Id. § 570.32(a)(1) (defining immediate family as "mother, father, step-parents, foster parents,
brothers and sisters, spouse, and children").
197. Id. § 570.32(a)(3).
198. 28 U.S.C. § 994(d) (2000).
199. Notably, it is easier to accomplish this accommodation for men than it is for women; there
are many fewer prisons with female populations. See Myrna S. Raeder, A Primer on Gender-Related
Issues That Affect Female Offenders, 20 CRIM. JUST. 4, 18 (2005).
200. 196 F.3d 800, 802 (7th Cir. 1999).
201. Id.
202. Raeder, supra note 199, at 11, 18.
203. Id. at 17.
No. 4]
HeinOnline  -- 2007 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1181 2007
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
correctional facilities pursuant to California Penal Code 1174, to
which women are sentenced directly, without serving time in prison,
where they can reside with their minor children under six years of
age for up to three years. The focus is not only on treatment of the
mother, but emphasizes the development of the mother-child bond.
In addition, for the last 20 years, California also has operated a
Community Prison Mother Program, where inmates with less than
six years remaining on their sentences may reside with their chil-
dren in a residential facility where they receive comprehensive pro-
gramming to enable them to better reintegrate into their communi-
ties. Small programs exist in a number of states, but currently there
is no groundswell to make such programs the norm rather than the
exception. °4
4. Other Intersections of Family Ties and Prison Practices
There are still other punitive policies and practices involving family
ties. Some prison administrators, for example, have enacted policies that
prevent those condemned to death from giving their family members a
final hug prior to execution.'0 5 Some states allow families of victims to
watch the execution of those responsible for the death of family members
even when general access to watching the execution is severely circum-
scribed.2 '°  Another accommodation given by the penal system (and the
Constitution more broadly) to families generally includes giving prison-
ers the right to marry;2°7 some argue that the state should even extend to
prisoners the right to procreate .2' Also, in the event of an inmate's
death, the federal prison system notifies family members and allows fed-
eral chaplains to be involved with the inmate's family during the initial
periods of grief.2"
Additionally, there is a little known provision in the federal criminal
code, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), which might be utilized to protect fami-
204. Id.; see also Myrna S. Raeder, Creating Correctional Alternatives for Nonviolent Women Of-
fenders and Their Children, 44 ST. Louis U. L.J. 377 (2000).
205. See Ryan A. Byrd, Comment, A "Last Hug" Before Execution: The Case in Favor of Contact
Visitation for Death Row Inmates in Texas, 2 SCHOLAR 249 (2000) (describing and criticizing a no-
contact policy in Texas).
206. See Patricia G. Barnes, Final Reckoning: States Allow Victims' Families To Watch Executions,
82 A.B.A, J. 36 (1996) (noting that Texas, Virginia, Louisiana, California, Washington, Illinois, Penn-
sylvania, and Oklahoma are the states with policies allowing such viewings).
207. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987); see Jason 0. Runckel, Criminal Procedure: Ending a
Prisoner's Right to Have Personal Visits, 28 PAC. L.J. 772, 773 (1997) (noting that California Constitu-
tion guarantees to prisoners the right to marry). The federal guidelines for prisoner marriage (requir-
ing wardens to grant prisoners permission to marry, subject to a few exceptions) are contained in FED.
BUREAU OF PRISONS, PROGRAM STATEMENT 5326.04, MARRIAGES OF INMATES (updated 1998).
208. Jaime Escuder, Comment, Prisoner Parents: An Argument for Extending the Right to Procre-
ate to Incarcerated Men and Women, 2002 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 271.
209. FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, PROGRAM STATEMENT 5553.06, ESCAPES/DEATHS NOTIFICA-
TION (updated 1999).
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lies during the punitive phase of the criminal law.z"' The provision "al-
lows a court, upon the motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons,
to reduce a sentence for 'extraordinary and compelling' reasons. 211 Al-
though the provision is employed only rarely (and usually in cases of ill-
ness), the organization Families Against Mandatory Minimums (FAMM)
has urged the Sentencing Commission to instruct judges to make greater
use of that law, which could facilitate sentence reductions in many more
cases than executive clemency provides.212 In particular, FAMM has rec-
ommended that certain family-related reasons should meet the "extraor-
dinary and compelling" circumstances test.213
Finally, it is also worth noting that the Bureau of Prisons encour-
ages inmates to use their funds to assist their families and meet their
"family needs." ' 4 The Bureau has also developed parenting program-
ming with the objectives of promoting "family values," counteracting
"negative family consequences resulting from ... incarceration," and in-
tending for the "institutional social environment [to] be improved
through opportunities for inmates to maintain positive and sustaining
contacts with their families." ' 5  The programs require expenditure of
substantial governmental resources on developing family ties between
the incarcerated and their families.216
210. See Mary Price, The Other Safety Valve: Sentence Reduction Motions Under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(1)(A), 13 FED. SENT'G REP. 188 (2001).
211. Id. at 188.
212. Id. at 188-89.
213. Id. at 191 (arguing that "the death or incapacitation of family members capable of caring for
the [prisoner's] minor children, or other similarly compelling family circumstance" should be sufficient
to make a prisoner eligible for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)). Several courts
have recently offered explication of § 3582(c)(1)(A). See United States v. Guerrero, 166 F. App'x. 757,
757 (5th Cir. 2006) ("Guerrero does not argue that he has an illness from which he will die within one
year or that his medical condition has rendered him unable to provide self-care. Thus, he has not
shown that the Bureau of Prisons abused its discretion in applying its interpretive rule restricting the
application of 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) to inmates who have been diagnosed with medical condi-
tions that are terminal within one year or who suffer from severely debilitating and irreversible condi-
tions that render them unable to provide self-care."); Williams v. Van Buren, 117 F. App'x. 985 (5th
Cir. 2004) (discussing what it calls the "compassionate release" provision); United States v.
Maldonado, 138 F. Supp. 2d 328, 333 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (same, denying relief). The Bureau of Prisons
has the regulatory authority to define what constitutes "extraordinary and compelling" reasons and
has promulgated Program Statement 5050.46, Compassionate Release; Procedures for Implementation
of 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) and 28 C.F.R. § 571.60 to explain that the BOP will only seek to help a
prisoner come within statute (for the BOP must make a motion under this provision) when "circum-
stances of terminal illness with a predictable life expectancy ... would likely prevent a person from
completing his/her sentence." FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, PROGRAM STATEMENT 5050.46, COMPAS-
SIONATE RELEASE (1998).
214. FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, PROGRAM STATEMENT 5270.07, § 541.12(11), INMATE DISCI-
PLINE AND SPECIAL HOUSING UNITS (1987)).
215. FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, PROGRAM STATEMENT 5355.03, PARENTING PROGRAM
STANDARDS (updated 1995).
216. Id.
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F. Identifying a Family Ties Benefit: Some Difficulties
Our survey of some of the more prominent points of intersection
between family life and the criminal justice system reveals one overriding
theme: the government repeatedly extends benefits, accommodations,
and privileges to family interests. 217 Many difficult puzzles arise from this
phenomenon.
First, in making any benefits available solely on the basis of family
ties, the state necessarily is making express normative judgments regard-
ing who counts as family and who does not.218  Thus, large numbers of
persons who might justifiably, in our view, see themselves as entitled to
family ties benefits are excluded. Perhaps the most obvious example is
families of same-sex couples, who are routinely denied treatment as
equals in the provision of family ties benefits, such as the evidentiary
privileges.219 When the state makes choices regarding families, it risks
217. One reader of an earlier draft suggested that this article could start from a different premise,
one that tried to put family law first, and thus saw the criminal justice system's intrusion into the family
and willingness to sacrifice family interests as requiring special justification. To be sure, that would
afford an interesting lens to view these issues; however, to the extent that such a perspective might
suggest that society would benefit from a general prioritization of the family unit over the prohibitions
on force or fraud, we respectfully disagree. A society that did not prioritize protection against force or
fraud would undermine the very security necessary for families (and everyone else) to flourish. (At
the margins, it might suggest sparing violent offenders from punishment merely on account of their
being parents or children.) Cf. Alon Harel, Why Only the State May Inflict Criminal Sanctions: On the
Incoherence of Privately-Inflicted Criminal Sanctions, 28 CARDOZO L. REv. (forthcoming 2007)
(manuscript at 16, on file with author) ("It is easy to conceive of a state that does not redistribute re-
sources or even a state that does not maintain a tort law system. Thinking, however, of a society with-
out criminal law system[s] or without a scheme of sanctions for the violation of norms seems tanta-
mount to thinking of a stateless existence."). As we show in Part ILA, we respect the importance of
the family in society, but we are reluctant to elevate categorically the promotion of family interests
above the basic values underlying criminal law norms when those interests conflict. Moreover, we
prefer that familial status not be the sole marker by which established relationships of care giving are
protected. In any event, legislatures might seek to carve out a middle ground by articulating and limit-
ing the conditions and circumstances in which criminal law values trump (e.g., felonies involving fraud
or violence) and those circumstances where the concern for family interests would prevail (e.g., petty
crimes). But at the very least, there should be a greater awareness for the way in which these two
realms of activity intersect.
218. See also Travis, supra note 186, at 37 ("[M]any prisons narrowly define the family members
who are granted visiting privileges. Michigan's corrections department, for example, promulgated
regulations in 1995 restricting the categories of individuals who are allowed to visit a prisoner. The
approved visiting list may include minor children under the age of eighteen, but only if they are the
prisoner's children, stepchildren, grandchildren, or siblings. Prisoners who are neither the biological
parents nor legal stepparents of the children they were raising do not have this privilege.... Many
prisoners' extended family networks, including girlfriends and boyfriends who are raising prisoners'
children, are not recognized in these narrow definitions of 'family."'). See generally Murray, supra
note 141.
219. We find the bright-line marriage rule impossible to justify. Others agree that same-sex part-
ners ought to be granted the same privilege rights that married couples get. See, e.g., Jennifer R.
Brannen, Unmarried with Privileges? Extending the Evidentiary Privilege to Same-Sex Couples, 17
REV. LIT. 311 (1998) (arguing that same-sex couples should be entitled to claim spousal privileges);
Elizabeth Kimberly (Kyhm) Penfil, In the Light of Reason and Experience: Should Federal Evidence
Law Protect Confidential Communications Between Same-Sex Partners?, 88 MARo. L. REv. 815, 845
(2005) ("[T]he debate between those who would protect communications between same-sex partners
and those who would not more readily resembles the paradigmatic dispute between Antigone and
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marginalizing persons who consider themselves family members but are
not recognized as such by the state. In this sense, use of the family to dis-
tribute benefits may be underinclusive.22 °
Second, even assuming one could agree on which people count as a
"family," reliance on that category will often be overinclusive. You
might not like your spouse at all and could harbor no hesitation to testify
against him; but he still might reap the benefits of an interfamily testimo-
nial privilege.2 ' To be sure, the obvious advantage of using family as the
dividing line here is administrability. But it is not easy to administer
when we operate with competing definitions, and the state must take a
value position on who counts.222
Third, the government does not always demonstrate a consistent
pattern of who counts as family for each of these benefits. In the federal
sentencing context, for example, where the courts look to find out
whether the defendant is an irreplaceable caregiver, the concept of fam-
ily for determining extraordinary family ties and responsibilities appears
rather broad.223 If a grandparent or an aunt can take care of the children,
then the single-parent defendant is unlikely to get a substantial depar-
ture, if at all.2 4 By contrast, in other areas where the government dis-
tributes family ties benefits, the range of relevant family members may
be narrow-for example, evidentiary privileges.2 5
Fourth, we recognize that some practices that confer benefits on
families may also serve other purposes that in fact directly benefit the
state. For example, pretrial release determinations that examine the
presence of a defendant's family ties in the area may be viewed as a
Creon. Those who, like Creon, believe the current, state-imposed laws are inviolate will refuse the
privilege. Those who, like Antigone, believe the eternal laws of family loyalty and ethical choice su-
percede the state's current pronouncement of the law will seek to apply the privilege."); Nancy D.
Polikoff, Ending Marriage As We Know It, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 201, 202 (2003) (advocating "sweep-
ing reform" in rewarding diverse adult relationships, rather than just marriage). Cohabiting couples
with serious relationships similarly deserve privilege protection if married people do. For a contrary
view, see Annotation, Communication Between Unmarried Couple Living Together as Privileged, 4.
A.L.R. 4th 422 (2005) (collecting cases unanimously drawing a bright-line test at marriage and refusing
to provide cohabiters with spousal privileges).
220. Of course, the exclusion of people here is not a problem unique to the criminal law context.
And the fact of a benefit's underinclusiveness is not a sufficient reason to jettison the benefit, but
rather is a potential reason to expand who receives it.
221. It bears mention, though, that many jurisdictions confer a right to a willing spouse to testify.
222. One possible solution to the administrability challenge would be to give people a discrete
number of persons eligible for privileges and to designate those persons ex ante through a registry.
See infra note 316.
223. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.6 cmt. n.l(B) (2006).
224. Consequently, in the federal context, it might appear that family ties actually work against
some defendants because of the broad network of persons on which they might rely. On this view, this
could seem more like a tax on defendants with family ties than a benefit to them. We disagree. By
narrowing the class of offenders who might benefit from family ties departures to simply those who
occupy a role of irreplaceable caregiver, the cases implementing the 5H1.6 provision help ensure that
defendants with family ties are not benefited vis-A-vis those similarly situated defendants without any
special family ties or responsibilities.
225. The federal courts, in other words, expand the notion of family capaciously for purposes of
sentencing but restrict it for purposes of extending evidentiary privileges.
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benefit for the family. Nonetheless, familial considerations may also
serve as an imperfect proxy for assessing a defendant's flight risk, an is-
sue in which the state has a clear and appropriate interest. Similarly, the
various accommodations of the family in the context of prison admini-
stration may reflect (imperfect or indirect) choices of decision makers in
the criminal justice system to advance goals such as strengthening pre-
carious families, or alternatively, reducing recidivism or 'facilitating of-
fender rehabilitation and reintegration into society. And perhaps-
though this seems more contestable-when the state takes an interest in
a defendant's criminal motivation (say, to steal bread for hungry chil-
dren) based on family loyalty, it may be assessing severity of moral cul-
pability rather than giving the family any benefit as such.
We acknowledge the general difficulty of identifying what counts as
a genuine benefit to the family. This challenge results, in part, because a
variety of extant and historical practices arise under the cloud of the tra-
ditional governmental reluctance to intervene in family life, even to pro-
tect a family's most vulnerable members.2 6 Thus, when government
prosecutors fail to pursue domestic violence, such as marital rape or child
abuse, it is unclear whether that pattern of prosecutorial inaction consti-
tutes a family ties benefit.2 27 The origins of the pattern of noninterfer-
ence were, as we explain in Part II, clearly intended to protect the family
against the reach of the state. But this policy choice may simply be a
wrong-headed approach to advancing family interests. Thus, it is hard to
say that, in those situations, the state is in fact advancing the welfare of
the institution of the family or a particular family. Clearly, not all appar-
ent "benefits" actually advance the interests of family life or the lives of
particular members of families.
Nonetheless, as should be apparent from our discussion thus far,
there are at least a handful of situations where the criminal justice system
has actively accommodated, promoted, or privileged familial interests or
chosen policies that at least disparately benefit those with families. We
have in mind here the evidentiary privileges, familial status defenses, sen-
tencing discounts for offenders with family ties and responsibilities, and
exemptions for family members from harboring fugitives. The next Part
shifts from the descriptive to the normative, as we consider what factors
should help determine whether a particular accommodation of family in-
terests by the criminal justice system is an appropriate policy choice.
226. See supra note 64.
227. As Alice Ristroph noted in a comment on an earlier draft, the failure to prosecute marital
rape and other domestic abuse may reflect less about family benefits and more about contested views
that men who have forced sex with their wives are less "blameworthy" than those who have forced sex
with strangers, and that violence against family members is less blameworthy than violence against
others.
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II. ERECTING THE SPARTAN PRESUMPTION: STRUCTURE, SCOPE, AND
RATIONALE
A. Family and the Modern State: An Ambivalent Relationship
The modern defense of using the state, its institutions, its laws, and
its coercive force to support the family often rings in "communitarian"
tones. The argument usually proceeds by drawing upon the "histori-
cal, ' '228 "constitutive," '29 or "situated""23  selves that constitute a polity.23
Such selves are composed of loyalties, role-responsibilities, and personal
ties that are, in some very basic sense, logically and morally prior to the
individual. The self, it is sometimes argued, is linked up so inextricably
with these group and relational affiliations that any moral system embod-
ied by a state and its laws must appreciate, respect, and facilitate the
self's authentic expression of that which creates its very identity. States
must either find a way to acknowledge special "associative" duties flow-
ing to family members that may conflict with and trump more general
duties to people as such,232 or risk irrelevance and illegitimacy.
Accordingly, it can be argued that states ought not ignore the indi-
vidual self's derivation from and debt to the family.233 If the family de-
fines the individual, a state's administration of justice must serve its citi-
zens by appreciating the very sources of their individuality. Privileging
and giving priority to the family-a central source of selfhood-is one
228. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, LOYALTY: AN ESSAY ON THE MORALITY OF RELATIONSHIPS 3
(1993).
229. See MEIR DAN-COHEN, Responsibility and the Boundaries of the Self, in HARMFUL
THOUGHTS: ESSAYS ON LAW, SELF, AND MORALITY 199-200 (2002) (originally published at 105
HARV. L. REV. 959 (1992)).
230. See MILTON C. REGAN, JR., ALONE TOGETHER: LAW AND THE MEANINGS OF MARRIAGE
15-29 (1999); Regan, supra note 21, at 2067-89.
231. These accounts of the self have their roots in the early communitarian theories of CHARLES
TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF THE MODERN IDENTITY 3-24 (1989) (developing
the idea that selves have "inescapable frameworks" that any theory of justice and the state must ac-
commodate); CHARLES TAYLOR, THE ETHICS OF AUTHENTICITY 37-39 (1991) (developing the idea of
the self with "horizons of significance"); and MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF
JUSTICE (1982) (developing the idea of the "encumbered" self).
232. For more on the distinction between associative and general duties, see SAMUEL SCHEFFLER,
Families, Nations, and Strangers, in BOUNDARIES AND ALLEGIANCES: PROBLEMS OF JUSTICE AND
RESPONSIBILITY IN LIBERAL THOUGHT 48, 49-50 (2001).
233. A variant of this argument is offered by Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Constitutional Rights of
Private Governments, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 144, 147 (2003). Drawing on JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY
OF FREEDOM 38-69 (1986), Hills suggests that state officials should defer to decisions made by compe-
tent "private governments" -of which the family is an example. Hills, supra, at 193-96. Such private
governments promote individual freedom and should be accorded special associational rights and lib-
erties. Hills's presumption that families' internal decision-making processes should command defer-
ence holds so long as the decision at issue would be more likely to be handled appropriately by the
private government than by the state. In what follows, we ultimately contest the notion that the family
and its internal decision-making process should receive any deference by the state in the criminal law
context. This is ultimately no real challenge to Hills, who concedes that deferring to private govern-
ments may be inappropriate if such deference does not improve decisions. See id. at 195-96. Never-
theless, with Hills, we are mindful that the state can draw on the family's expertise and efficiency-and
appreciate that these reasons may sometimes help rebut our preferred presumption of no deference.
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way to have the state connect with the individuals to which it must dis-
pense justice. Moreover, without extending benefits and immunities to
the family, the state risks losing compliance from its citizens; some bene-
fits may be necessary to establish and maintain the state's legitimacy. In-
deed, while the benefits may seem inappropriate in the context of the
criminal justice system, they might be viewed as a net benefit for induc-
ing general compliance with a legal regime.234
There is yet another available justification for the state's support of
the family-one that is potentially more practical and less philosophical.
One could argue that because the state either cannot or will not live in
accordance with what Plato's Republic idealizes for the Guardian class-
no private families with all children being held in common 235 - the state
needs to keep families together and solvent. The state can draw from the
rich panoply of resources naturally furnished and expended by the family
in creating good citizens. By giving families special support, the state can
economize on expenditures that it would otherwise be forced to bear in
educating its citizenry and preparing its members to contribute to the
stability and flourishing of the regime. This is a crude way of thinking
about the matter, to be sure. But it is one that must have a grain of truth:
the state simply cannot afford to provide all the services families rou-
tinely provide relatively efficiently and effectively, so it "subcontracts"
such work to the family-and "pays" it accordingly. Families will not be
able to provide care services completely for free-and can rightfully de-
mand that the state (which is parasitically living off of its successes) sub-
sidize the hard work of helping children "take their place as responsible,
self-governing members of society. '236 The state helps itself when it sub-
contracts cheaply the "formative project of fostering the capacities for
democratic and personal self-government" 237-and leaves it in generally
reliable hands.
There is a third argument available to those wishing that the state
continue to furnish families with special treatment. Some argue for an
234. See Paul H. Robinson, Competing Conceptions of Modern Desert: Vengeful, Deontological,
and Empirical 9 (U. of Penn. Law School Pub. Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Re-
search Paper No. 06-32), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=924917 ("If
the criminal law tracks the community's intuitions of justice in assigning liability and punishment, it is
argued, the law gains access to the power and efficiency of stigmatization, it avoids the resistance and
subversion inspired by an unjust system, it gains compliance by prompting people to defer to it as a
moral authority in new or grey areas (such as insider trading), and it earns the ability to help shape
powerful societal norms."); see also Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw.
U. L. REV. 453 (1997).
235. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 155-68 (Francis MacDonald Cornford ed. 1945).
236. Linda C. McClain, Care as a Public Value: Linking Responsibility, Resources, and Republi-
canism, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1673, 1674 (2001).
237. Linda C. McClain, Negotiating Gender and (Free and Equal) Citizenship: The Place of Asso-
ciations, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1569, 1569 (2004); see also MARTHA FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY,
MYTH, at xviii (2004) ("It is very important to understand the roles assigned to the family in society-
roles that otherwise might have to be played by other institutions, such as the market or the state.").
Although space constraints have prevented us from giving the subtle and important work of McClain
and Fineman its due, we think it important to give a flavor of this form of argument in the text.
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"ethic of care" in political and moral life more generally-and think the
state can facilitate this ethic by supporting families in the right way.238 As
Deborah Stone puts it,
Caring for each other is the most basic form of civic participation.
We learn to care in families, and we enlarge our communities of
concern as we mature. Caring is the essential democratic act, the
prerequisite to voting, joining associations, attending meetings,
holding office and all the other ways we sustain democracy. Care,
the noun, requires families and workers who care, the verb. Caring,
the activity, breeds caring, the attitude, and caring, the attitude,
seeds caring, the politics. 23
9
Accordingly, making sure the state cares for the family ensures that
citizens can care for one another, the state, and politics.
24
These arguments have much to recommend them; together they
seem persuasive and suggest that the law's recognition of family ties
might be more than just irrational sentimentalism or a knee-jerk instan-
tiation of "family values. '241 These arguments go beyond the notion oft
heard that strong families lead to a strong nation-and the contention
that families help furnish "civic virtue" and "social capital.2142 Although
many have tried to connect familial self-government with democratic
self-government, 43 the scholars we draw upon put meat on the bones of
the mottos and creeds routinely invoked. Obviously, we have not ex-
hausted the field or comprehensively explained how these ideas cash out
in particular legal contexts; instead, we have aimed only to summarize
very briefly the arguments of those who grapple with the role of the fam-
ily in the state's endeavor to secure the political conditions for human
flourishing.
Ultimately, we find little to quarrel with when these arguments are
considered at the most general level. All things being equal, we do not
think states can succeed without being attentive to the way in which
selves are constructed through families-and we agree that if states are
going to feed on the capacity-generating benefits families confer, it is not
inappropriate for families to demand some subsidization in return.
Families may be labors of love; but they are full of real undercompen-
sated labor all the same.
238. See JOAN C. TRONTO, MORAL BOUNDARIES: A POLITICAL ARGUMENT FOR AN ETHIC OF
CARE 3 (1993); Deborah Stone, Why We Need a Care Movement, NATION, Mar. 13, 2000, at 13, 15.
239. Stone, supra note 238, at 15.
240. Some feminists remain suspicious of the "ethic of care" because it seems intrinsically gen-
dered-and using the state to promote care might only further ensnare women in particular into the
hard work of caring. See JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK
CONFLICT AND WHAT To Do ABOUT IT 179 (2000).
241. McClain, supra note 237, at 1569.
242. See DONALD BRAMAN, DOING TIME ON THE OUTSIDE 6-7 (2004).
243. See NANCY COTT, PUBLIC Vows: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION (2000);
HENDRIK HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICA: A HISTORY (2000).
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Nevertheless, we do not think that the arguments to support family
benefits at a general level of political theory can succeed in every area of
the law. For the reasons we sketch in the remainder of this Part, we
think that the criminal justice system is an especially inappropriate place
to recognize the family's importance in our common lives together as
citizens-especially through the use of family ties benefits.2" Put briefly,
the consequences of wrongly or unfairly distributing criminal penalties or
causing more crime trump the invocation of "family privacy" or "family
preservation" when conflicts come to the fore.
We advance four normative cost considerations; together, we think
they erect a presumption-albeit rebuttable-against family ties benefits
in the criminal justice system.24 5 The normative costs we identify can be
summarized briefly. Benefits to families in the criminal justice system
historically facilitate gender hierarchy and domestic violence; undermine
the pursuit of accuracy in the effective prosecution of the guilty and the
exoneration of the innocent (thus possibly leading to unwarranted
harshness or leniency in the administration of justice); disrupt our liberal
political commitments to treat similarly situated persons with equal con-
cern and discriminate against those with little or no family; and incentiv-
ize more crime and more successful crime. For these reasons, we are
generally skeptical of using the criminal justice system to promote family
interests absent a compelling reason and no feasible alternative means.
B. Some Normative Costs of Family Ties Benefits
1. Patriarchy and Power: Historical Perspectives
The historical context in which the family's relationship to the
criminal law has evolved reveals that many benefits to the family often
served (and in some cases, continue to serve) to perpetuate patriarchy,
gender hierarchy, or domestic violence.246 Indeed, in the context of
crimes against children, the sanctuary the family has enjoyed against the
criminal law has served in particular to perpetuate child abuse and ne-
glect. The cultural assumption, validated at times by the Supreme Court,
has been that the "natural bonds of affection" between parent and child
244. See Jill Elaine Hasday, Intimacy and Economic Exchange, 119 HARV. L. REV. 491, 530
(2005) (arguing that we can furnish respect for intimate relationships through various means-and
need not pursue all strategies at once in every issue area).
245. "To say that these [arguments] are seen as [creating a] presumption is not to say that they
can never, in the end, be outweighed by other considerations. It is merely to say that, in the first in-
stance, they present themselves as considerations upon which one must" render judgment. SAMUEL
SCHEFFLER, Conceptions of Cosmopolitanism, in BOUNDARIES AND ALLEGIANCES: PROBLEMS OF
JUSTICE AND RESPONSIBILITY IN LIBERAL THOUGHT, supra note 232, at 121.
246. Cf. Markus Dirk Dubber, The Power to Govern Men and Things: Patriarchal Origins of the
Police Power in American Law, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 1277, 1345 (2004) (describing the patriarchal geneal-
ogy of the modem police power and noting that a clear view of the origins of state power can help
achieve the legitimate use of power).
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will protect our children.2 47  But this assumption has entailed a perverse
result: a culture of relative indifference toward violence in the family,
particularly against children.148 This is not a hard and fast rule, as many
family ties benefits have "liberalized" over the years and now operate to
prevent family members from using their special immunities to subvert
prosecution for domestic violence and child abuse. Still, there can be no
question that many of the policies canvassed in Part I-and the contin-
ued application of many family ties benefits-have ignoble origins and
serve to further domination in the "private" sphere.
As recounted in Wayne Logan's illuminating article, Criminal Law
Sanctuaries, the family has long been understood as an untouchable site
for criminal justice.249 Under Roman law, the doctrine of patria potestas
empowered fathers and husbands to dominate family life without fear of
the state's interference; thus, adulterous wives could be killed without
public retribution, and wives could be beaten with impunity.2 0  In colo-
nial America, Puritan courts squarely "placed family preservation ahead
of physical protection of victims," 251 allowing men to use force against
wives and children for "legitimate" reasons, a limit rarely tested out of
reluctance to disturb the privacy of family life. 2  Law enforcement inter-
est in family violence then waxed and waned over the generations, with
periods of activism butting up against a deep-rooted tradition of nonin-
terference in the affairs of a family.
253
Over time, wife beating was officially banned,254 but like so much
else, the law on the books eclipsed the law on the streets, as the act of
wife beating was often viewed as a nonevent from the eyes of the state -
it was, as one scholar (cynically?) called it, the "rule of love. ' 255  Unsur-
prisingly, children also suffered under the de facto sanctuary from the
247. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979); see also Lehr v. Robertston, 463 U.S. 248, 256
(1983) ("The intangible fibers that connect parent and child have infinite variety. They are woven
throughout the fabric of our society, providing it with strength, beauty, and flexibility.").
248. See generally Collins, supra note 77 (manuscript at 7-9).
249. See Logan, supra note 87.
250. Terry Davidson, Conjugal Crime: Understanding and Changing the Wifebeating Pattern 99
(1978); Logan, supra note 87, at 339; see also Mason Thomas, Child Abuse and Neglect Part I: Histori-
cal Overview, Legal Matrix, and Social Perspectives, 50 N.C. L. REV. 293, 295 (1972) (explaining that
doctrine of patria potestas also gave a father the right to "kill, mutilate, sell, or offer his child in sacri-
fice").
251. PLECK, supra note 68, at 17-33.
252. Id. at 27-29; see also Logan, supra note 87, at 340.
253. See generally Elizabeth Pleck, Criminal Approaches to Family Violence, 1640-1980, in
FAMILY VIOLENCE 19, 19-57 (Loyd Ohlin & Michael Tonry eds., 1989) (describing the history of re-
form efforts in matters of family violence). Pleck notes that "[t]he greater the defense of the rights
and privileges of the traditional family, the lower the interest in the criminalization of the family." Id.
at 20.
254. See, e.g., Fulgham v. State, 46 Ala. 143, 146-48 (1871); Commonwealth v. McAfee, 108 Mass.
458, 461 (1871).
255. See Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as Pr'erogative and Privacy, 105 YALE
L.J. 2117 (1996).
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reach of criminal law.256 Needless to say, there was still great difficulty in
prosecuting and punishing marital rape.257
In the 1970s, the tide began to shift, at least in part as a result of
greater sensitivity to the concerns raised by feminists. Police officers, for
instance, were no longer urged or instructed to play the role of "media-
tor" or "peacemaker" when called to a domestic disturbance; they could
play their normal role of enforcer of the criminal law. 8 Some scholars
contest whether that "normal" role is a desirable role in the family con-
text for fear that the implementation of "no-drop" or "shall-arrest" poli-
cies 25 9 might end up alienating victims from a criminal justice system that
is indifferent to or dismissive of their particular interests.2 6
That said, notwithstanding some advances in prosecution norms for
domestic violence, the criminal law system still exhibits a great reluctance
to interfere in the private life of the family. Scholars, such as Logan,
point to several examples of this ongoing phenomenon: elder abuse,26'
tolerance of domestic violence in homosexual relationships,2 62 the con-
256. Logan, supra note 87, at 341 ("Child abuse, by mothers and fathers alike, similarly continued
without significant intervention." (citing 1 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL
LAW §§ 878-891 (Little Brown 5th ed. 1872) (elaborating upon the chastisement right in families)));
Robert W. Ten Bensel et al., Children in a World of Violence: The Roots of Child Maltreatment, in THE
BATrERED CHILD 3 (Mary Edna Helfer et al. eds., 5th ed. 1997) (historical survey of child abuse). As
Logan explains, it was not until the widespread use of x-ray technology, which could discern evidence
of abuse that children were too afraid to discuss, that the tide changed, and jurisdictions began adopt-
ing criminal laws against child neglect or abuse. Logan, supra note 87, at 342-43.
257. According to Logan, "[m]arital rape, as of the mid-1980s, largely remained a legal impossibil-
ity, with the drafters of the influential Model Penal Code expressing concern over 'unwarranted intru-
sion of the penal law into the life of the family."' Logan, supra note 87, at 347; see also MODEL PENAL
CODE § 213.1 cmt. 8(c) (1985).
258. See 42 U.S.C. § 3796hh(c)(1)(A) (2000) (requiring units of government to "encourage or
mandate arrests of domestic violence offenders based on probable cause that an offense has been
committed" to be eligible for certain grants); MARC. L. MILLER & RONALD F. WRIGHT, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURES: CASES, STATUTES, AND EXECUTIVE MATERIALS 297-306 (2d ed. 2003) (discussing
changes in police responses to domestic violence); LAWRENCE W. SHERMAN ET AL., POLICING
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: EXPERIMENTS AND DILEMMAS (1992); Deborah Epstein, Procedural Justice:
Tempering the State's Response to Domestic Violence, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1843, 1851-56 (2002);
Cheryl Hanna, The Paradox of Hope: The Crime and Punishment of Domestic Violence, 39 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1505, 1518-19 (1998).
259. See R. Michael Cassidy, Reconsidering Spousal Privileges after Crawford, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L.
339, 348 (2006) (distinguishing soft from hard no-drop policies).
260. See Coker, supra note 65, at 803-05; Linda G. Mills, Killing Her Softly: Intimate Abuse and
the Violence of State Intervention, 113 HARV. L. REV. 550, 569-70 (1999); Suk, supra note 67, at 45.
But see Annalise Acorn, Surviving the Battered Reader's Syndrome, or: A Critique of Linda G. Mills'
Insult to Injury: Rethinking our Responses to Intimate Abuse, 13 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 335, 340
(2005); Cassidy, supra note 259, at 350 (surveying counter-arguments and studies supporting claim that
welfare and autonomy of women are improved through tough policies on domestic violence).
261. Seymour Moskowitz, Saving Granny from the Wolf: Elder Abuse and Neglect-the Legal
Framework, 31 CONN. L. REV. 77 (1998); Audrey S. Garfield, Note, Elder Abuse and the States' Adult
Protective Services Response: Time for a Change in California, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 859 (1991).
262. Nancy J. Knauer, Same-Sex Domestic Violence: Claiming a Domestic Sphere While Risking
Negative Stereotypes, 8 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 325 (1999); Ruthann Robson, Lavender
Bruises: Intra-Lesbian Violence, Law and Lesbian Legal Theory, 20 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 567
(1990); Symposium, Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Communities and Intimate Partner Vio-
lence, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 121 (2001).
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tinued difficulty of prosecuting marital rape,263 and the free use of corpo-
ral punishment against children." Moreover, the scourge of domestic
violence continues at astonishingly high levels.265 The effects of these
willful silences and deferential nods to the family have been, in Logan's
words, an unrelenting "form of criminal predations, perpetrated in the
shadow of public law."2"
The historical context provided above only partly underwrites our
Spartan presumption. Our argument reaches well beyond the fear that
benefits to the family facilitate the perpetuation of gender hierarchy and
domestic violence-though these reasons alone might suffice to reorient
our doctrines and practices. Indeed, the overwhelming respect for fami-
lies afforded by our law is often criticized by feminist scholars who are
undoubtedly right to express discomfort that the state subsidizes a do-
main in which women and children are routinely dominated. 267 For this
reason, we think the state should be very cautious when deciding to ex-
tend benefits or privileges on the basis of family ties in the criminal jus-
tice system.268
2. Accuracy and Justice
Benefits to the family in the criminal justice system also endanger
the accurate and just imposition of punishment. As we described earlier,
various jurisdictions afford family members special privileges that ex-
empt them from having to testify at trial or from providing other assis-
tance to law enforcement, even if they have information critical to the
accurate prosecution or exoneration of defendants or others.269 At bot-
tom, there are places where truth and family loyalty conflict, and the
state should not knowingly afford benefits to family members, or exempt
them from duties borne by other members of society, simply because of
263. Logan, supra note 87, at 347; see also Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A Legal His-
tory of Marital Rape, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1373, 1482 (2000) (noting the "partial norm and uneven" reform
of marital rape law).
264. Logan, supra note 87, at 347 (citing MURRAY A. STRAUS, BEATING THE DEVIL OUT OF
THEM: CORPORAL PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN FAMILIES (1994); Susan H. Bitensky, Spare the Rod,
Embrace Our Humanity: Toward a New Legal Regime Prohibiting Corporal Punishment of Children,
31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 353 (1998); David Orentlicher, Spanking and Other Corporal Punishment of
Children by Parents: Overvaluing Pain, Undervaluing Children, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 147 (1998)).
265. Id. at 372 (citing PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, EXTENT, NATURE, AND
CONSEQUENCES OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE: FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY III (2000)) (estimating that 4.8 million women experience every year some
form of sexual or physical abuse, and that annually about 2.9 million men endure physical assaults by
their partners).
266. Id. at 348.
267. See, e.g., SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 25-40 (1989).
268. If our skepticism toward family ties benefits were implemented in law and practice, we might
see the state's criminal justice system serve as a vehicle to interrupt and upend patterns of private pa-
triarchy and domination. But this would only be a first step; as Laura Rosenbury pointed out to us in a
comment on an earlier draft, reducing private patriarchy would not address the various ways the
state's institutions historically perpetuated its own kind of public patriarchy.
269. See supra Part I.C.2.
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familial relationships to the defendant. When innocent people mistak-
enly sit in prison (or guilty people escape prosecution altogether) as a re-
sult of these benefits, then our commitment to the accurate distribution
of justice is undermined at an intolerable cost.270
To be sure, we recognize that our concern about privileges also has
an empirical component. For one thing, in defense of the testimonial
privileges, the state can argue that it will be effectively inviting perjury
without them-and that no "truth" benefit can be conferred by trying to
force people to testify against their better judgments to maintain the se-
crets of a loved one against state intrusion.271' Although we have found
no empirical evidence to support the thesis that family members would
lie under oath if forced to testify against a loved one (in sufficient num-
bers to undermine the quest for truth in criminal trials), there is some
plausible appeal to the suggestion. Additionally, it may turn out that
having the privilege deters future crime because the communication of
the information to the spouse may have the salutary effect of the spouse
encouraging the defendant to forbear further crime. (Of course, if it
turns out that this is empirically grounded, then the privilege or immu-
nity should be limited to communications regarding future conduct, not
past conduct.)
Similarly, at work in the exemption for family members' harboring
fugitives must be an assumption that the temptation to commit the crime
of harboring in certain contexts is too great. A parent would have a very
difficult time turning away a child at the door precisely at a moment of
extreme vulnerability. Some might think that prudence demands that we
exempt those family members who are, in this situation, undeterrable; 27 2
others may think mercy is appropriate for those too weak to turn their
closest relatives away in a time of desperate need. Indeed, some jurisdic-
tions seem to acknowledge that family members have reduced culpabil-
ity; accordingly, some states do not immunize family members but charge
them with a lesser crime.
Our reaction to these efforts to excuse family members' commission
of a crime (perjury and harboring) is the same: the criminal law is a sepa-
rate sphere of justice, with its own primary values, among which are the
protection of citizens and the accurate and fair prosecution of those who
have endangered public safety and contravened the laws passed to pro-
tect that interest in security.273 Although it cannot be denied that humans
are frail and fallible-in particular when it comes to family loyalty-we
believe it risks too much accuracy in the criminal justice system to immu-
nize family members from crimes they may commit in service of a rela-
270. See Harel, supra note 217.
271. FLETCHER, supra note 228, at 81 (arguing that the perjury rationale for the intrafamilial
privileges might justify it where other rationales fail).
272. See 5 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 338 (1827).
273. Cf. MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 283 (1983).
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tive's obstruction of justice and to give them a free pass from answering
governmental subpoenas. The state simply cannot legitimate its accep-
tance of perjury and obstruction by refusing to prosecute individuals who
engage in these practices. Moreover, those who think it is unattractive to
make a parent testify against a child should undertake a thought experi-
ment: imagine that because of a parent's failure to testify against her
child, another person sits wrongfully on death row, a person who would
otherwise be exonerated. That wrongfully convicted person may also
have a family whose interests in their child's life should be protected.
The fact that it seems like it is only an apparently distant and disembod-
ied government that loses access to evidence should not obscure the fact
that the state is acting on behalf of potential future victims as well as past
victims. The state must fairly and effectively balance its solicitousness of
the defendant against others in society.
There are certainly other aspects of the criminal justice system that
similarly undermine the quest for accuracy, such as the exclusionary rule
associated with evidence procured in violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment. 74 But we do not believe the existence of such practices under-
mines our argument here. The exclusionary rule, for example, vindicates
another critical interest of our system of criminal justice, the constitu-
tional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.275 In con-
trast, we do not think the interest typically invoked in defending those
family ties benefits that impede accurate punishment or exoneration-
encouraging close familial relationships-constitutes sufficient reason to
abdicate our commitment to the truth-seeking function of the criminal
justice system.
3. Equality
Family ties benefits not only impede the accurate and just admini-
stration of criminal penalties, but they can also threaten basic commit-
ments to equality under law. Thus, our third difficulty with family ties
benefits is that they can disrupt norms of equality that should otherwise
prevail in an attractive regime of liberal governance. 76 A desideratum in
criminal law investigation and prosecution should be to treat citizens' in-
terests with equal concern, and without fear or favor. The extension of
274. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961) (holding that the exclusionary rule is an essential
part of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments). The attorney-client privilege is another example
and will be discussed in greater detail in infra Part III.A.1.
275. Moreover, with the right alternative measures available, some scholars have suggested that
there is good reason to revisit the wisdom of the exclusionary rule. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE
CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES 20-31 (1997).
276. See, e.g., Tracy E. Higgins & Laura A. Rosenbury, Agency, Equality, and Antidiscrimination
Law, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1194, 1198 (2000) (noting that liberal discourse normally entails commit-
ments which respect that "individuals, and not groups, are the primary political units and bearers of
rights; [and] that equality means, first and foremost, the right of every individual to 'equal respect and
concern' in pursuit of her conception of the good").
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special privileges to persons simply because of their family situation
bears an onus of justification especially because any benefits that accrue
to those who have specially recognized family ties will be unavailable to
those who lack such family ties. Whether this constitutes pernicious or
permissible discrimination may be subject to some debate, but we think it
is the former in all but the rarest of circumstances.
We do not think it especially controversial to draw upon a principle
of equality under the law. This basic liberal commitment underwrites not
only our governing documents and institutions, but it is a prerequisite for
a legitimate system of criminal justice as well. Accordingly, benefits and
special treatment that emerge from leniency on account of family status
are, generally speaking, unattractive within a properly liberal criminal
justice system.277
At one level of abstraction, when a criminal derogates from the de-
mocratically derived codes of proper conduct, he indicates a superiority
that claims he is not bound by the rules that bind others. Society builds
credible criminal justice systems to diminish the plausibility of those
claims of superiority, and by its attempt to punish offenses, the criminal
justice system endeavors to make clear that no one is superior to the law.
Mercy (including mercy derived from family ties benefits) is so threaten-
ing to the very basic equality principle undergirding our constitutional
democracy because it allows the offender to maintain his claim of superi-
ority, and to point to his unanswered crime as evidence of that superior-
ity.278 Because at least part of the justification for the state's administra-
tion of criminal justice is that it must-under the principle of equality-
try to diminish the offender's claim of superiority, the state fails part of
its essential purpose in having a criminal justice system when it distrib-
utes mercy to some offenders merely because of their family status.279
Having a family, while "constitutively" relevant to an individual's iden-
tity, is morally orthogonal to the offender's claim of superiority as repre-
sented through the crime. Accordingly, allowing mercy based on family
ties subverts the institutional task of recalibrating the messages of equal
worth undergirding the liberal institutions of criminal justice.2"°
The principle of equality also has a more straightforward valence
that does not require extended discussion: unjustified disparities in sen-
tence disposition or duration contribute mightily to the perception of the
277. See Dan Markel, Against Mercy, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1421,1452-74 (2004).
278. This account draws from Jean Hampton's discussion in JEFFRIE MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON,
FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 157-61 (1988), and Markel, supra note 277, at 1453-56.
279. Of course, the degree of disruption to the equality norm is diminished if the liability of the
offender is established and the leniency affects only the sentence incrementally rather than the fact of
being adjudged guilty.
280. Indeed, various feminist scholars have emphasized the importance of holding women ac-
countable when they are offenders. See Kay Levine, No Penis, No Problem, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
357, 385 n.125 (2006); cf. Martha Mahoney, Women's Lives, Violence and Agency, in THE PUBLIC
NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE 59, 64 (Martha Fineman & Roxanne Mykituik eds., 1994) (discussing
how it is "so difficult" for us "to see both agency and oppression in the lives of women").
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illegitimacy of the criminal justice system. To illustrate: imagine that I
physically attacked my neighbor and that such attacks are illegal. If the
state, in its ordinary course of business, knowingly did nothing in the face
of my crime, its inaction could be read to express two social facts: first, an
indifference to the legal rights of its citizens, particularly to the security
of their persons and property; and second, a statement of condescension
to me that my actions will not be taken seriously by the state. When the
state makes an effort to investigate, prosecute, and punish me for my
crime, by contrast, it tells me that I will be held accountable for my
unlawful actions. It also sends a signal to my fellow citizens that their le-
gal rights are being vindicated by the state.281
These various expressions of care and concern are significantly
more difficult to articulate when the state must address many offenders,
many victims, and many citizens. These difficulties are best alleviated
when institutions exhibit fidelity to rule of law values, under which like
cases are treated alike, in accordance with legal norms that are known or
knowable. In a situation where we must address two similarly situated
offenders, and an unjustified disparity results, these departures from rule
of law values will invariably trigger demoralization, resentment, and, per-
haps in some cases, outrage and violence. Thus, in light of the risks asso-
ciated with disparity-and the gashes in the moral fabric of impartial jus-
tice such disparities create-the principle of equality should be a lodestar
guiding our collective actions in the criminal justice system.
It goes without saying that invoking the principle of equality does
not mean mindless fealty to treating every offender with the same puni-
tive response. Some level of granular analysis is required to sort cases
appropriately -only the "like" should be treated alike. But once we
have devised reasonable bases for distinguishing among classes of of-
fenses and offenders, only compelling reasons and narrow options should
suffice to displace the outcome that would have been otherwise obtained
in light of the classification scheme that has been established through
democratic institutions.282
281. Thus, when family members receive punishment discounts on account of who the victim was,
we are saying that their victim is not worth the same amount as she would have been if the victim were
not a family member. Cf. ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS 73
(1976) ("[D]isproportionately lenient punishment for murder implies that human life-the victim's
life-is not worthy of much concern.").
282. But see Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1982) (arguing
that rhetoric of equality should be abandoned). It is true that Peter Westen cleverly shows why the
concept of equality itself is, in some very real sense, tautological, circular, and uninteresting. That
likes should be treated alike is also not actually true as an independent moral principle: if someone
said to treat all murderers to green lollipops equally, we would think they were crazy, not egalitarians.
His very reasonable point is that the substantive moral rules that tell us who are relevant equals and
how to treat any one individual from that class contain all the relevant data to perform any moral cal-
culus; the equality principle only contains what we already know-that the rule that prescribes con-
duct or treatment of one person in a group would likewise apply to anyone else with the same relevant
conduct or orientation. Id. at 572-73. He delightfully argues that "justice" fares little better, render-
ing "equal justice under law" one big empty redundancy. See id. at 558.
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That said, we recognize that incarceration may wreak havoc on in-
nocent third parties, many of whom are wholly innocent family mem-
bers.283 But our concern for minimizing harms to innocent third parties
should not necessarily be tethered to proof of a family relationship; it is
both over- and underinclusive to limit benefits to family members.
Moreover, as we explain later, there may be ways to minimize these
harms without actually extending unfair sentencing discounts to someone
simply because one is a father or mother, or son or daughter. Still, to the
extent that rehabilitative aims are pursued through our corrections sys-
tems, we can imagine sites within the criminal justice system where the
Spartan presumption is overcome by distributing benefits in a manner
that is neutral to family status but still pays close attention to the obliga-
tions of those with unique care-giving roles.
Still, we think Westen's thesis gets taken too far when he calls equality (and by extension, justice)
an "empty vessel with no substantive moral content of its own." Id. at 547. For our purposes, the ideal
of equality is a proxy for the uncontroversial claim that the criminal justice system's intrinsic legiti-
macy rests on its ability to treat all fairly, without favoring certain classes of citizens for morally irrele-
vant characteristics. Having a family-like being of a certain race or religion-may be psychologically
relevant to a person's identity; but it is morally arbitrary from the standpoint of criminal justice. The
principle of equality functions as a stand-in for the more general point that a person's status as a family
member is not, in principle, a mitigating or aggravating factor in the administration of punishment.
Making assumptions that family members are entitled to a special brand of criminal justice is inconsis-
tent with the criminal justice system's focus on distributing punishment for culpability without favoring
the status of an offender.
More generally, we are sympathetic to the response to Westen's article made by Kent Greenawalt.
See Kent Greenawalt, How Empty Is the Idea of Equality?, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1167, 1169-70 (1983)
("The applicability of the principle [of equality] provides an additional moral reason for complying
with an established standard of how people are to be treated. In many situations the principle also
affects the substantive conclusions that can properly be reached, bearing on whether differences in
ultimate treatment are warranted and, if so, on the methods for determining how choices among indi-
viduals are to be made. [And s]omewhat less directly, the principle also affects how justifications of
unequal treatment should proceed and what should be done in instances of uncertainty over whether
people are relevantly alike or unalike."). But see Peter Westen, To Lure the Tarantula from Its Hole:
A Response, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1186 (1983).
283. See generally Darryl Brown, Third Party Harms in Criminal Law, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1383
(2004). Importantly, we recognize that many aspects of the criminal justice system have a disparate-
and profoundly troubling-impact on family life in minority communities. See, e.g., BRAMAN, supra
note 242, at 1-11 (ethnography of effects of incarceration on family and community life in the District
of Columbia); Dorothy E. Roberts, Criminal Justice and Black Families: The Collateral Damage of
Over-Enforcement, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1005 (2001); Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral
Cost of Mass Incarceration in African American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271 (2004). We also
recognize that our current sentencing regime has particularly harsh consequences for incarcerated
mothers and their children. See, e.g., Raeder, supra note 161, at 678-99. Rather than use the criminal
justice system to confer benefits just on members of favored groups such as traditional nuclear fami-
lies, however, we believe a better response would be more sanity with respect to drug law enforce-
ment, less harsh sentencing policies, expanded use of the coercion or duress doctrines, and greater use
of alternatives to incarceration. See, e.g., Dan Markel, Are Shaming Punishments Beautifully Retribu-
tive? Retributivism and the Implications for the Alternative Sanctions Debate, 54 VAND. L. REV. 2157
(2001); Dan Markel, Wrong Turns on the Road to Alternative Sanctions: Reflections on the Future of
Shaming Punishments and Restorative Justice, 85 Tex. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2007) (draft available at
www.danmarkel.com). Additionally, if we want to direct benefits to improve family life, we believe it
more appropriate to do so through the distributive-justice institutions of social policy and not through
criminal justice "benefits" that are indirect and potentially more costly along other dimensions.
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4. Do Family Ties Benefits Incentivize More Crime?
Finally, we note that some family ties benefits can have the un-
wanted effect of incentivizing more criminal activity-and more success-
ful criminal activity to boot. To the extent the law effectively signals
messages to the public by highlighting that family membership confers
special benefits, some family ties benefits would encourage family mem-
bers to keep their criminal enterprises in the family. Jeremy Bentham
disfavored the notion of spousal privilege precisely because "it secures,
to every man, one safe and unquestionable and ever ready accomplice
for every imaginable crime"2-and facilitates criminals converting their
own castles into "a den of thieves." '285 Today, many jurisdictions have ac-
knowledged the need for a joint spousal criminal activity exception, pre-
cisely to reduce the likelihood of the den of thieves arising in the castle.
Moreover, if sentencing policies serve to create a nonincarcerable (or
less carcerable) class of persons because these persons are "irreplaceable
caregivers," then those persons will seek out criminal endeavor or be,
other things being equal, the most sought after by others to serve in
criminal enterprises.
In short, we fear that family ties benefits will help fortify a sanctuary
from criminal law, and thus encourage the enlistment of family members
into criminal enterprises of all sorts, whether fraud or murder, embez-
zlement, or racketeering.286 With respect to sentencing, we should be es-
pecially anxious, for as Judge Kleinfeld noted, "[n]o class of persons can
be immunized from imprisonment without assisting recruitment for
criminal enterprises by providing an incarceration-proof labor force." '287
This point has been reiterated by other appellate courts construing sen-
tencing departures based on family responsibilities, 88 as well as by mem-
bers of other branches of government.289 We note that we have thus far
found little empirical research examining this hypothesis; it remains fer-
tile ground for future research.2"
284. Bentham, supra note 272, at 338.
285. Id. at 340.
286. "Criminal families" exist well beyond the Godfather trilogy. For a good introduction to
scholarship about criminal families, see DIEGO GAMBETTA, THE SICILIAN MAFIA: THE BUSINESS OF
PRIVATE PROTECTION (1993).
287. United States v. Menyweather, 431 F.3d 692, 708 (9th Cir. 2005) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
288. United States v. Guy, 174 F.3d 859, 861 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting that the trial court acknowl-
edged that incarcerating the defendant would impose hardship on her family but was averse to creat-
ing a situation "where a person could steal with relative impunity and not expect incarceration simply
because they come from a large family, or have responsibilities for a large family").
289. Cf. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN & JAY KATZ, THE FAMILY AND THE LAW 368 (1965) (Dwight Eisen-
hower, considering clemency for Ethel Rosenberg's espionage conviction, noted that "if there would
be any commuting of the woman's sentence without the man's then from here on the Soviets would
simply recruit their spies from among women.").
290. For example, do states with particularly vigorous parental discipline defenses have a higher
rate of child abuse? In states that exempt family members from prosecutions for harboring fugitives,
are prosecutors encountering significant obstructive activity from family members?
No. 41
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This point about the incentives these benefits extend to families
raises an important related observation. When a state decides to extend
a benefit on the basis of family ties, the state is not only reflecting back-
ground social preferences but also occupying a position of power with
which to shape the institution and norms of families. For instance, the
state can construct norms of appropriate family behavior by using the
criminal law in the context of "deadbeat dad" statutes, which are not
merely punitive but designed to encourage responsible parental behav-
ior. Similarly, the state may elsewhere shape our sense of where one's
obligations to the family end and where one's obligations to the public
begin by applying incentives via the criminal law. Thus the state can ac-
tually construct what we consider appropriate or desirable familial con-
duct rather than just responding to how we think families behave in some
predetermined and fixed manner.29'
C. Scrutiny of Family Ties Benefits: A Normative Framework for the
Spartan Presumption
In light of these four distinct normative concerns, we think a pre-
sumption against family ties benefits is warranted when considering a po-
tential policy in the criminal justice system that affects family life, even
though not every family ties benefit triggers all or any of these con-
cerns.2" Thus, the bare proposal of a benefit should not be categorically
rejected under this framework-it just means the benefit should undergo
scrutiny.
This scrutiny requires inquiry into three matters. First, to what ex-
tent does the particular family benefit contribute to patriarchy, inaccu-
racy, inequality, or risk of heightened crime, collusion, or complicity? If
the family ties benefit does not incur one of these normative costs, then it
may be appropriate to extend it, especially if the interest underlying the
family ties benefit is substantially beneficial (and substantially achievable
through the benefit). But if the normative costs of the family benefit ob-
tain, it is important to inquire whether there are potentially persuasive
compelling state interests (separable from any family-promotion agenda)
upon which a benefit draws. Finally, we propose asking whether there
are other means available to achieve the particular outcome without the
particular benefit. In other words, can the benefit be distributed in fam-
ily-neutral terms, looking more at the function played by the recipient of
291. We thank Dave Fagundes for this point. On an earlier draft, Fagundes commented that per-
haps the penalties for harboring fugitives in the intrafamily setting should be even higher than the
general norm in order to account for the additional difficulty of deterring this behavior. Our fear is
that this would impose an unjustified "tax" on family ties and, in the process, emit social messages that
themselves run at odds with our commitment to implementing equality in the criminal justice system.
292. We recognize that not every family ties benefit raises all four concerns. Indeed, some might
not trigger any of them. For our purposes in what follows, we do not rank their importance either.
Nor do we argue that a benefit must trigger a certain number of the relevant cost considerations to
offend our normative framework.
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the benefit and not the status of the beneficiary? In the final analysis,
there will have to be a judgment applied to whether the proposed family
benefit advances a goal in which the government has an especially com-
pelling interest, notwithstanding the reasons underlying the Spartan pre-
sumption.
Clearly, this form of scrutiny will not resolve all questions: we will
inevitably have disputes about the strength of competing claims. But it
will do some work in helping us think more clearly about the challenge of
family ties in criminal justice.
III. THE SPARTAN PRESUMPTION IN ACTION
In this Part, we apply the normative framework to a handful of ar-
eas that we have discussed earlier in the descriptive Sections of the arti-
cle. Using the framework developed in Part II, we explain in Section A
how some of the various benefits we canvassed in Part I face difficulties:
evidentiary privileges for familial members in many situations; most sen-
tencing discounts for those with family ties; and exemptions from prose-
cution or other defenses based on familial status.293 In Section B, we con-
tend that other benefits, by contrast, survive scrutiny because there are
compelling state interests that are properly vindicated or because the
benefits trigger such minimal normative costs that the presumption
against family ties benefits should be rebutted. However, even in these
situations, we think there should be some effort to distribute the benefits
in terms that are neutral to family status when possible. Finally in Sec-
tion C, we show how some benefits can succeed by being retailored
through alternative means. In this Section, for instance, we address what
is perhaps the most difficult case-that of the irreplaceable caregiver
who is asking for a sentencing discount, and in this connection, we dis-
cuss the use of "time-deferred sentencing," '294 as well as the use of pro-
grams that redound to the benefit of family members, but not exclusively
to them and not on account of their status as family members.
A. Application of the Spartan Presumption
1. Evidentiary Privileges
a. Competing Assessments of Familial Privileges
Views about the marital privileges are, unsurprisingly, mixed.
These privileges are ostensibly justified not only because they are rooted
in the common law but because they are presumed to have a persuasive
293. We treat the evidentiary privileges question in depth as an example of our analytical frame-
work and then we discuss some of the other examples more briefly to avoid repetition.
294. This refers to sentences to be served by an "irreplaceable caregiver" which are delayed until
a point when the need for care is diminished or alternative means of care are secured.
No. 41 1201
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rationale: the spousal immunity "provides social benefits by preventing
marital discord," '295 and the marital-communications privilege is said to
"foster[] openness between spouses by ensuring that none of their confi-
dences will be revealed in court." '296 In short, "[t]he basic reason the law
has refused to pit wife against husband or husband against wife in a trial
where life or liberty is at stake [is] a belief that such a policy [is] neces-
sary to foster family peace, not only for the benefit of husband, wife and
children, but for the benefit of the public as well."2"
But not all agree that the spousal privileges are proper exceptions to
the hoary rule that every man's evidence should be available in the ad-
ministration of justice. In recent years, the spousal immunity has come
under more serious fire from commentators than the marital-
communication privilege, which on its face just looks like other confiden-
tial communication privileges in a relationship of trust: attorney-client,
psychotherapist/social worker-patient, and so on.29 Still others think that
spousal immunity makes sense if we really care about protecting family
harmony-and that we do not need the marital-communication privilege
because people will trust their spouses naturally and are usually indiffer-
ent to legal entitlements to privileges. Moreover, once the marriage dis-
solves, the justification of "keeping the family" together dissolves with
it-and a marital-communications privilege certainly should not outlive
the marriage (as it currently does in some of the jurisdictions that recog-
nize it). 99 Finally, some oppose the immunity because, in practice, it op-
erates in a gendered manner: "[t]he plain fact is that.., the adverse tes-
timony privilege operates largely to prevent wives from testifying against
their husbands ... [and] reinforce[s] a traditional ethic of self-sacrifice
for women within marriage."" The detractors aside, the marital privi-
leges enjoy widespread support in the nation's courts and state legisla-
tures.30'
295. Developments in the Law, supra note 111, at 1577.
296. Id.
297. Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74,77 (1958).
298. See, e.g., HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIc RELATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES 544 (2d ed. 1988) (spousal immunity "was never supported by any but specious reasons"); 8
WIGMORE, supra note 104, § 2228 (stating that spousal immunity is "the merest anachronism in legal
theory and an indefensible obstruction to truth in practice"); David Medine, The Adverse Testimony
Privilege: Time to Dispose of a "Sentimental Relic," 67 OR. L. REV. 519 (1988).
299. See 2 STONE & TAYLOR, supra note 107, § 5.08.
300. REGAN, supra note 230, at 90. Most importantly, the spousal privilege disadvantages victims
of domestic abuse, especially in a post-Crawford landscape. See generally Cassidy, supra note 259 (de-
scribing how Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), makes it much more difficult to prosecute
domestic abusers).
301. It is worth noting that there are often exceptions to the spousal privileges: they tend not to
apply in cases involving spousal violence, child abuse or neglect. REGAN, supra note 230, at 91. But
see Cassidy, supra note 229, at 367-69 (citing ALA. CODE § 12-21-227; D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-306; GA.
CODE ANN. § 24-9-23; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. CH. 223, § 20; and Mo. ANN. STAT. § 546.260, which
codify adverse testimony privileges without any exception for crimes committed by one spouse against
the other-and GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-21; N.H. R. EVID. 504; N.C. GEN STAT, § 8-57(c); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 19-11-30; and W. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-3-4, which codify spousal-communications privileges
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With respect to broader intrafamilial privileges, there are several
arguments offered by their proponents. Proponents argue that "[f]orced
disclosure of confidential communications between children and parents
not only destroys the trust between parent and child necessary to foster
open communication, it pits a parent against a child in a court of law."3 2
As the In re Agosto court put it, in one of two federal district courts to
recognize the child-parent privilege, "[t]o damage the parent-child rela-
tionship would result in damage to the child's relationship to society as a
whole." 3  Advocates routinely cite the Supreme Court's decision in Wis-
consin v. Yoder, which stressed that "[t]he history and culture of Western
civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture
and upbringing of their children. ' '3"" The importance of this relationship
is the reason that society seeks to foster open communication between
parents and children.3 5 In short, the "arguments in favor of adoption of
the parent-child privilege center around the importance of loy-
alty.., inherent to the [] relationship."3 °6 This is generally known as the
"preservation of the family" argument."° It has particular salience when
we consider that it is routine for juvenile delinquency lawyers to tell their
clients not to speak with their parents about their cases.
Another related argument relies upon the "cruel trilemma" pre-
sumably imposed upon subpoenaed family members who must "either
(1) testify truthfully and condemn the accused relative, (2) testify falsely
and commit perjury, or (3) refuse to testify and risk contempt."308 As In
re Agosto found, in putting witnesses in this position, "the law would not
merely be inviting perjury, but perhaps even forcing it."3 °9 This argument
emphasizes not only that we put family members in an awkward position,
but that the search for truth itself will be hampered because in our zeal-
without such an exception). There are a lot of nuances to how the spousal privileges apply-and those
details extend beyond our immediate concern here. For the specifics and how they frustrate law en-
forcement in the domestic violence context, see Cassidy, supra note 259. Federal courts tend to create
an exception for joint criminal enterprises, see REGAN, supra note 230, at 91 (citing United States v.
Marashi, 913 F.2d 724, 730-31 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Sims, 755 F.2d 1239, 1243 (6th Cir.
1985); United States v. Broome, 732 F.2d 363, 365 (4th Cir. 1984)), and some states have followed suit,
see State v. Witchey, 388 N.W.2d 893, 895-96 (S.D. 1986); Wolf v. State, 674 S.W.2d 831, 841-42 (Tex.
App. 1984). But see Johnson v. State, 451 So. 2d 1024, 1024 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); State v. White,
480 A.2d 230, 232 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984). Obviously, we endorse the federal approach-and
the states that have embraced it; it speaks directly to our fourth consideration, that the privileges serve
to incentivize more successful criminal activity.
302. Need for ParentChild Privilege, 22 CHAMPION 10, 11 (April 1998) (proposal by the National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers for enactment of a statutory parent-child communication
privilege by Congress and state legislatures).
303. 553 F. Supp. 1298, 1326 (D. Nev. 1983).
304. Id. at 1304 (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,232 (1972)).
305. Id. (citing Susan Levine, Comment, The Child-Parent Privilege: A Proposal, 47 FORDHAM L.
REV. 771,782-83 (1979)).
306. Jessica Perry, Note, The Parent-Child Testimonial Privilege: An Argument for Qualified Rec-
ognition, 37 BRANDEIS L.J. 97, 106 (1998/1999).
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. In re Agosto, 553 F. Supp. at 1326.
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ous pursuit of it, we are inviting falsified testimony that will adulterate
the system more than it will foster the system's integrity. There is also
the possibility, as mentioned earlier, that the extension of these privileges
works in favor of reducing crime; a spouse with an adverse testimonial
immunity may decide to talk to his wife (because he knows she cannot
testify against him), and during that talk, she may persuade him to desist
from future crimes.
More generally, advocates of the expansion of intrafamilial privi-
leges beyond the spousal privileges argue by analogy to other privileges
already recognized in the courts and by legislatures. The professional
privileges are generally thought to encourage the free flow of informa-
tion in socially valuable relationships where trust is required for the suc-
cess of the relationship.31 ° Similarly, the marital privilege supposedly
serves the function of preserving harmony and fostering openness in so-
cially valuable relationships. Proponents of other intrafamilial privileges
argue by analogy to other relationships of trust to reinforce their case.3"'
A final strategy proponents (and adopting courts) have drawn upon is
basing the extended privilege in the constitutionally recognized right to
privacy. 2
In response to those who favor extending intrafamilial privileges,
critics (including judges on many federal and state courts) argue that
there is no case law to support such a new privilege; that privileges are
meant to be granted very sparingly and narrowly for they are in deroga-
tion of the search for truth; that further intrafamilial privileges do not
pass the "Wigmore test;" '313 and that Congress may, if it wishes, furnish
310. The generally acknowledged purpose of the attorney-client privilege is "to encourage 'full
and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public
interests in the observance of law and the administration of justice."' Swidler & Berlin v. United
States, 524 U.S. 399, 403 (1998) (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981)); see
also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 68 cmt. c (2000) ("The rationale
for the [attorney-client] privilege is that confidentiality enhances the value of client-lawyer communi-
cations and hence the efficacy of legal services.").
311. United States v. Ismail, 756 F.2d 1253, 1258 (6th Cir. 1985) (suggesting that the parent-child
privilege could be analogized to the marital privileges insofar as they both contribute to family "har-
mony").
312. Another option some have pursued is to claim the privilege under the First Amendment. See
In re Greenberg, 11 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 579, 1982 WL 597412, at *1 (D. Conn.) (recognizing a parent-
child privilege under the Free Exercise Clause because of the Jewish law's prohibition from having
parents testify against their children); see also Grand Jury Proceedings of John Doe v. United States,
842 F.2d 244, 248 (10th Cir. 1988) (rejecting the claim of a fifteen-year-old Mormon who invoked the
Free Exercise Clause to avoid testifying against his mother). But see Smilow v. United States, 465 F.2d
802, 804 (2d Cir. 1971) (refusing to grant such a privilege because the court was skeptical of the genu-
inely religious basis of the claim despite claimant's invocation of potential "divine punishment" and
"ostracism from the Jewish Community"). Some have also suggested that the Fifth Amendment privi-
lege against self-incrimination should be held to protect people from being forced to testify against
their family members. See, e.g., Margaret Carlson, Should a Mom Rat on Her Daughter?, TIME, Feb.
23, 1998, at 25.
313. Courts routinely apply the criteria adumbrated by John H. Wigmore in his evidence treatise.
8 WIGMORE, supra note 104, § 2192. The "Wigmore Test" considers four factors: (1) the communica-
tion must originate in confidence that it will not be disclosed; (2) this element of confidentiality must
be essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties; (3) the rela-
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such a privilege if there is a true need for it.3 4 More basically, critics
''commonly assert that people typically know little or nothing about their
privilege[s] and that, even if they did, the knowledge would rarely alter
their communicative behavior. 3. 5  In short, intrafamilial privileges are
very unlikely to incentivize people to talk with their families if they are
not otherwise inclined to do so. As unseemly as it may be to force peo-
ple to testify against their family members, it may just be the cost of do-
ing justice.
b. The Spartan Presumption's Application to Privileges
We think our normative framework offers a different perspective on
intrafamilial privileges, one that has heretofore often been overlooked:
that family ties generally ought not to be privileged in the administration
of criminal justice. Accordingly, not only should courts and legislatures
reject the parent-child and more attenuated intrafamilial testimonial
privileges; but they should also revisit the marital privileges, which enjoy
widespread support. In short, it is our view that the family neither needs
nor deserves any special protection when the smooth and fair administra-
tion of criminal justice is at stake. Just as our society values friendship as
a very beneficial social relationship of trust but fails to entrust friends
with testimonial privileges,316 we believe that the family can sustain itself
without special immunity from the criminal justice system. We take no
position here, however, on the ongoing debates about whether there
should be intrafamilial privileges in the civil context.1 But because the
intrafamilial evidentiary privileges implicate our four normative consid-
erations-and all four of them no less-we think such benefits are inap-
propriate and should therefore be abandoned.
As we have already recounted, the testimonial privileges have an
undeniably patriarchal etiology. Based in an old English common law
rule of complete disqualification in which a wife was not allowed to tes-
tion must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be sedulously fostered; and (4) the
injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure must be greater than the benefit thereby
gained for the correct disposal of the litigation. Id.
314. All of these arguments appear in In re Grand Jury, 103 F.3d 1140, 1144 (3d Cir. 1997).
315. Developments in the Law, supra note 111, at 1474.
316. For an effort to think through how we might furnish testimonial privileges to friends, see
Levinson, supra note 24, at 643-54. Levinson argues that it might be a good idea if people could
choose to give a limited number of "privilege tickets" to whomever they want-thereby, deciding for
themselves where they most need a relationship of trust. See id. at 654-62. The value of friendship
and family in political and legal life is further explored in Ethan J. Leib, The Politics of Family and
Friends in Aristotle and Montaigne, 31 INTERPRETATION: J. POL. PHIL. 165 (2004), and Ethan J. Leib,
Friendship & the Law, 54 UCLA L. REV. 631 (2007) (arguing that many areas of the law should confer
upon the friend special status and consideration).
317. It is worth noting that at least one commentator would like a "qualified" parent-child privi-
lege that would apply only in criminal contexts rather than civil contexts because the "stress placed on
the family bond would be greater where criminal punishment was at stake .... Perry, supra note 306,
at 114. In our view, precisely because much more tends to be at stake in the pursuit of criminal justice,
the familial privileges are especially inappropriate in the criminal context.
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tify against her husband,318 the testimonial privileges have roots that
would offend our first normative consideration. Indeed, women rou-
tinely were not considered to be competent witnesses at all. Even those
who contest the disqualification theory of the derivation of the privileges
and assume that the privileges developed from a theory of "petit trea-
son" against the head of a household319 could not deny that the protec-
tion of the "head of a household" traditionally protected men. And al-
though the testimonial privileges have been modernized in most places to
defang their patriarchal roots,32° they continue to operate in a male-
friendly manner: men commit more crime, so it will benefit men more of-
ten if their spouses (or mothers or sisters) are prevented from testifying
against them. As Wayne Logan writes, "[e]videntiary law... continues
to betray an age-old reluctance to interfere; the spousal privilege, for in-
stance, prohibits the government from compelling the testimony of a bat-
tered spouse, should prosecution ensue. ''321 This is especially disconcert-
ing in the wake of Crawford v. Washington, which will only further
exacerbate the use of spousal privileges to protect male domination in
the household.322
Even bracketing the gendered roots and effects of the intrafamilial
testimonial privileges that give us pause, our second normative consid-
eration is also implicated. Testimonial privileges are very much excep-
tions to the common law principle that "the public has a right to every
man's evidence."3" Because the public has a compelling interest in the
efficient and correct administration of its criminal justice system, the law
does not lightly create exceptions to the rule that people must testify
truthfully before legal tribunals. Even the few privileges recognized by
318. "[I]t hath been resolved by the Justices that a wife cannot be produced either against or for
her husband." 1 E. COKE, A COMMENTARIE UPON LITTLETON 6b (1628); see also 8 WIGMORE, supra
note 104, § 2227.
319. See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 104, § 2227.
320. See Developments in the Law, supra note 111.
321. Logan, supra note 87, at 347. See generally Malinda L. Seymore, Isn't It a Crime: Feminist
Perspectives on Spousal Immunity and Spousal Violence, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1032 (1996). There are
exceptions, both at common law, and today in many jurisdictions, for crimes against spouses or others
in the household. See Cassidy, supra note 259, at n.170 & n.205 (citing AK. R. EVID. 505(A); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4062; CAL. EVID. CODE § 970; COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-107; CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 54-84A; HAW. REV. STAT § 626-1; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-3002; KY. R. EVID. 504; MD.
CODE ANN., CRTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-106; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2162; MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 595.02; NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-505; NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.295; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-17; N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 8-57; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.42; OR. REV. STAT. § 40.255; 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 5913; TEX. R. EVID. 504(B); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-271.2; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.60.060 (1); W.
VA. CODE ANN. § 57-3-3; Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 1-12-104); see also State v. Taylor, 642 So. 2d 160, 166
(La. 1994) (creating an exception by judicial construction); Stubbs v. State, 441 So. 2d 1386 (Miss.
1983) (same); State v. Benson, 712 P.2d 252 (Utah 1985) (same). Still, as Cassidy notes, a number of
jurisdictions permit no such exception. Cassidy, supra note 259, at 367-68 (citing Alabama, the Dis-
trict of Columbia, Georgia, Massachusetts, and Missouri).
322. See Cassidy, supra note 259, at 352 (describing how Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36
(2004), makes it much more difficult to prosecute domestic abusers).
323. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 104, § 2192. See generally United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331
(1950).
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the law are not to be "expansively construed" because they "are in dero-
gation of the search for truth. 3 24 Privileges that facilitate the exclusion
of relevant evidence from a fact finder seriously impede the truth-
seeking function of the trials, which hampers both the effective prosecu-
tion of the guilty and the exoneration of the innocent. These privileges
matter not only at trial, but also beforehand, because their availability at
trial casts a shadow over plea bargaining encounters between the state
and the defense lawyer. Without other independent evidence, a prosecu-
tor will be more likely to drop a case against a potential defendant if the
prosecutor knows a husband can block the testimony of, or revelations
about communications to, his wife.
We acknowledge, of course, the speculative concern that the privi-
leges may help prevent perjured testimony from polluting the trial. Per-
haps the privileges function to prevent family members from lying on the
stand-a result that may, after all, serve the "truth." To the extent that
any credible empirical evidence would bear out such a claim, we might
reconsider our conclusions about the benefit's implication for the norma-
tive consideration of accuracy. We also recognize the empirical possibil-
ity that the privileges may have a deterrent effect on crime if spouses
communicate intentions to commit future crime and are subsequently
able to dissuade each other from committing that future crime,325 though
we have not seen empirical evidence to support this possibility, and we
doubt that such instances are widespread.
Third, there is a basic inequity built into intrafamilial testimonial
privileges. Although this inequity is not as obvious as the central case
where an offender gets differential treatment in a sentence on account of
his family ties, the normative consideration of equality is implicated nev-
ertheless: those with spouses (rather than friends or same-sex partners)
get to share the details of their crimes with a loved one without conse-
quence. This may have a cathartic effect for offenders, rendering an ul-
timate confession to the police less likely.
More importantly, it creates a class of persons, who might otherwise
have extremely useful information about an offender, immune from
questioning at trial. This allows the offender to maintain a sense of supe-
riority-both over his household and over the polity, whose interests in
vindicating justice play second fiddle to the protection of the "sanctity"
of his family. This is unfair to the state and unfair to victims whose rights
can be vindicated only if the police and prosecution can do their jobs ef-
fectively. Creating rules that prevent the police and the prosecution
from learning the truth are counterproductive to the tasks of criminal
justice. Although one can sympathize with the difficulty of testifying
against a family member, we suspect that thoughtful citizens would not
want to live in a regime with such privileges for family members when
324. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974).
325. We are indebted to Michael O'Hear for this point.
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they realize that a perpetrator of crimes is often being shielded by family
members, who are potentially immune from questioning on the witness
stand.
Finally, our last normative consideration is also implicated by the
testimonial privileges that protect family members. To the extent that
defendants are getting signals from the evidentiary privileges,326 the privi-
leges furnish incentives to keep criminal conspiracies within the family.
Spouses are more likely to recruit each other into criminal activity be-
cause they know they can occlude their communications with their
spouse later on. The law needs tools to disrupt conspiracy and make it
less efficacious, not more so. A better system would realize that the law
should aim at "help[ing to] destabilize trust within the conspiracy, cue
the defection of conspirators, and permit law enforcement to extract
more information from them." '327 Unsurprisingly, some jurisdictions have
adopted a joint-spousal-criminal-activity exception to the marital-
communications privileges.3" Obviously, in lieu of full-scale abandon-
ment of the privileges, we welcome at least this development.
In light of the troublesome normative costs in the context of familial
testimonial privileges, we think there is a good basis to eliminate these
privileges. We do not see any compelling state interests that could ren-
der these privileges appropriate or acceptable, unless our empirical con-
cerns regarding perjury and deterrence were proven demonstrably.329
Moreover, although we recognize that some argue that familial interests
are prepolitical or prelegal in some sense such that the law needs to step
aside in the face of family loyalties (rendering family interests to be suffi-
cient to override the maxim that the public is entitled to every man's evi-
dence), we are not persuaded. At least as a matter of fit with other as-
326. We are somewhat skeptical of the capacity for decision-rule doctrines in the law of evidence
and crimes to influence most people's primary conduct. See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley,
Does Criminal Law Deter? A Behavioral Science Investigation, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 173
(2004). But there might be pockets in the population that are especially susceptible to these rules,
such as the families involved in organized crime; these families are repeat players and can obtain coun-
sel to guide their conduct.
327. Neal Kumar Katyal, Conspiracy Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1307, 1333 (2003).
328. REGAN, supra note 230, at 91. For further discussion on the "joint criminal enterprise" ex-
ception that speaks directly to this consideration, see supra note 302.
329. Mary Coombs mentioned, in her comments upon an earlier version of this paper, that al-
though we emphasize that the spousal privileges are family-specific benefits, we disregard the reality
that the state cannot take a neutral position in this context: if the state did not give the "innocent"
spouse a testimonial privilege, the state's prosecutors would have an extra tool (and an extra sharp
one, at that) in coercing testimony from a defendant because the state could always leverage pressure
against the innocent spouse. We think that there remain two neutral positions, neither of which the
state adopts in its current solicitude for the family. Either the state could afford testimonial privileges
to a wide circle of persons that extend beyond the spousal context or it could afford no one such privi-
leges. We prefer the latter approach because we see no reason to give criminals access to confessors,
who may both help defendants evade capture and avoid confession to law enforcement. We do not
see this preferred neutral policy as a "tax" on families in particular because any defendant who trusts
any intimate will give the prosecutors a tool for coercion all the same. Most important for our pur-
poses here is not neutrality as between defendant and state but neutrality as between defendants with
family networks and those without.
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pects of the legal landscape, we note the state's intimate regulation of
family law; thus, it is hard to take this argument seriously. Marriage itself
is an undeniably legal relation-and it betrays common sense to think a
general respect for the "private sphere" of the family should be sufficient
to overcome our normative framework, which itself derives from the task
of trying to assess whether family ties benefits are appropriate in the
criminal justice system. In this case, to say that family ties should over-
ride our normative framework is only to disagree that our normative
framework establishes a presumption against family ties benefits in the
criminal justice context in the first place.
Moreover, those who consider the protection of family interests suf-
ficient to override the law's meddling in family loyalties have an extra
step of justificatory work to do that we think cannot be done success-
fully-one must defend not only the general idea that it would be nice
for the law to protect the family from some legal incursions but the more
specific proposition that the law must protect families in the context of
criminal justice, a site where we think the law cannot afford this type of
benefit. Too much is at stake when the lives and liberties of men and
women are held in the balance.
That said, we can imagine that jurisdictions might be interested in
narrower options than the ones we endorse. For instance, Maryland has
a two-strikes policy regarding the invocation of the privileges in courts.33 °
Alternatively, jurisdictions might want to limit the application of the
privilege to cases involving a discrete set of crimes, leaving violent or
more serious felonies outside the scope of the privilege (or even other
benefits, such as the exemptions and defenses that are family-status
based). A third strategy might be to limit the privilege to cover commu-
nications regarding only future conduct, not past conduct.
We cannot, of course, deny that our catalogue of normative consid-
erations might seem to condemn other testimonial privileges. For exam-
ple, the attorney-client and psychotherapist-patient privileges might
clearly result in prosecutors and police having less information to pursue
justice. Although these privileges have no especially ignoble histories,
they are, at a general level, in derogation of the search for truth and have
the potential to implicate an equality norm.
Still, we think the normative considerations we have highlighted
condemn intrafamilial privileges in ways different and more substantial.
In the first place, we think other testimonial privileges do not fare as
badly through our normative framework: they neither offend our first
consideration, nor do they reasonably trigger substantial concerns under
the fourth consideration. On the contrary, the lawyer-client privilege, for
example, can help prevent crime by facilitating communications with po-
330. MD. CODE ANN. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-106(a) (West 2006); cf. CAL. CODE CIV. PRO. 1219(c)
(West 2007) (sentencing victims of domestic violence guilty of contempt for counseling or community
service).
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tential offenders to steer them away from unlawful conduct. Moreover,
even our second normative consideration-accuracy-does not clearly
disfavor the lawyer-client privilege. The lawyer-client privilege substan-
tially contributes to the vindication of our adversarial system of justice.
By giving the defendant a true and zealous advocate who is bound by a
duty of confidentiality to him, we give the defendant a fighting chance to
use the criminal justice system to prove his innocence; this ultimately
contributes to the project of accuracy. So, upon further investigation, the
lawyer-client privilege actually might enhance accuracy, have no ignoble
origins, and may create incentives for the ultimate deterrence of crime.
We do not often worry that psychotherapists and lawyers are actually go-
ing to become coconspirators (though, of course, such results are not un-
heard of).
Finally, even if one could make the claim that other testimonial
privileges fail our normative framework, we would not be the first to no-
tice that some of the privileges rest on less than firm footing: Kaplow and
Shavell and others have argued that to the extent the privileges have
value, the value extends only to advice regarding prospective behavior-
not past behavior.3 31 In any case, to the extent that the other privileges
pursue compelling state interests that are appropriate in the criminal jus-
tice sphere, we acknowledge that our normative framework is not the fi-
nal word on whether a benefit is acceptable. Other testimonial privileges
may be justifiable by countervailing interests that override the considera-
tions outlined above.
2. Exemptions from Prosecution for Harboring Fugitives
As discussed in Part I, another way in which states favor family rela-
tionships is by exempting family members from prosecution. Eighteen
states currently exempt immediate family members from prosecution for
harboring a fugitive or reduce their potential liability.332 What are the ra-
tionales offered for these family exemptions? First, perhaps "it is unreal-
istic to expect persons to be deterred [by the possibility of criminal
prosecution] from giving aid to their close relatives. 3 33 Criminal pun-
ishment is therefore unwarranted as a deterrent because it would be inef-
fective in any event. Second, perhaps such statutes are "an acknowl-
edgement of human frailty."31 Under this view, legislatures have simply
recognized that the bonds of familial love will inevitably trump any per-
331. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Legal Advice About Information to Present in Litigation:
Its Effects and Social Desirability, 102 HARV. L. REV. 567, 597 (1989) (questioning the merits of the
attorney-client privilege); see also JEREMY BENTHAM, Rationale of Judicial Evidence, in 7 THE WORKS
OF JEREMY BENTHAM 473-75, 477, 479 (J. Bowring ed., 1842) (arguing that the attorney-client privi-
lege serves to let the guilty go free).
332. See supra notes 47-49.
333. See Charles Daniels & Teresa Storch, Criminal Law, 14 N.M. L. REV. 89, 105 (1984) (citing
WAYNE LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 716 (4th ed. 2003).
334. See State v. Mobbley, 650 P.2d 841, 843 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982) (Lopez, J., dissenting).
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ceived obligation to the state. A third rationale is the one expressed by a
Florida court: "society's interest in safeguarding the family unit from un-
necessary fractional pressures." '335
Analyzing these statutes under the framework of our four norma-
tive considerations, we conclude that the family exemption is misguided
and should therefore be soundly rejected by state legislatures. The ex-
emptions obviously contribute to a fundamental inequity: close friends
who provide assistance face prosecution, while family members do not.
Further, like the evidentiary privileges, these exemptions have patriar-
chal origins and may serve to shield from prosecution those who commit
crimes in the home. The focus of these exemptions at common law was
to exempt wives from liability for following their "duty" by shielding
their husbands. To be sure, these statutes have now become gender neu-
tral by extending their protection to other immediate family members, so
perhaps they should not be invalidated on the basis of their patriarchal
roots alone. But these are not our strongest normative arguments; we
therefore turn to our two remaining considerations.
In terms of accuracy, these exemptions do a different kind of mis-
chief than threatening our ability to sort the guilty from the innocent;
they facilitate a guilty person's escape from punishment entirely. Allow-
ing an individual to obstruct justice by hiding a family member obviously
frustrates "the essential government functions of locating and appre-
hending criminals." '336 Moreover, this immunity is granted without regard
to the heinousness of the underlying crime-the exemption is granted
whether the fugitive is a forger or a murderer. The statutes sweep with
too broad a brush in another regard as well-they protect those family
members who might never have previously enjoyed a meaningful rela-
tionship with the primary offender, but simply came to the aid of a rela-
tive when asked for assistance after the commission of a crime.337 It is
also difficult to imagine that it is the government's decision to prosecute
that creates significant stresses upon the family; rather, the responsibility
for that would seem to lie squarely on the shoulders of the family mem-
ber who decided to enlist his relatives to assist him in his illegal activities.
Finally, like the testimonial privileges, these statutory exemptions
create perverse incentives. In a state with a family exemption, there is no
reason for a defendant to commit a crime unilaterally; he has every in-
centive to enlist close family members to help him conceal evidence and
hide from the authorities because those family members face no criminal
consequences for their actions. Why should we create an incentive for a
defendant to recruit accomplices and thereby increase the chances of
335. State v. C.H., 421 So. 2d 62, 65 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
336. United States v. Hill, 279 F.3d 731, 737 n.17 (9th Cir. 2002).
337. The Florida court recognized the issue that "some immunized family members might render
assistance to an offender for reasons other than familial affection" but simply noted this did not render
the statute "fatally overinclusive" under its constitutional analysis. C.H., 421 So. 2d at 65.
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success for his criminal venture? As the Supreme Court recognized forty
years ago:
[C]ollective criminal agreement-partnership in crime-presents a
greater potential threat to the public than individual delicts. Con-
certed action both increases the likelihood that the criminal object
will be successfully attained and decreases the probability that the
individuals involved will depart from their path of criminality.
Group association for criminal purposes often, if not normally,
makes possible the attainment of ends more complex than those
which one criminal could accomplish.338
Because family exemptions pose such significant costs in terms of
preventing the government from punishing clearly criminal activity and
creating incentives for conspiratorial activity, we believe our presump-
tion against such benefits is clearly triggered. Further, these benefits
provide no substantial benefit. We reject the notion that allowing sib.-
lings to dispose of murder weapons for one another is an essential com-
ponent of family harmony. Even if we were to concede the point that not
every brother would be deterred by the threat of criminal punishment
from hiding a murder weapon for his beloved sibling, it might still be the
case that the possibility of punishment would deter the killer from mak-
ing the request in the first instance.
3. Familial Status Defenses
In demonstrating how our normative framework would apply in the
context of familial status defenses, we have chosen to focus on the exam-
ple of the parental discipline defense as it is used in child abuse prosecu-
tions. Parents have employed corporal punishment to discipline children
and mold their characters for centuries with minimal interference from
the state.339 The historical origins of the tradition of noninterference in
matters of family violence have been well documented both here and
elsewhere.3" We choose here to focus on the less-obvious concerns this
defense raises in terms of equality and incentivizing more criminal activ-
ity.
In terms of equality, the parental discipline defense elevates the
right of the parent to discipline his child over the right of the child not to
be subjected to physical force. We would never allow an adult to exer-
cise comparable physical force against another adult or against someone
else's child; any adult who took a belt to the backside of an unrelated
338. Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587,593 (1961).
339. See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 250, at 293 (describing the maltreatment of children from an-
cient Greece through twentieth-century America).
340. See, e.g., PLECK, supra note 68, at 6; Judith G. McMullen, Privacy, Family Autonomy, and the
Maltreated Child, 75 MARQ. L. REV. 569, 572-81 (1992).
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adult or child would be eligible for swift and condign punishment."1
Why is a child's relative entitled to escape punishment within the crimi-
nal justice system when an unrelated adult is not? The nature of the de-
fendant's conduct and the physical harm suffered by the victim is the
same under both scenarios. Critics of course respond that the motive un-
derlying the conduct is different, that the parent wishes to discipline and
the stranger wishes to harm. But this reflects a rose-colored view of par-
enthood that so often permeates the criminal law. We as a society des-
perately want to believe that all parents are altruistic and loving indi-
viduals who always act in their children's best interest. 4  But the
prevalence of child abuse and neglect in America shows this assumption
is too often untrue.343
In terms of the negative incentives created by the use of corporal
punishment, spanking is often a precursor to more serious parental vio-
lence.344 Deanna Pollard argues that "the defense of 'discipline' is raised
in forty-one percent of homicide prosecutions against parents who 'acci-
dentally' killed their child." 5 Pollard further suggests that spanking in-
creases the chances that the child victim of a parent's violence will him-
self be more likely to engage in aggression and other antisocial behavior
later in life, including engaging in domestic violence in his own family.346
Because of the normative costs associated with these family status
defenses, we believe it triggers our presumption. We recognize that crit-
ics of our position will argue that the utilities of this "family ties benefit"
are indeed substantial: many believe spanking is in fact beneficial to chil-
dren; others simply believe that parents should be allowed to make their
own disciplinary choices without undue interference by the state. For the
reasons stated above, we are unpersuaded that these interests are suffi-
cient to override our normative considerations.
341. See Franklin Zimring, Legal Perspectives on Family Violence, 75 CAL. L. REV. 521, 523-24
(1987) (using a hypothetical to suggest that if a stranger slapped a child, it would be considered assault
and battery, but the matter would be treated very differently by the legal system if a mother slapped
her own child).
342. See Thomas, supra note 250, at 293 (noting "our reluctance to believe that parents-whom
we expect to love and protect their offspring-could maltreat or abuse their own children, sometimes
even fatally"). Thomas further notes that "[o]ur laws and legal systems have developed over hundreds
of years around the notion that parents will love and protect." Id.
343. See, e.g., Ira Lupu, The Separation of Powers and the Protection of Children, 61 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1317, 1324 (1994) ("[I]t is now clear that the psychological influences at play in family life are not
limited to the positive sentiments of affection and concern."). For example, the National Clearing-
house on Child Abuse and Neglect Information concluded that there were approximately one thou-
sand four hundred child abuse and neglect fatalities in the United States in 2002, although that number
is in all likelihood too low because these cases are traditionally underreported. See ADMIN. FOR
CHILDREN & FAMILIES, DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILD MALTREATMENT 2002, at 51,
available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/pubs/cm02/cmO2.pdf.
344. See Pollard, supra note 72, at 621-22.
345. Id. at 621.
346. Id. at 602-13.
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4. General Sentencing Discounts
As discussed earlier, until the recent Booker decision by the Su-
preme Court, which rendered the federal sentencing guidelines advi-
sory,347 the federal government's position on family ties discounts at sen-
tencing has probably been the most restrictive compared to the policies
guiding sentencing in the several states. Even in the federal context, of
course, courts found ways to extend discounts to offenders with extraor-
dinary "family ties and responsibilities." Now with the imprimatur from
the Supreme Court in Booker, federal courts are more likely to award
discounts out of compassion for the defendant's family responsibilities.
Moreover, to the extent the federal courts conform to the pre-Booker
guidance from the Sentencing Commission, it bears emphasis that the
federal courts address only a small fraction of the cases in the national
criminal justice system. And as we saw earlier in Part I, many states ex-
pressly tell judges to calibrate a sentence based, in part, on one's family
ties and responsibilities in sentencing offenders.
Thus, offenders who are parents or caregivers to spouses or elders
may, depending on the jurisdiction, be in a position to receive a sharp
discount from the punishment they might otherwise receive. Not only
does this facilitate ad hoc disparities between offenders who are other-
wise similarly situated across cases, it also hastens to create inequalities
between persons involved in the very same offense.348 These disparities
require justification.
An offender-so long as he satisfies the competence criterion for
punishment349-anticipates (or should reasonably be expected to antici-
pate) a risk that he will be punished in accordance with extant sentencing
norms. If we make that presumption, which is not an unreasonable one,
there is nothing unfair-putting aside proportionality issues-about the
offender seeing that risk of punishment materialize. No unfairness to the
defendant attaches to punishing persons for conduct they could, by hy-
pothesis, control with consequences they can reasonably anticipate. °
347. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
348. See, e.g., supra Part I.D.1 (discussing Johnson case at text accompanying note 151).
349. As previously urged by one of us, the competence criterion must be satisfied at the time of
the criminal offense, the trial, and during the punishment to satisfy the moral requirement that pun-
ishment be intelligible to the offender. Specifically, the offender must have freely undertaken the
criminal action and known (or reasonably should have known) that his conduct was unlawful at the
time he committed the crime; at the time of adjudication, the offender had to either freely and know-
ingly plead guilty or have the competence to assist in the preparation of his case for trial; and at the
time at which the punishment is inflicted, he had to be able to understand that he is being punished for
his unlawful actions. See Markel, supra note 277, at 1445-46.
350. Of course, reducing the sentence or precluding culpability may be entirely appropriate if the
offender had diminished capacity, or if the crime was committed under duress because of a relation-
ship with the primary offender or because of a history of domestic violence within the relationship.
Similarly, if there can be a causal connection drawn between the feature of a person that elicits some-
one's compassion (i.e., the mother was stealing to feed her children) and the choice to commit the
crime, then that too might be a reason for a legitimate departure. Or, if there is some other reason
related to the merits of the case that warrants less punishment: for example, the offender has reduced
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The resulting disparities in sentences across otherwise similarly situated
defendants at least shift the burden of justification for discounts onto
their proponents. A person who commits a crime can reasonably foresee
that if prosecuted and punished, his punishment will affect not only him-
self but also his family. Just about everyone acknowledges that extend-
ing a discount to an offender for a reason unrelated to his crime consti-
tutes an undeserved windfall. Of course, the fact that offenders do not
deserve sentencing discounts does not mean that accommodations should
never be made-there may be compelling nondesert-related reasons to
extend such accommodations, and we discuss some of them below in the
context of the irreplaceable caregiver.
As we adverted to earlier, giving benefits to defendants with family
ties in the currency of sentencing discounts will also, on the margin, in-
centivize this class of defendants to seek out greater criminal opportuni-
ties, or they will be recruited or pressed into action by others. Still, we
think there are some important exceptions that may override these trou-
blesome normative costs (particularly with respect to innocent third
party harms). We therefore address what those circumstances are and
how to deal with them in Section C, where we examine how the use of
alternative means may be available to reduce these normatively signifi-
cant costs.
B. Family Ties Benefits that Survive Scrutiny
There are various places in the criminal justice system where the
state has the opportunity to accommodate family interests either without
incurring the troublesome normative costs we identify or where a com-
pelling state interest exists that might justify providing the benefit. Addi-
tionally, there are domains where the state can take an interest in vindi-
cating family interests, as long as the means adopted do not offend our
normative framework.
1. Child-Sensitive Arrest Policies
A child-sensitive arrest policy is a good example of a situation
where our normative cost structure is not implicated.351 Arranging to ar-
the social cost of his wrongdoing by coming forward to the government. Absent these considerations,
we can insist on a meaningful distinction between factors about someone's background that, in the
main, should not mitigate the sentence, and factors surrounding someone's criminal action with which
an attractive vision of criminal justice is properly concerned. Id. at 1466-67. Of course, all this as-
sumes there are no justifications or excuses for the offender either.
351. Raeder, supra note 199, at 8 (citation omitted) ("Where are the children? Although it is es-
timated that nearly 20 percent of women are arrested in the presence of their children, relatively few
police departments have developed protocols for child-sensitive arrest practices. Whether or not a
woman had her child with her when she was arrested, jurisdictions vary widely about obligations of
police and Child Services. Thus, while not typically thought of as a function of defense counsel, it is
important to find out if the female defendant has minor children, and, if so, their location, because
many of these women are not in intact families. In other words, counsel should assume that many
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rest an individual outside the presence of his minor children, while ensur-
ing that the children have safe and comfortable living arrangements after
the arrest, is a family ties benefit or accommodation in the sense that it
might be more administratively burdensome for police or prosecutors.
But the four costs we identified in Part II are otherwise irrelevant.
Therefore, the presumption against such a benefit is rebutted, and we be-
lieve the policy is an appropriate one for the criminal justice system to
pursue.
Even in situations where the normative costs are implicated, how-
ever, there can still be compelling state interests that can justify the bene-
fits, like concern for prisoner reentry or reducing grave harms to inno-
cent third parties. We examine how this works in the context of prison
policies immediately below.
2. Prison Policies
Our normative framework requires a fairly nuanced approach to the
evaluation of prison policies. Assessing the appropriateness of prison
policies' promotion of family interests cannot be done monolithically.
That is because each individual policy we mentioned when elaborating
upon this area of the criminal justice system in Part I risks implicating
different normative considerations, varying our ultimate appraisal of
each particular policy. Accordingly, we cannot present a unified ap-
proach to prison policies as such. At some very basic level, it is under-
standable that our punitive practices aim to take account of family ties;
we often harm entire families for one member's wrongdoing by punish-
ing and removing the wrongdoer from the home. Still, our normative
framework will furnish some reasons to think that there is an unfairness
and inequality associated with state promotion of family ties in the penal
context. Moreover, we think many of the policies can be recrafted in
terms that are neutral to family status.
However, we think there is one central difference between most of
the other family ties benefits discussed and the set of practices we group
together as prison policies: a potentially compelling state interest in of-
fender reentry that may be appropriately vindicated through benefiting
those with family ties (though not necessarily only those with family ties).
In the context of corrections, we cannot ignore that the family can play a
central role in facilitating successful prisoner reentry, one of the most
women will not have voluntarily revealed to the police that they have children or disclosed their
whereabouts, given the realistic fear that their children may become involved in the foster care system,
triggering the ASFA timeline leading to termination of family rights. Ascertaining that a woman's
children are safe will both let her focus on assisting in her defense, and ensure that she does not face
child endangerment charges if no one is at home or someone unreliable is watching the children."); id.
(encouraging lawyer to see if there "are any programs that will house both mother and child"). For
support, Raeder cites to CLARE M. NOLAN, CAL. RESEARCH BUREAU, CHILDREN OF ARRESTED
PARENTS: STRATEGIES TO IMPROVE THEIR SAFETY AND WELLBEING (2003), available at http://www.
library.ca.gov/crb/03/11/03-O11.pdf.
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important, if often overlooked, functions of our penal system. While the
criminal justice system's interest in offenders prior to the service of a sen-
tence must focus on the inculpation of the guilty and the exculpation of
the innocent-a task routinely undermined by the provision of benefits
for family ties-once an offender is sentenced and moral responsibility
for a crime is placed on the right shoulders, our penal system can right-
fully draw upon the resources of the family to help reintegrate an of-
fender back into society and to encourage rehabilitation while incarcer-
ated. It is in the penal context where the interests in rehabilitation and
reintegration might trump the considerations within our normative
framework-and where the family might be entitled to benefits precisely
because it is doing work that is subcontracted out by the state. As we
discussed in our introductory remarks to Part II, one of the strong argu-
ments for having the state benefit the family arises when the family is do-
ing work the state very much wants done-but the task can be accom-
plished more cheaply and effectively by drawing upon the natural
resources within the family. Nonetheless, our normative framework re-
mains useful in analyzing a host of prison policies.
For example, in trying to assess the furlough policies we recounted
in Part I, our normative framework demands an inquiry into how such
policies could potentially implicate an ideal of fairness or equality. Why
should those with family members get more days off from their prison
sentences than those without family? Although our other normative
considerations do not seem applicable to furloughs, our norm of equality
seems offended by policies that favor those with family members.
Similarly, visitation policies that may prevent certain inmates from
receiving visitation merely because a set of visitors is not within the defi-
nition of family membership352 seems very unfair to those without family
recognized by the state. Because courts allow substantial discretion to
prison officials in devising visitation policies,353 there can be inequities
that escape notice. Accordingly, the normative framework we offer here
indicates that prisons ought to devise such policies with care not to ex-
tend benefits to those with families that cannot accrue to those without
families. It offends a sense of justice that inmates with families should
get differential treatment such that policies discriminate against those
352. FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, POLICY STATEMENT 7300.4A(a), VISITING REGULATIONS; see
also GLASER, supra note 180, at 362; AM. CORRECTIONAL ASS'N, supra note 180, at 542; AM. PRISON
ASS'N, supra note 180, at 342; COMM'N ON ACCREDITATION FOR CORRECTIONS, supra note 180, at 68;
FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, PROGRAM STATEMENT 5270.07, § 541.12(5), INMATE RIGHTS AND
RESPONSIBILITIES (1987).
353. See, e.g., Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 585 (1984); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547-48
(1979); In re Dyer, 20 P.3d 907, 912 (Wash. 2001) (finding that prison authorities have wide discretion
to administer an extended visitation policy because "[i]t is not in the best interest of the courts to in-
volve themselves in the 'day-to-day management of prisons, often squandering judicial resources with
little offsetting benefit to anyone. Courts ought to afford appropriate deference and flexibility to state
officials trying to manage a volatile environment."' (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 482
(1995))).
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without families. To the extent that discrimination against those without
families implicates our third normative consideration, our presumption
against family ties benefits has some-albeit limited-force.
Yet, in the post-sentence phase of the criminal justice system, we
cannot help but conclude that certain compelling interests may counter-
act our worries about family ties benefits such that our presumption
should be deemed rebutted as a general matter. First, only one of our
four normative considerations is implicated here-the equality prong.
Moreover, we acknowledge the role that relations of care giving can play
in the corrections system. The Federal Bureau of Prisons embraces fam-
ily ties in its policy statements because they can be especially rehabilita-
tive.354 We acknowledge that family reunification after incarceration may
serve as an appropriate predicate to favor the family in certain prison
policies. Accordingly, our sympathy for some of the "pro-family" argu-
ments we adumbrated at the beginning of Part II are given effect in this
context. In particular, the compelling state interest of rehabilitation
counters our presumption that family ties should not be promoted by the
criminal justice system.
That said, our preferred strategy here would be to look at function
instead of status. If there are ways of crafting the relevant policies in
ways that satisfy the goals of prisoner reentry without reliance on family
status (because family status may be both under- and overinclusive355),
then we should look at those ways rather than using the imperfect proxy
of "family" to achieve these goals. An additional way in which we think
the state can satisfy the imperatives of punishment is to realize that the
coercion the state metes out as part of its punishment need not be done
in temporally contiguous ways. If we think of punishment in terms of
units, it might be better to ensure that offenders spend five days a week
working at home and the remaining two days in a carceral facility. That
might lengthen the period in which the punishment occurs, but it might
also serve society's interest in ameliorating innocent third party harms
and achieving successful prisoner reentry. If courts or prison officials are
given the guided discretion to decide when a punishment-units approach
should be embraced, then the offender is still being coerced-and for so-
cial purposes, not to the benefit of the offender. (The social meaning of
this coercion can be expressed more clearly by limiting the offender's
movements when not serving time in a carceral facility.)
The compelling state interest analysis is especially relevant in prison
policies related to the placement of inmates within the correctional sys-
tem.356 Family ties are routinely considered when establishing an in-
354. See BUREAU OF PRISONS, POLICY STATEMENT 7300.4A(1).
355. See supra Part I.F. ("Identifying a Family Ties Benefit: Some Difficulties").
356. BRENDA MCGOWAN & KAREN BLUMENTHAL, WHY PUNISH THE CHILDREN? A STUDY OF
CHILDREN OF WOMEN PRISONERS 50-53 (1978); Philip M. Genty, Damage to Family Relationships as
a Collateral Consequence of Parental Incarceration, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1671, 1680 (2003).
[Vol. 20071218
HeinOnline  -- 2007 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1218 2007
CRIMINAL JUSTICE
mate's "place of service." '357 Although this effort to use prison placement
to help families might be seen as a benefit for family ties-and might also
implicate the third of our normative considerations (like furlough and
visitation policies)-we think the compelling state interest in rehabilita-
tion rebuts the presumption against such benefits altogether. Still, our
normative consideration of nondiscrimination against those without fam-
ily counsels for sensitivity in designing such benefits: those with other
good and rehabilitative reasons for visits, furloughs, and specific place-
ment needs should be heeded so as to minimize favoritism for those with
families.
There is yet another. potential compelling state interest that also
counsels for greater toleration of family ties benefits in the penal system:
the interests of extremely vulnerable third parties. As we highlighted in
Part I, some innovative programs have been created to help mothers and
their children stay together, notwithstanding a prison sentence that
would otherwise keep a mother away from her children."8 To be sure,
the focus on providing only women with these alternatives could be said
to implicate our first normative consideration insofar as such programs
reinforce traditional gender roles and stereotypes (i.e., that parenting is
primarily a woman's responsibility, and that men are entitled to less con-
sideration for their status as fathers). Moreover, our third normative
consideration is potentially offended because women who are not preg-
nant or mothers do not get the same "discount" in their prison terms; and
men are almost completely excluded from such programs as the federal
MINT program and California's Pregnant and Parenting Women's Al-
ternative Sentencing Program Act.359 Finally, our fourth normative con-
sideration is implicated because such programs could set up incentives
for mothers to be targeted for criminal recruitment because they may be
afforded especially light sentences.
Nevertheless, we think these programs may yet be defensible in ser-
vice of the potential irreplaceability of a caregiver, something we discuss
at length in the next Section on sentencing discounts that may survive the
scrutiny of our normative framework. We would recommend, however,
that such programs become nongendered, in that they be made available
to men who, for example, have sole custody of infants.
A final example is the location of prisons and the assignment of
prisoners within a prison system. If prisons are built in remote rural ar-
eas, or if prisoners are sent to prisons far from their families, then it will
be harder for the families of most prisoners to come visit; equally diffi-
cult may be access to the therapy or social resources we want to see
357. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 994(d) (2000).
358. These programs are particularly important because of the disproportionate harm that incar-
ceration can visit upon mothers and their children. For example, women are more likely to face ter-
mination of parental rights if sent to prison than men, because women are more likely to have sole
custody of their children and therefore not to have ready access to another suitable caregiver.
359. 28 U.S.C. § 994(d).
No. 4]
HeinOnline  -- 2007 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1219 2007
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2007
available to offenders as part of the coercive punishment they endure at
the hands of the state.36 It seems perfectly appropriate for states to con-
sider ease of access to those who may facilitate reentry (whether family
or friends) when making decisions regarding prison construction or
prison assignment after conviction; such policies do not offend our four
normative considerations and simply prevent the intimates of inmates
from paying extra costs and forcing offenders to serve "harder" time.36'
C. Sites Where Alternative Measures Are Possible
1. Time-Deferred Sentencing for Irreplaceable Caregivers
Although we have advanced the unusual position-taken primarily
and unpopularly by the federal government's sentencing guidelines362 -
that ordinarily a defendant's family ties and responsibilities should not
serve as a basis for a lighter sentence, we are sensitive to the serious ar-
guments made by proponents of sentencing departures for those with sig-
nificant care-giving responsibilities. These arguments merit attention
and amplification.
Primarily, the proponents of these departures can point to the an-
ticipated harms to innocent third parties as a reasonable basis to distin-
guish the sentences "caregivers" should get from the ones who do not
have those responsibilities.363 In other words, they can reject the claim
that offenders with urgent family responsibilities are similarly situated to
360. McGOWAN & BLUMENTHAL, supra note 356, at 50-53; Genty, supra note 356, at 1680.
361. Kelly Bedard & Eric Helland, The Location of Women's Prisons and the Deterrence Effect of
"Harder" Time, 24 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 147-49 (2004). Notably, Bedard and Helland are able to
show that the "harder" time actually serves a deterrent effect; so what may look like a "tax" on fami-
lies may in the end be an indirect way to keep the family together. Id. at 148-49. They conclude:
"[t]he evidence suggests that an increase in average prison distance leads to a decrease in crime. A 40-
mile increase in the average distance to a female penitentiary reduces female violent crime, property
crime and murder rates by 6.9, 2.3 and 13.3%, respectively." Id. at 165.
These results are very provocative and suggest that a "family sensitive" location policy may actually
recommend having the state place women as far away from their families as possible as an indirect way
to deter their participation in crime. Although a sustained inquiry into family taxes is beyond the
scope of this article, the Bedard and Helland results suggest how empirical work could usefully illumi-
nate the relationship between family ties and criminal justice. Still, it is important to acknowledge that
Bedard and Helland appreciate the externalities associated with using remote prison locations for
their deterrent effect and do not ultimately endorse using "harder" time as a way to keep families to-
gether:
The evidence presented in this paper suggests remote prison locations and/or restricted visitation
as low cost crime deterrence mechanisms. However, our estimates do not quantify the welfare
implications of this change. Increasing the distance to women's prisons (or an outright ban on
visitation) has clear externalities. There is ample evidence that a mother's incarceration has ad-
verse effects on her children. It therefore seems quite likely, although not certain, that even more
severe restrictions on maternal visitation would exacerbate an already bad situation for the chil-
dren of female inmates. As such, the secondary effects therefore render the long-run general
equilibrium effects of prison location on crime rates ambiguous.
Id. at 166 (citation omitted).
362. See Raeder, Gender and Sentencing, supra note 21, at 908-09; Raeder, supra note 147, at 251;
Weinstein, supra note 147, at 169.
363. See, e.g., Genty, supra note 356, at 1680.
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those offenders without pressing family responsibilities. Insisting on such
a distinction is reasonable, they might add, because, in a particular case
or class of cases, the private harm of removing a caregiver's support to an
innocent third party outweighs the public gain from continuous incar-
ceration.3" In this respect, the judge need not be expressing any claim
about the diminished moral culpability of the offender who receives the
sentencing discount. Rather, the claim is simply that we recognize that
this offender deserves no breaks, but we think the weight of these other
considerations (i.e., the harms to innocent third parties) should trump.
To the extent this departure disrupts equality norms, the proponents say,
such departures are justifiable.
The justification may take several forms. First, there is an argument
that depriving children of parents in order to incarcerate the parents for
purpose of punishment is itself a criminogenic (crime-creating) policy.365
Second, notwithstanding the culpability of the offenders and the harm
suffered by the victims of their crimes, that harm is already done; the
state should not inflict its own harms on the offender's children or other
members benefiting from the offender's care giving. Indeed, if we urge
offenders to bear responsibility for the reasonably foreseeable conse-
quences of their actions, so too must social planners who create institu-
tions of punishment bear such responsibility.
By that logic, our compassion and concern should properly extend
to harm imposed on innocent third parties by the state's punishments.3"
We are therefore willing to agree that compelling circumstances arise
when an offender is the sole and irreplaceable caregiver for minors or for
aged or ailing persons with whom the defendant has an established rela-
tionship of care giving. Here we abjure any reason to privilege the famil-
ial relationship in the context of any accommodations made to "irre-
placeable caregivers." What matters from our vantage point is that the
defendant is serving a critical social role as irreplaceable caregiver.367
Ordinarily, however, we think that harms to innocent third parties
should be ameliorated through the institutions of distributive justice, not
criminal justice. In an attractive polity, a child without a parent should
receive state and communal aid regardless of whether the parent is not
364. See generally Darryl Brown, Cost-Benefit Analysis in Criminal Law, 92 CAL. L. REV. 323,
343-48 (2003) [hereinafter Brown, Cost-Benefit Analysis]; Darryl Brown, Third Party Interests in
Criminal Law, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1383,1407 (2002).
365. Cf. Paul Butler, Race-Based Jury Nullification: Case-in-Chief, 30 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 911,
919 (1997) (arguing that "[parental] training prevents more crime than the deterrent effect of
prison"). On the related claim that lengthy terms of incarceration are criminogenic and counterpro-
ductive, see Brown, Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 364, at 346.
366. See Dan Markel, State, Be Not Proud: A Retributivist Defense of the Commutation of Death
Row and the Abolition of the Death Penalty, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407, 459 (2005); Cass R. Sun-
stein & Adrian Vermeule, Is Capital Punishment Morally Required? Acts, Omissions, and Life-Life
Tradeoffs, 58 STAN. L. REV. 703,711-16 (2005).
367. We recognize our approach may incur slightly higher "information costs" by abandoning the
simple proxy of family status, but this approach in practice is not likely to be more costly than the ex-
tant costs of verifying the reality of familial care-giving responsibilities.
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around due to sickness, death, or imprisonment. But where the state has
persistently failed its obligations of distributive justice, it would not be
unreasonable to tailor the punishment of "caregiver" offenders in a way
that mitigates third-party harms without simultaneously elevating the of-
fender's status in violation of the principle of equal justice under law.
For that reason, we think, assuming the crime was severe enough
that some form of incarceration is deemed necessary, it may be appropri-
ate for legislatures to authorize greater use of time-delayed sentencing to
offenders with irreplaceable care-giving responsibilities.368 For example,
where an offender is the irreplaceable caregiver for children, the of-
fender in a time-delayed sentencing scheme would defer his punishment
until after the children reach the age of majority or until alternative and
feasible care can be arranged.369 In the case of caring for aging parents or
ill spouses, the sentence may be delayed until the person receiving the
care is deceased, improved in health, or able to obtain care from another
person or entity. During the period that the sentence is deferred, the of-
fender's freedom of movement would be dramatically limited so that
only work and necessary chores (i.e., taking one's child to the doctor)
would be permitted. Electronic bracelets or other tracking devices could
be used to ensure compliance. Additionally, during the time of deferral,
the state could attach extensive community service obligations or other
release conditions such as drug testing. Failure to abide by the condi-
tions would lead to more severe punishment than would be experienced
absent the deferral of the sentence to minimize possible exploitation by
the defendant.
Of course, this option should not be restricted to only those with a
blood relationship or marriage. If there is an established relationship of
care giving, then that should be the critical issue. On the other hand, this
option should not be available when the defendant has already commit-
ted a crime either with or against the child, or has exhibited a propensity
to harm his family (e.g., prior convictions for reckless endangerment of a
child), or is such a dangerous criminal that it would be foolish for society
to let him remain free. Simply put, there might be some crimes whose
violations would render an offender ineligible for this kind of differenti-
ated-sentencing scheme. But there are ways of using alternative punish-
ments that still, by their coercion or deprivation, communicate to the of-
368. Of course, we also think there are a variety of noncarceral punishments that might be appro-
priate for many nonviolent crimes. One of us (Markel) has written on this earlier. See Markel, supra
note 277, at 1452-74; Markel, supra note 283.
369. To prevent the offender from trying to delay sentencing indefinitely, we might want to re-
strict the length of the deferral. Thus, if the crime occurs at T1, and the defender only has one child
who is four years old, the defendant would be permitted to defer sentencing for fourteen years. This
limit would apply even if the defendant subsequently had more children after T1. During those four-
teen years, the offender would effectively be on probation, such that if the offender violated other
conditions of the delayed sentencing, the offender would then go to prison. This does not eliminate
the imposition of harms on children but it reduces, in part, the likelihood of such harm being realized.
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fender the norms of equal liberty under law without wreaking (as much)
havoc on the lives of innocent third parties.
As should be clear from the foregoing, we are very sympathetic to
the concerns of innocent third parties affected by draconian sentencing
policies. Myrna Raeder, for example, has forcefully illustrated that our
current sentencing regime has particularly harsh consequences for incar-
cerated mothers and their children.37° But recognizing the consequences
of a sentencing regime is not the same as effectively condemning it in
whole cloth. For one thing, a caregiver who is also a serial killer should
not receive a sentencing discount simply because of the caregiver's status
as a mother. Rather, the critical issue here seems to be that many of the
crimes for which women are convicted (providing low-level assistance to
a drug trafficking ring, for example) do not deserve the extremely harsh
sentences that are currently imposed for that activity. Thus, many of
Raeder's very legitimate concerns about the "gendered differences in
criminality" '371 could be taken into account when we properly consider
such factors as the nature of the criminal conduct, the criminal history of
the defendant, and so on, in making a sentencing decision for an individ-
ual defendant, or a class of defendants similarly situated. Further, many
of the harms to innocent third parties can be addressed by ameliorating
the sentences imposed for nonviolent crimes across the board, which are
the crimes some suggest that women are more likely to commit in any
event. But this analysis, and the prescriptions that flow from it, do not
require the extension of sentencing discounts simply because of family
ties or responsibilities.
In sum, we recognize that punishment (especially in the form of in-
carceration) affects innocent third parties. Those innocent third parties,
however, are not connected to the defendant through family status alone.
Thus, to the extent legal officials should tailor a punishment in recogni-
tion of its deleterious impact on innocent third parties, the law should re-
ject a categorical effort to accommodate only those innocent third parties
who are family members.372 Second, we doubt that the criminal justice
system should be the first resort to resolve the social needs of families in
distress. But in those situations where distressed-family problems arise
with no alternative resources available to ameliorate the situation, it is
preferable to establish more options including time-deferred sentencing
or, for example, custodial options where the sole caregiver and the cared-
370. See, e.g., Raeder, supra note 199, at 8-9. Indeed, Raeder herself typically centers her critique
on the costs incarceration poses on nonviolent offenders.
371. See id. at 3-8.
372. A similar point may be made about the introduction of victim impact or defendant impact
evidence. For example, some jurisdictions limit who may offer statements on behalf of victims or de-
fendants to family members only. See text accompanying notes 178-79. Although we are personally
divided over the desirability of victim or defendant impact evidence, we all agree that statutes or poli-
cies that permit only family members to offer statements are too narrowly cabined.
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for individuals can live together, assuming that the offender's offense was
not directed against his children (or others) in the first instance.373
2. Greater Access to Phone Calls in Prison
Another situation where alternative measures may be feasible in-
volves access to telecommunication options in prisons. Recently, the
New York Times editorial page argued for the end of New York state's
prison practice requiring inmates to call their families collect (and then
collecting a commission from the inflated rates of those phone calls).
The Times contended that the "billing strategy erodes fragile family ties
by discouraging prisoners from keeping in touch with loved ones-
especially small children-who often have difficulty visiting because they
live hundreds of miles away." '374 The Times has called the collect-call pol-
icy (dominant in many state375-but not federal-prisons) "a hidden tax
on prisoners' families, who tend to be among the poorest in American
society"; indeed, "inmates' families must often choose between paying
phone bills or paying the rent." '376 One might wonder if there is more to
excessive phone rates in prison than merely successful lobbying and in-
centives generation by phone companies.377 Madeleine Severin explains
that "[t]o some extent excessive prison phone rates reflect nationwide
ambivalence about prison costs and prisons in general [because, accord-
ing to some,] ... the phone rates alleviate a burden on taxpayers" who
are already "paying an enormous amount to warehouse, feed, get cable
373. Raeder refers to these programs as options for mothers with children. See generally Raeder,
supra note 147; Raeder, Gender and Sentencing, supra note 21.
374. Editorial, Please Deposit All Your Money, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2005, at A18.
375. California's state prisons have perverse phone systems, as do many other states. See Justin
Carver, An Efficiency Analysis of Contracts for the Provision of Telephone Services to Prisons, 54 FED.
COMM. L.J. 391, 392-93 (2002) ("With respect to the financial incentives, it is estimated that inmate
calls generate a billion dollars or more in annual revenue. One prison pay phone can generate $15,000
annually; a typical public pay phone generates only one-fifth of that amount. Faced with the possibil-
ity of such revenues, MCI installed its inmate phone service in prisons throughout California at no
charge to the state. As part of the deal, in exchange for the right to be the sole provider of telephone
services to prisoners, MCI pays the California Department of Corrections a thirty-two percent share of
all revenue derived from the calls.").
376. See also Editorial, Keeping in Touch with a Parent in Prison, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2004, at
A14.
377. See Travis, supra note 186, at 37 ("The high price of collect calls reflects sweetheart ar-
rangements between the phone companies and corrections agencies, under which the prisons receive
kickbacks for every collect call, about 40 to 60 cents of every dollar. This arrangement translates into
a substantial revenue source for corrections budgets. In 2001, for example, California garnered $35
million, based on $85 million of total revenue generated from prison calls. Some states require, by
statute or policy, that these revenues pay for programs for inmates. Most states simply deposit this
money into the general budget for their department of corrections."). For more on the economic
background of these policies, see Carver, supra note 375, at 397-98 ("[Tjhe state receives the benefit of
having a [telephone] service provided, but does not have the corresponding burden of paying for that
benefit. That burden falls on the families of the inmates.").
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television and other perks to these criminals." '378 Yet the counter argu-
ments are clear:
Inmates' families counter that they, not their convicted loved ones,
pay the bills and the rates are unfairly punishinginnocent people.
Families and legislatures further assert that maintenance of familial
and other relationships between inmates and the outside world
serves an important penological interest in lowering recidivism
rates.379
Ultimately, we too think that prisons could move away from the ex-
tant collect-call policy in the state prisons. But such a design shift should
be justified in terms that are family neutral, because the desire to
strengthen family ties is a proxy for other state interests, much like the
use of certain pretrial release conditions that assessed family ties in a par-
ticular venue.380 We have some reason to believe that reforming collect-
call policies in state prisons will help families maintain contact-and con-
tribute to the flourishing and, at least potentially, the rehabilitation of all
inmates, not just those with family ties.38'
3. A Note on Alternative Measures: Function, Not Status
We think it bears emphasis that the accommodations to family ties
that we discussed in this Section might better be viewed as doing away
with a "tax" on all offenders than affording a real benefit to families. For
instance, the availability of fairly priced phone calls will redound to the
benefit of all prisoners, even if some inmates with families may benefit
more than others. Similarly, time-deferred sentencing for irreplaceable
caregivers may benefit families more often than others, but we would not
want to see the benefit of time-deferred sentencing restricted to those
who give care only for their family members. This is a perfect example of
where helping families need not offend our normative considerations-
and we have no trouble signing on to policies that help families in this
benign way, affording a benefit in a nondiscriminatory fashion. In short,
we are generally skeptical toward distributing family ties benefits prior to
and including determinations of criminal liability and most instances of
378. Madeleine Severin, Is There a Winning Argument Against Excessive Rates for Collect Calls
from Prisoners?, 25 CARDOZO L. REv. 1469, 1473 (2004).
379. Id.; see also Travis, supra note 186, at 37 ("In a study, conducted by the Florida House of
Representatives Corrections Committee, family members reported spending an average amount of
$69.19 per month accepting collect phone calls. According to this report, '[sleveral family members
surveyed stated that, although they wanted to continue to maintain contact with the inmate, they were
'forced to remove their names from the inmate's approved calling list because they simply could not
afford to accept the calls."' (citation omitted)).
380. See supra Part I.
381. Cf. Genty, supra note 356, at 1674 ("Of those [incarcerated] parents who have phone contact
[with their children], only about half of the mothers and forty percent of the fathers in state prison
make at least monthly phone calls. The figures are much better for parents in federal prison, with ap-
proximately eighty percent of the mothers and seventy percent of the fathers making phone calls at
least once a month.").
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sentencing. When it comes to sentencing of irreplaceable caregivers and
matters affecting the incarceration of an offender, however, we are more
inclined to reengineer the current panoply of family ties benefits in terms
that are neutral to family status and instead focus on promoting those
functions delineated by established relationships of care giving.
IV. CONCLUSION
As we noted earlier, we believe that there very well may be appro-
priate places for the modern liberal state to recognize and accommodate
the significance of family life. But the criminal justice system, with a few
exceptions that we sketched above, in general is not one of them. While
our criminal justice system reflects many values, surely the critical and
dominant ones are the promotion of accurate and fair verdicts and the
protection of citizens from serious wrongful harm. Privileging certain in-
dividuals because of their membership in a state-denominated family
unit threatens these core functions. When we excuse certain classes of
individuals from prosecution entirely, solely on account of a family rela-
tionship, we both allow potentially dangerous individuals to escape pun-
ishment and create a more attractive class of accomplices. When we al-
low a husband to prevent his wife from offering relevant testimony on
the witness stand that may exculpate someone else, we inhibit the truth-
seeking function of a criminal trial. When we allow a wife to claim a
privilege, but not a partner in a same-sex relationship, we subtly but in-
evitably convey our disapprobation of those relationships. Although this
seemingly simple story can get more complicated, we have argued that it
rarely gets so complicated as to sanction the privileging of family ties
over our commitment to doing justice in a sphere in which the liberty and
lives of women and men are at stake.
To be sure, the troubling normative costs we associate with these
family ties privileges and benefits require verification; and, we hope
other scholars will participate in finding out the empirical costs of these
family ties benefits. It is possible that comparing crime rates in jurisdic-
tions that have these benefits with those that do not (both domestically
and abroad) will yield interesting results. Some apparent benefits to
families in the criminal justice system, for instance, may prove to be self-
defeating.3"2 Other seemingly "private" family ties benefits might dem-
onstrate tangible general public advantages.383 And still others are less
382. Cf., e.g., Bedard & Helland, supra note 361, at 165-66.
383. Elizabeth Scott and Amitai Aviram shared the reaction that average citizens may view cer-
tain family ties benefits as ways by which the state tries to induce compliance with the overall legal
regime. Cf. Robinson & Darley, supra note 234, at 497-99; Robinson, supra note 234, at 15-17. In
other words, absent these benefits and privileges, confidence in the legitimacy of the criminal justice
system would erode precipitously. In some such situations, prosecutors might end up exercising their
discretion to decline exacting "full justice" because they would face the threat of jury nullification.
These suggestions are provocative-as far as they go. But we think that the elimination of the unjusti-
fied family ties benefits can be explained in a moral vocabulary (accuracy, equality, crime-reduction)
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susceptible to empirical "verification" because the benefits involve
tradeoffs between competing normative values, such as the family ties
benefits that pose risks to relevant equality norms."
Although we are open minded about the possible empirical effects
these various benefits cause, we are, at least right now, especially doubt-
ful that the family needs systematic support through the use of criminal
justice benefits in order to enable and ensure its flourishing.385 We rec-
ognize that the tension between loyalty to the family and loyalty to the
state is real, and that the choices faced by families like the Sheinbeins are
agonizing. But when conflicts between family and the criminal justice
system arise, especially prior to the determination of sentence, the need
to prevent adverse consequences and attacks on our fundamental values
should generally prevail over the need to promote family preservation
and "harmony." Indeed, when family relationships involve criminal
complicity, those families seem already in disrepair and are likely unde-
serving of state protection, notwithstanding the relatively minor taxes the
state may put on familial-status relationships inside and outside the
criminal justice system.386
Although our presumption against family ties benefits can be rebut-
ted, we believe the scrutiny called for under the presumption is war-
ranted-and entail curtailing some of the benefits or privileges the crimi-
nal justice system already recognizes, and being cautious to new ones.
that would resonate with much of the population. Just as government has successfully disturbed and
altered social norms involving racism or sexism, so too could institutions of criminal justice shape so-
cial norms and not just uncritically reflect them. In any event, it may turn out this concern about non-
compliance is exaggerated; we need empirical work to study whether jurisdictions without family ties
benefits are suffering from higher crime rates than those with them and whether those jurisdictions
that have either adopted or abandoned such benefits found any noticeable differences within their
own jurisdiction.
384. For example, the punishment discounts given to parents, on the one hand, rupture equality
norms and, on the other hand, may work to reduce harms that young children may endure in the ab-
sence of a parent.
385. For instance, we are aware that families often help in the reintegration of offenders into soci-
ety, but we doubt that families would refuse to offer that help in the absence of family-specific privi-
leges extended during the course of investigating, prosecuting, and punishing the predicate criminal
activity.
386. See Dan Markel, Jennifer M. Collins & Ethan J. Leib, Criminal Justice and the Problem of
Family Taxes (2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors) (examining various burdens-e.g.,
omissions liability, vicarious liability, sentence enhancements-placed by the state on those offenders
with familial connections to the crime in the criminal justice system).
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